Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule
depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority'
problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout
and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens
have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative
is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that
the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social
welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to
majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority
group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout
within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority
group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minorities
