King-Farlow, John

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DISCUSSION 91 th e o ry of te s ting  is  a  p re lim in a ry to  his  th e o ry o f c o rro b o ra tio n ,  a n d  th a t this  la tte r th e o ry is  a  s o lu tion  to  the  p ro b le m s : h o w d o  we  kn o w a n d  wha t s hou ld  we  be lie ve ?  Bu t P o p p e r trie s  to  s o lve  the  p ro b le m : how d o  we  le a rn?  His  a ns we r is : by critic iz ing o u r e rro rs .  Th e  ide a  th a t a nyth ing  we  s a y ca n  be  a  s ub je c t fo r a  c ritica l e xa m in a tio n  is  the  c o r e  o f P o p p e r's  ph ilo s oph ica l a ttitude . Mr. S tove  vie ws  P o p p e r's  re c o m m e n d a tio n  o f the  c ritica l a ttitude  a s  a  p a rt o f his  th e o ry o f c o rro b o ra tio n ,  a nd  h e  trie s  to  s e e  whe the r it is  a  ne ce s s a ry o r a n  e limina ble  p a rt o f it. He  is  thus  pu tting  the  c a rt b e fo re  th e  hors e . P o p p e r ta ke s  the  c ritica l a ttitude  a s  funda me n ta l.  C o rro b o ra tio n ,  a cco rd ing  to  h im, is  o n e  s o rt o f h a p p e n in g  in  the  h is to ry o f s c ie nce  which  re s u lts  fro m  this  a ttitude  a nd  to  which, in  tu rn , this  a ttitude  s hou ld  b e  a pplie d . Mr.  S tove  ta ke s  it fo r g ra n te d  tha t, to  P o p p e r,  a  c o rro b o ra te d  th e o ry is  c o rro b o ra te d  b e c a u s e  it is  tru e  o r like ly to  b e  true  o r c re d ib le . As  I u n d e rs ta n d  it, P o p p e r's  p h ilo s o p h y con ta ins  the  ide a  tha t we  s hou ld  ta ke  no tice  o f a  we ll-c o rro b o ra te d  th e o ry a nd  try to  e xpla in  the  fa c t th a t it wa s  c o rro b o ra te d --a n d  a  va rie ty o f e xp la na tions  m a y be  a va ila b le , e a ch  o f which  s hou ld  b e  critica lly e xa mine d . Un d o u b te d ly,  P o p p e r's  ph ilo s ophy is  c o n n e c te d  with  a  long-s ta nd ing  tra d ition ; bu t it is  the  critica l tra d ition  o f Ga lile o  a nd  Boyle ,  of Ka n t a n d  Whe we ll,  ra th e r th a n  the  induc tivis t tra d ition  o f Ba c o n ,  Ne wto n ,  a nd  Mill. Unive rs ity o f Ho n g  Kong .  T H R E E  Q UE S TIO NS  F O R  P R IO R  O N TIME  By JOHN KING-FARLOW P ro fe s s o r A. N. P rio r's  vie ws  on  Tim e  a re  a s  though t- p ro vo kin g  a s  a n yo n e 's  s ince  Mc Ta g g a rt c la ime d  to  un ra ve l the  con tra d ic tions  o f te m p o ra l ta lk. To  be  p ro vo ke d ,  howe ve r,  is  no t to  b e  c o n vin c e d  a nd  I s hou ld  like  to  a dd  th re e  que s tions  to  critic is ms  a lre a dy a d va n c e d  o ve r Tim e  and Modality. (I)  W ould Prior's  am bition e lim inate  De te rm inis m ? P rio r be gins  his  b o o k by confe s s ing  to  "a  h a n ke rin g  fo r we ll c o n - s truc te d  the orie s  which  m u c h  c o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo s o p h y fa ils  to  s a tis fy". 1 Th e  kind  of we ll cons truc te d  the o ry h e  ha s  ce n tra lly in  m in d  is  a  logica l s ys te m in  which  te ns e  ope ra to rs  p e rfo rm  like  Luka s ie wicz 's  m o d a l o p e ra to rs  in  s uch  a  wa y tha t,  toge the r with  ce rta in  ru le s  o f in fe re nce ,  a xioms  a nd  tru th  va lue s , va rious  m e ta - phys ica l p roc livitie s  o f P rio r's  a re  s a tis fie d. His  ma in  c o n c e rn  is  1 T .  & M. ,  p re fa c e ,  p . vii. 92  J O~N KING-FARLOW to  b e n d  logic  to  "b rin g  ou t the  logica l a s ymme try be twe e n  p a s t a nd  fu tu re  which  s e rious  inde te rmin is m s e e ms  to  d e m a n d "Y He  wou ld  fo rma lis e  th e  vie w "th a t fro m  th e  fa c t th a t th e re  is  a  s e a - ba ttle  going on  it doe s  n o t fo llow th a t th e re  wa s  going to be  one , though  it doe s  fo llow th a t th e re  will have  be e n one "Y  Th u s  P rio r's  firs t a n d  in te ns e s t m o tiva tio n  fo r a dve n tu ring  with  s ymbols  is  his  de s ire  th a t logic  s hou ld  p re ju d g e  the  de te rmin is t-inde te rmin is t is s ue . C o m m e n tin g  o n  this  de s ire , L.  J . C o h e n  ha s  writte n : "O rd in a ry log ic  with  its  time le s s  tru th  e va lua - tions  is  qu ite  u n c o m m itte d  to  e ithe r s id e .  Ne ith e r 'An y p o in t ins ta n t be long ing  to  a  da y s u b s e q u e n t to  the  p re s e n t one  is  ne ce s s a rily o c c u p ie d  by wh a te ve r occupie s  it', n o r its  c o n tra - d ic to ry,  is  a  the s is  o f a ny fa milia r te xt b o o k s ys te m. If te ns e  logic  te nds  to  be g  the  que s tion  in  fa vo u r o f inde te rmin is m, th a t is  ha rd ly a  re a s o n  fo r ca lling it 'g o o d  logic ' e ve n  if it is  g o o d  phys ics  o r me ta phys ic s ".  4 In  one  wa y Cohe n 's  c ritic is m goe s  to o  fa r a nd  in a no the r wa y n o t ne a rly fa r e nough . If a  me ta p h ys ic ia n  s o  be nds  logic o r la ngua ge  a s  to  m a ke  it re fle c t his  m e ta p h ys ic a l b ia s , th e n  the  fin is he d a rtic le  is , b y his  ca nons , a  g o o d  logic  o r a  g o o d  la ngua ge . Bu t P rio r is  n o t m e re ly mis ta ke n  in  a s s uming  th a t te ns e  logic is  a  ne ce s s ary conditio~ fo r s a tis fying the  d e m a n d s  o f s e rious  inde te rmin is m. He  is  fu rth e r mis ta ke n  in  th inking  th a t s e tting  up  s uch  a  logic  s upplie s  a n yth in g  like  a  s u~c ie n t condition. As  to  de te rmin is m, in a n y o f the  us ua l s e ns e s , I c e rta in ly a gre e  with  Cohe n ,  Do n a ld  Willia ms  5 a nd  o the rs  th a t s ta n d a rd  qua n tifica tion  the orie s  a re  a g re e a b ly ne u tra l.  O n  the  o th e r h a n d ,  wh e th e r o r n o t we  be lie ve  in  the  e xis te nce  o f time le s s  o r te m p o ra l tru th s  a b o u t the  fu tu re  is  no t a  q u e s tio n  the  ne ga tive  a ns we r to  which  qua lifie  s  us  to  be  ca lle d  inde te rmin is ts ,  in  the  a p p ro p ria te  s e ns e  o f de fe nde rs  o f fre e  will. (Th a t  s e ns e  o f inde te rmin is m is  p re s u m a b ly wh a t P rio r's  re fe re nce s  to  Aris to tle 's  s e a -ba ttle  ind i- ca te . 6) S uppos e , like  C. D. Bro a d  in S cienti]~c Thought, I re fu s e  to  ca ll a ny p ro p o s itio n  true ,  fa ls e , true -o r-fa ls e ,  o r e ve n  a  p ro p o - s ition  unle s s  it c o rre s p o n d s  o r fa ils  to  c o rre s p o n d  to  a  s u ita b le  pa s t o r p re s e n t fa c t.  Th is  a ffords  m e  a  ma gnifice n t a s ym m e try o f S pa ce  a nd  Time ,  pe rha ps ,  ye t it doe s  no t p re ve n t m y be lie ving  tha t th e re  is  n o  s uch  th ing  a s  h u m a n  choice , tha t a ll p re s e n t a nd  pa s t fa c ts  o f h u m a n  b e h a vio u r s how dis tre s s ing re gula ritie s  n o  le s s  me cha n ica l th a n  th o s e  o f b ru te  be a s ts  o r fa lling  bod ie s .  It might be  s ugge s te d  th a t re s tric ting  the  in d e te rm in a te  va lu e  to  ~P . 94. 3p .  95. Philosophi~-ul Qut, rlerly, 1958, p. 279. ~lournal o] Philosophy, 1951, pp . 457 ft. 6 Cf. De  Interpre tatione , IX. DISCUSSION 93 fu tu re  p ropos itions  a b o u t h u m a n  be ha viou r is  wha t s e rious  in- de te rmin is m de ma nds .  Th is  ill fits  P rio r's  willingne s s  to  fo rs a ke  the  e xis te nce  o f "fa c ts  d ire c tly a b o u t" any  obje c ts  which  d o  no t ye t e xis t. We  migh t m o ve  a  s ha de  c los e r to  re fle c ting  inde te rmin is m if th e re  we re  a n  a s ym m e try be twe e n  re fe re n c e  to  h u m a n  a nd  to  n o n -h u m a n  fu tu re  ob je c ts , b u t P rio r doe s  n o t p ro vid e  this . E ve n  s o  a  n e u te r va lu e  c o n c e rn in g  fu tu re  h u m a n  b e h a vio u r cou ld  e qua lly we ll re fle c t be lie f (a )  tha t m a n  is  u tte rly u n p re d ic ta b le  (h e n c e  n o t fre e ,  cf. Hu m e )  o r (b )  tha t the  c o n tin u e d  e xis te nce  o f m e n  is  too  p re ca rious  fo r one  to  be  c o m m itte d  to  a ny fu tu re  a s s e rtion  a b o u t the m. S o  m y firs t que s tion  is : wh y doe s  te ns e  logic  re fle c t "s e rious  inde te rmin is m" a ny m o re  th a n  de te rmin is m is  e n fo rc e d  b y time le s s  tru ths ?  (II)  Do  Prior's  ju s tify ing  re m a rk s  abou t re fe re n c e  to w h a t ts  fu tu re  s up'port or m e re ly  fo,llo,w fro m  his  m e ta p h y s ic a l v ie w  o] T im e ?  In  his  (s e ve n th ) c h a p te r on  C o m m o n  No u n  Lo g ic  a nd  a t e a rlie r s ta ge s  P rio r is  m a g n a n im o u s  a b o u t d is pe ns ing  with  the  re fe re n c e  re s ource s  we  h a ve  in o rd in a ry la ngua ge  a n d  qua ntifica - tion  the o ry.  Th is  is  in  s p ite  of his  ca mpa ign  p romis e s  to  re s pe c t s ome  ba s ic  in tu itions  o f the  fo rm e r a nd  n o t  to  ta m p e r with  the  la tte r.  He  write s  in  s e lf-jus tifica tion a t a n e a rly s ta ge : "I a m a  little  u n c o m fo rta b le  a b o u t this  vie w tha t we  c a n n o t prope rly" n a m c  obje c ts  which  h a ve  ce a s e d  to  e xis t, like  Buce pha lu s ; b u t I d o  no t s e e  a ny wa y of a vo id ing  it - - if we  s a y th a t we  can  p ro p e rly n a m e  th e m . . . we  a re  e xp o s e d  to  a ll the  difficultie s  which  we re  s hown e a rlie r to  a ris e  with  the  ge ne ra l th e o ry th a t the re  a re  non -e xis te n t obje c ts . Ins tinc tive ly, a ll the  s a me , we  a re  h a p p ie r a b o u t g ra n ting  tha t we  c a n n o t p ro p e rly na me , a nd  the re  a ve  ~o fa c ts  d ire c tly a bou t,  ob je c ts  which d o  n o t y e t e xis t".  7 P rio r goe g on  to  in vo ke  in  his  s u p p o rt the  "ve ry p o we rfu l" a rgume nts  which  P ro fe s s o r G ilb e rt R yle  ra is e d  in Dile m m a s  a ga ins t na ming  o r re fe rrin g  to  the  n o n -e xis te n t) Tu rn in g  to  the s e  "ve ry powe rfu l a rgume n ts " o f Ryle 's ,  we  m e e t a  ra th e r odd  in fe re nce  p a tte rn  he a vily c o a te d  with  b lu ff)  We  a re  o ffe re d  the  obvious  p re mis e  tha t we  "c a n  n e ve r p o in t to  o r n a m e  a  p a rtic u la r h a p p e n in g  a nd  s a y o f it 'Th is  h a p p e n in g  wa s  a ve rte d ' "--o b vio u s ,  th a t is , in  the  s e ns e  th a t ta lking about wh a t d id  no t h a p p e n  is  n o t e n tire ly like  ta lking  abou t wh a t d id  ha ppe n .  In  the  s a me  wa y, R yle  s a ys  p la us ib ly e nough , if the  Wa te rlo o  o f 1814  h a d  n o t b e e n  fough t o r the  p re s e n t R yle  n o t b e e n  born ,  th e n  th e re  wou ld  be  n o  s uch  e ve n t o r p e rs o n  fo r h is to ria ns  to  de s c ribe : ce rta in ly th e re  is  a  s e ns e  o f de s cribe  T .  & M. ,  p. 33. P p . 33-34. D v ,  D ile m m a s ,  p p .  24-27. 94  J OHN KING-FARLOW a p p ro p ria te  to  Ryle 's  c la im. Ho we ve r,  Ryle  move s  o n  confide n tly to  p u t w h a t has  no t y e t  o c c u rre d  on  a  logica l p a r with  w h a t d id  n o t occur a t s ome  s pe cifie d  pa s t time : in  o the r words  we  a re  e xp e c te d  to  b ra c ke t wh a t is  n o t ye t th e  ca s e  with  wha t n o w ca n  n e ve r be  the  ca s e , a s  if the y we re  o f the  s a me  o rd e r o f s ubs ta n - tia lity. Wh y the  la tte r s hou ld  be  s o  like  the  fo rm e r fro m  a  re fe re n tia l p o in t o f vie w we  a re  n e ve r to ld . Wh y in d e e d  s hou ld  the  po te n tia l a nd  p e rh a p s  a ll b u t c e rta in  s ta n d  in th e  s a me  s o rt o f re la tion  t o  the  re fe rre r a s  th e  now u tte rly impos s ib le  non -e n tity?  Th e  me ta phys ica l vie w which  wou ld  le a d  us  to  h o ld  this  is  go ing  to  invo lve  Bro a d 's  a s ym m e try o f S pa ce  a nd  Time , wh e re b y to  b e  p re s e n t is  "s imp ly to  p re c e d e  no th ing".  R yle  like  Bro a d  ins is ts  o n  a  ra d ica l d iffe re nce  b e twe e n  p rophe c ie s  a nd  chronic le s . Th e re  is  a  Bro a d ia n  ring  a b o u t Ryle 's  a s s e rtion  th a t n o  p ro p h e t,  h o we ve r vivid  a nd  a ccura te ,  c o u ld  "ge t the  fu tu re  e ve nts  the ms e lve s  fo r the  he roe s  a nd  he ro ine s  o f his  s to ry".  Ryle  ta lks  th ro u g h o u t a s  if a n  e xa mina tion  o f o u r c o m m o n -s e n s e  wa ys  o f ta lking  ma ke s  it impos s ib le  to  d iffe r with  h im, b u t in  the  ca s e  o f this  la s t e xtra va g a n t m e ta p h o r n o  a p p ro p ria te  common-s e ns ib le  s e ns e  o f ge t is  c le a r. It is  th is  c ru d e  m e ta p h o r of ge tting  which  m o re  th a n  a n y- th ing  e ls e  s ugge s ts  th a t R yle  ha s  p re s u p p o s e d  Bro a d 's  b y n o  m e a n s  un ive rs a lly a c c e p ta b le  p ic tu re  o f h is to ry. He re  a  p ile  o f h a rd  s pe c ious -p re s e n t-s ize d  e ve n ts --wh ic h ,  ha ving  a lre a dy b e c o m e ,  we  ca n  re a lly ge t h o ld  o f to  re fe r t o - - a r e  o p p o s e d  to  the  p ra c tica lly ine ffa b le  va c u u m  of wh a t is  n o t ye t. S imila rly, P rio r in  his  p a p e r 'Tim e  a fte r Tim e  '1° ba u lks  a t P e a rs ' ta lk o f the  logic ia n 's  tru ths  a s  time le s s  s ha dows  s e t in a  s ymme trica l He a ve n .  He  p re fe rs  to  th in k o f e ve nts  a s  ca s ting  the ir s ha dows  o ve r wh a t will h a ve  b e c o m e  a fte r the m, s ha dows  tha t le n g th e n  with  the  pa s s a ge  o f time . O n  a  riva l m e ta p h ys ic a l vie w, like  th a t o f Willia ms , wh o  vie ws  the  to ta lity o f e ve n ts  a s  s p re a d  ou t s u b  s pe c ie  ae te rn ita tis  in  th e  d ime ns ions  o f S p a c e  a n d  Tim e  a like , we  ge t a  s ym m e try which  wou ld  m a ke  us  wa n t to  in te rp re t ma tte rs  o f re fe re n c e  ve ry d iffe re ntly. An  o d d e r vie w might m a ke  us  wa n t to  re s tric t the  pos s ibility o f dire c t re fe re n c e  to  th ings  p re s e n t a nd  fu tu re .  Ho w o rd in a ry la ngua ge  c o u ld  h e lp  us  to  d e c id e  be twe e n  s uch  riva l me ta phys ic ia ns  a nd  th e ir a ccoun ts  o f re fe re n c e  is  obs cure ; ce rta in ly R yle  a nd  P rio r m a ke  it a ll n o  c le a re r.  S o m y s e cond  que s tion  runs : a re  n o t P rio r's  a nd  Ryle 's  pa rs imonie s  in  th e  m a tte r o f fu tu re  re fe re n c e  m e re ly c o n s e q u e n c e s  of, n o t jus tifying  re a s ons  fo r,  the ir que s tiona b le  me ta phys ics  o f Tim e ?  ~o Min d ,  1958, pp, 244-46. DISCUSSION 9 5 ( III)  In  s o Jar as  Tim e  can be  m ade  logically special, cannot S pace  and Individuats  be  m ade  special, too?  In  a  tong  s e c tion  o f a p p e n d ix P rio r trie s  to  s how th a t th e re  is  s om e thing s pe cial a bou t Tim e .  11 Cons truc ting  s ome  inge n ious  p la ce -log ica l a nd  time - logica l fo rmu la e  h e  a rgue s  th a t we  ca n  e qua te  a n  e xpre s s ion  me a n ing  "it is  the  ca s e  m mile s  to  th e  le ft th a t it is  the  ca s e  n mile s  to  th e  le ft th a t f '  with  a n o th e r e xpre s s ion  in which  a  s ymbo l re p re s e n ts  th e  a lge bra ic  s um o f m a nd  n or, with  a  wide  ra n g e  o f d ire c tions , the  ve c to r s um. But,  h e  ins is ts , th e re  is  n o  s uch  a na logy in  the  ca s e  o f time -log ica l fo rm u la e : "fo r e ve n  if it wa s  the  ca s e  m da ys  a go  th a t p , it might no t h a ve  b e e n  true  m p lus  n da ys  a go  th a t it wa s  going  to  be  the  ca s e  n da ys  la te r th a t p . F o r m p lus  n da ys  a go the  is s ue  migh t h a ve  be e n  in d e te rm in a te ".  No  a uxilia ry s ymbol pa ra lle l to  the  one  in  p la ce - logic  c a n  obvia te  th is ?  2 We  h a ve  a lre a dy re je c te d  the  the s is  tha t we  m u s t b rin g  in a  n e u te r va lue  to  s a ve  fu tu re  con tinge nc ie s : P rio r's  a lle ge d ne e d fo r s pe c ia l va lue s  re la tive  to  Tim e  is  s pe cious . A n e u te r va lue  in the  ca s e  o f fu tu re s  yie lds  no t Inde te rmin is m, b u t s ome th ing  like  the  un re a lity o f the  fu tu re ,  a  ve ry d iffe re n t me ta phys ica l pos ition~ Willia ms  ha s  re to rte d  to  Bro a d  tha t we  migh t e qua lly we i! pos it the  tra g ic  un re a lity o f the  pa s t.  Th is  vie w cou ld  e qua lly we ll bc  re p re s e n te d --n o t  prove n--in  P rio r's  Time -log ic  by a s s igning n e u te r va lue s  to  a ll fo rm u la e  a bou t the  pa s t. Aga in , a  m a n  wa lking  e ve r fo rwa rd s  a long  a  s tra ight line  migh t e qua lly we t! be lie ve  in  the  u tte r no th ingne s s  o f a ll he  h a d  le ft be h ind .  In  a  b a c kwa rd s -fo rwa rd s  logic  h e  cou ld  re p re s e n t--n o t  p ro ve --h is  the s is  b y a s s igning the  s pe c ia l ne u te r va lue  to  a ll fo rm u la e  a bou t the  re g ions  be h ind . Aga in , P rio r te lls  us , th o u g h  he  doe s  no t a rg u e  in  s uch  de ta il, tha t th e re  is  s ome th ing  s pe c ia l a b o u t time s  a s  o p p o s e d  to  individua ls . Bu t a  P la ton is t c o u ld  re p re s e n t the  on to log ica l h ie ra rc h y of the  Lin e  pa ra b le  in  R e public  Bo o k VI by a s s igning a n  a s ce nding  o rd e r o f tru th -va lue s  to  fo rm u la e  me n tion ing  the  a s ce nd ing  o rd e r o f gignomena a nd  onta. S o m y fina l que s tion  runs : s ure ly the  on ly re s tric tion  on  m a kin g  time s , p la ce s  o r individua ls  logica lly s pe cia l is  th a t we  mus t n o t m a ke  th e m  all s pe cia l a t once , o r e ls e  n o n e  o f th e m will be  s pe cia l?  Unive rs ity o f P itts burgh . ~ T .  & M. ,  p p .  1 1 7 -1 2 1 .  ,2 v. p p .  1 1 9 -1 2 0 .  

Three Questions for Prior on Time

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Three Questions for Prior on Time

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