Several argue that truth cannot be science’s sole epistemic goal, for it would fail to do justice to several scientific practices that advance understanding. I challenge these arguments but only af..

Khalifa, Kareem

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Several argue that truth cannot be science’s sole epistemic goal, for it would fail to do
          justice to several scientific practices that advance understanding. I challenge these arguments,
          but only after making a small concession: science’s sole epistemic goal is not truth as such;
          rather, its goal is finding true answers to relevant questions. Using examples from the natural
          and social sciences, I then show that scientific understanding’s epistemically valuable features
          are either true answers to relevant questions or a means thereof

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Understanding, Truth, and Epistemic Goals

https://philpapers.org/archive/KHAUTA.pdf

Understanding, Truth, and Epistemic Goals

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