Antinomy basically as an inherent structural tension from within the reason between
rational willing toward the unconditioned and rational thinking necessarily conditioned
by the rule of understanding plays a negative role in and for Kant’s system to critically
compass reason in limiting itself within the possibility of real experience. In Husserl,
under the banner of one all-encompassing reason, antinomy takes a modified form
of an ontological incommensurability between two essentially separable regions of
being, i.e., between the ideal and the real; such ontological antinomy now takes up the
place of an apriori condition for the possibility of meaning for Husserl. Representing a
peculiar hierarchical ontological relation through which a lawful power flows, Husserlian
antinomy plays an essentially affirmative-political function. In this paper, I will analyze
the constructive antinomic structure of phenomenological being relation in contrast to
Kantian restrictive antinomy and discuss its political implication
