In addition to defending their countries, modern day militaries assist the state in labour intensive non-defence related activities. This ranges from disaster relief to providing administrative assistance. In countries where the military already exercises hegemonic control, possession of such auxiliary capabilities can potentially provide an avenue to extend the military’s jurisdiction / further strengthen its hegemony. This research uses Pakistan military as a case study. It operationalises military presence in two development sectors – Fauji Foundation representing welfare foundations, and Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) representing infrastructure building – to explore the underlying practices and methods through which militaries can use their additional or supplementary competencies to their own advantage. An analysis of the primary data collected from the field for this thesis shows that while the [Pakistan] military is present and thriving in the ‘development’ sector, it reflects on, or calls this presence its nation building role. Closer scrutiny reveals that although the terms ‘development’ or nation building are used interchangeably, the military’s understanding thereof, and the extent it holds itself responsible for it, are two separate questions. Moreover there is no clear answer thereto. The question is what is in the military’s habitus that compels its behaviour? What is the guiding rationale? The objective of this thesis is twofold: a) to investigate how the Pakistan military operationalises its presence in non-military domains to establish its hegemony albeit through non coercive means; and to understand b) what are the practices that allow for its continuous presence in the civil sphere (using the two case studies) without divesting its military status. The specific question that this thesis asks is what are the underlying practices and perceptions that allow the Pakistan military to establish its hegemony? The research design of this thesis deviates from other studies pertaining to civil military interactions in that instead of rationalising the relationship of the two domains (inter se) within historical trajectories, it approaches the actions / practices of the military as a product of social conditions and contexts. Using habitus as a prism of analysis, it directs attention to the processes and procedures through which behaviours, codes of conduct and most importantly the perceptions and thoughts inform generated actions. This study shows that Pakistan military’s presence in the non-defence sectors is not circumscribed by the duration of the coup. Even when the military is not directly in control of the political and administrative structures, we see it present and thriving in almost all traditionally civil domains – especially those archetypically linked with public service delivery. Primary data collected for this research reveals that after three takeovers, the military is not actively considering another coup. However, by extending its presence in the civil arenas it has discovered new avenues of concretising its hegemony. Just because a takeover is not a viable option any more does not mean the military is willing to compromise its omnipresence. It navigates the military yet not-military nature of entities like FWO and Fauji Foundation to consolidate its hegemony. These commercial concerns do not feature as symbols of hegemony or off-budget money making schemes within its habitus, but as attempts to fix the country. The military considers itself not only responsible but ideally suited for delivering on nation building / ‘development’. I argue that this new kind of hegemony does not operate in lieu of hegemony as we understand but as an extension thereof. Using the usual tools of a hegemon – coercion and consent – would mean violating civil-military boundaries. By investing in the ‘developmental’ realms yet simultaneously calling it nation building, the military can be in control of the country and popular amongst the population. Based upon the findings of the case studies this thesis illustrates that the military ensures an absence of a money trail linking it to such organisations. This way the civil military boundaries stay intact. Moreover, the trusteeship of ‘development’ remains with the civil state. The military does not need to acquire political control outright anymore as it is extending its hegemony via socio-cultural means. And such the military’s preponderance endures because neither the hegemon nor the public perceive it as a forceful imposition
