Allen, James D.

English

University of Kentucky

Kentucky Law JournalVolume 27 | Issue 3 Article 121939Homicide--Burden of Proof When Defense IsInsanityJames D. AllenUniversity of KentuckyFollow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kljPart of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure CommonsRight click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefitsyou.This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky LawJournal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.Recommended CitationAllen, James D. (1939) "Homicide--Burden of Proof When Defense Is Insanity," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 27 : Iss. 3 , Article 12.Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol27/iss3/12KENTUCKY LAW JOURNALand involves no fraud or mistake then the law should give the agree-ment legal effect. Consideration for a promise is valuable evidenceuthat the parties intended to make an agreement to which the lawshould give effect, but it is only one sort of evidence and is not alwaysproof of the real intent of the parties. From time to time cases willarise, such as this voluntary old age pension contract, where one whomade a promise, intending to be legally bound by it, is able to escapefrom it at will by operation of the consideration rule.The desirability and utility of the consideration rule in contractshas been questioned frequently in the writings of legal theorists. Thiscriticism has been given a limited effect by the adoption of the Uni-form Written Obligations Act by the legislatures of several states.,As yet, however, the judicial feeling against the doctrine expressesitself only in making additional exceptions to the general rule thatthere can be no binding contract without consideration.PAUL OBERST.HOMICIDE-BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN DEFENSE IS INSANITY.Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree for killinghis wife and child. The defense was insanity. He7d: where the de-fendant pleads insanity and introduces evidence on the matter, theburden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that thedefendant is sane. Noelke v. State. ...... Ind ........ 15 N. E. (2d) 950(1938).In the past few years there has been an increased use of the de-fense of insanity in criminal cases and out of these cases at least threerules have arisen.'The principal case represents the view taken by several courts.2Such a rule places the entire burden of proving that the defendantis sane upon the state. The Massachusetts's courts, while subscribingto the rule that the state must prove the defendant sane, relieve partof the burden of the rule by saying that the presumption that all men" "I take it that the ancient notion about want of consideration wasfor the sake of evidence only." Lord Mansfield in Pillans v. VanMierop,3 Burr. 1663 (1765) (Discredited as historically inaccurate by Holds.worth in Moddrn History of Consideration (1922), 2 B. U. L. Rev. 174,190; but approved as a principle at 208.) "It can only properly betreated, not as a test, but as an indication; an indication, but an indi-cation only, amongst many others, that the parties entering into atransaction had in contemplation their legal relations to each other."Markby, Elements of Law (6th ed., 1905), 315. "There can be littledoubt however, that our law has shown itself too scrupulous in thismatter (danger of giving legal effect to unconsidered promises andlevities of speech); in other legal systems no such precaution isknown, and its absence seems to lead to no ill results.' Salmond,Jurisprudence (7th ed., 1924), 374.22Adopted by Pennsylvania in 1927, and Utah in 1929.25 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed., 1923), Section 2051.2 Blume v. State, 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771 (1900); Fritz v. State,CASE COMMENTSare sane remains throughout the trial and must go to the jury for itsconsideration with the rest of the evidence.3 The usual reason given"for placing the burden of proof on the state to prove sanity is thatonce the question of sanity is put in issue it becomes a material partof the state's case and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Thetheory behind this reason Is that without a criminal intent there canbe no crime, and without mental capacity for it there can be no intent.Therefore, to establish its case the state must prove the sanity of thedefendant. A second reason given for requiring the state to prove thedefendant sane is that it is as much the duty of the state to protectan Insane man from conviction, as it is to prevent a sane man fromescaping that result.6A second rule applied by several courts is that where the defendantpleads Insanity as a defense to the prosecution the duty is on him tocome forward with enough evidence to rebut the legal presumption thatall men are sane. In introducing this evidence the defendant mustraise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as to his sanity; whenthis doubt has been raised the legal presumption of sanity ceases toexist and the state must prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonabledoubt.1 Hotema v. U. S., 8 states the rule in the following words:"There Is a presumption of sanity in all criminal cases which warrantsa conviction if no evidence to the contrary is offered, but if the defend-ant Introduces enough evidence to create a reasonable doubt as to hissanity an acquittal is necessary unless the state can rebut this doubt."It Is submitted that this rule only makes an already involved legalprocess more complicated.The third rule is that the plea of insanity is an affirmative defenseand the burden is on the defendant to prove his insanity.' The rulerepresents the great weight of authority" and is based on the theorythat the law presumes every adult to be of sound mind and capable of178 Ind. 463, 99 N. E. 727 (1912); Walters v. State, 183 Ind. 178, 108N. E. 583 (1920); State v. Warren, 91 Vt. 391, 101 Atl. 149 (1919);Commonwealth v. Soaris, 275 Mass. 291, 175 N. E. 491 (1931); Com-nionwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 99 N. E. 266 (1912); Common-wealth v. Clark, 198 N. E. 641 (1935).3Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 99 N. E. 266 (1912);Commonwealth v. Clark, 198 N. E. 641 (1935).'Fritz v. State, 178 Ind. 463, 99 N. E. 727 (1912).Id., at 465, 99 N. E., at 729.*State v. Warren, 91 Vt. 391, 101 Atl. 149 (1919).1 Hotema v. U. S., 186 U. S. 413 (1902); Thompson v. State, 78 Fla.400, 83 So. 291 (1919); Smith v. State, 12 Okla. C. R. 307, 155 Pac. 699(1916); 40 Okla. C. R. 266, 266 Pac. 790 (1928); Lemke v. State,56 Okla. C. R. 1, 32 P. (2d) 331 (1934).8186 U. S. 413 (1902).'Young v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 766, 81 S. W. (2d) 595 (1935).1 State v. Cooper, 195 Iowa 258, 191 N. W. 891 (1923); State v.Schilling, 95 N. J. Law 145, 112 Atl. 400 (1920); State v. Jones, 191N. C. 753, 133 S. E. 81 (1926); Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 246 Pa. 528,86 Atl. 472 (1914); Roberts v. State, 67 Tex. C. R. 580, 150 S. W. 627(1912); Snow v. State, 106 Tex. C. R. 222, 291 S. W. 558 (1927); Dob-bins v. State, 127 Tex. C. R. 380, 76 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1934).K]NTucKY LAW JOURNALcommitting a crime, and such person, when charged with the commis-sion of a crime, must rebut such presumption by evidence which reason-ably satisfies the jury that he was insane at the time the act was com-mitted.u This is the more logical rule because it places the burden onthe person best fitted to prove it; this rule also follows the general rulethat where affirmative matter is pleaded it must be proven by thepleader. 2 It would seem that where the state clearly establishes aniintentional killing by the use of a deadly weapon, an illegal homicideIs presumed, and if the defense is insanity, the burden of sustainingit Is upon the person having charge of the defense. %J3,xss D. ALn=.RUH'S EXECUTORS v. RUH-ACCELERATION OF THE REMAIN-DERS BY WIDOW'S REFUSAL TO TAKE UNDER THE WILL.Testator provided for a trust fund for his grandson, surplus Por.sonalty and a life estate in all realty to his widow, with remainder overto his children. The realty was to be sold and the proceeds distributedamong his children upon the death of the widow. Exercising herstatutory right, the widow renounced the will and took a third of thedecedent's real property for life and half of the surplus personalty.Held, that immediately upon the election of the widow to take againstthe will, the remainders to the children were accelerated, and theremaindermen took as if the contingency, the death of the widow, hadIn fact happened. Rnth's Executors v. Ruhz, 270 Ky. 792 (1937)."Ordinarily the election of the widow to take against the will hasthe effect of accelerating any remainder limited to take effect after herlife estate. The election of a widow to take against her husband's willis equivalent to her death, as respects payment of legacies, and thedistribution of that part of the estate which is to be distributed underthe will upon the happening of that event."' This is the majority rule.'The Kentucky court has followed the majority on this question, holdingin Trustees v. Morris,' that the general rule is that legacies which wereto be paid at the death of the death of the widow become immediatelydue upon the widow's renunciation of the will. It is to be noted thatthis rule makes no distinction between contingent and vested remain-ders. The courts merely hold that the estate is distributable as if thewidow were dead' and let it go at that." State v. Corrington ....... Mo ........ 116 S. W. (2d) 87 (1938).2See 22 C. J. 71, note 66 and cases cited therein.128 R. C. L., Wills, Sec. 323.2 Will of Reynolds, 151 Wis. 375, 138 N. W. 1019 (1912); Stevens v.Stevens, 121 Ohio St. 490, 169 N. E. 570 (1929); Swan v. Austell, 261Fed. 465 (C. C. A., 5th, 1919); Rose v. Rose, 126 Miss. 114, 88 So. 513(1929).' 99 Ky. 317, 36 S. W. 2 (1896).' e Kerns Estate, 296 Pa. 348, 145 Atl. 824 (1929). See also O'Rearv. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. 1107 (1914) (held that the theory ofacceleration applies to both vested and contingent remainders).

Homicide--Burden of Proof When Defense Is Insanity

https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4418&amp;context=klj

Homicide--Burden of Proof When Defense Is Insanity

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

University of Kentucky