Buku ini mengupas pengertian bahwa seorang wartawan terutama wartawan foto harus sigap menjelajah setiap sudut untuk mendapatkan foto berita yang otentik dan baik. Foto berita adalah fakta, sehingga tidak dibenarkan adanya rekayasa. Dan sebuah foto jurnalistik tingkat keberhasilannya sudah ditentukan pada saat photo journalist-wartawan foto berada di tempat (wartawan foto yang baik adalah selalu berada di tempat kejadian). Foto-foto jurnalistik yang dimuat dalam buku ini khususnya subyek human interest, pembuatannya juga diawali dengan berjalan kaki, tidak menggunakan kendaraan karena subjek liputan menyangkut kehidupan orang-orang terpinggirkan, hidupnya ada di pelosok

Bertha B. Hallam

Eileen R. Cunningham

Eleanor Fair

Gertrude L. Annan

Isabelle T. Anderson

Janet Doe

Marion F. Dondale

Mary Louise Marshall

Mildred E. Walter

Mildred R. Crowe

English

This book discusses the medical library and their administration.xv, 601 p.; 24 c

opac.fah.uinjkt.ac.id

Handbook of medical library pratice

SUGIARTO, Atok

opac.isi.ac.id

Jurnalisme Pejalan Kaki: Kiat Membuat Foto untuk Laporan Jurnalistik

Washington University St. Louis: Open Scholarship

Washington University Law Review Volume 15 Issue 3 January 1930 Charities—Liability in Tort—Effect of Liability Insurance Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview  Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Charities—Liability in Tort—Effect of Liability Insurance, 15 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 292 (1930). Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/12 This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu. ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEWperform in an exhibition for profit, under a contract by which the musicianhas authority to play whatever compositions are in accordance with herjudgment appropriate and fitting, must be held responsible for all that isdone by the musician. By giving her that authority the employer acquiescesin and ratifies whatever she does. If under his contract he has parted withthe right to exercise this control over her actions, without making inquiryas to what she intends to play, he yet must be deemed to have taken part,and to have given her general authority to perform copyright compositions."Ha7-/ns et al. v. Cohen (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1922) 279 F. 276. See also M. Wit-mark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1924) 298 F. 470.When scrutinized closely it is apparent that the above passage, in effect,says that when the employer parts with the right to control the actions ofthe independent contractor he is deemed to have given general authority forthe commission of torts, thus disregarding all of the immunities which havecome to be considered incidents of the employer-independent contractor re-lationship. For copyright infringement purposes, then, there is no distinc-tion between the master-servant and employer-independent contractor re-lationship.The result reached in the main case is not inequitable, but rather desir-able. In view of the general practice in agency cases we might rather expectthe decision to be on the ground that the orchestra leader was not truly anindependent contractor than on the ground that defendant profited from themusic, however much more realistic the latter ground may be. In manycases involving small jobs it is found more expedient and equitable to con-sider what are technically independent contractors as servants, and thus torender employers liable for their torts. In some cases where this is notdone a very inequitable result is reached. In an Arkansas case defendantphysicians owned and operated a hospital. They had an X-ray departmentbut defendants, knowing nothing of X-rays placed an expert in charge.Through the negligence and incompetence of an employee of the departmentplaintiff was burned severely. Defendants were held not liable because thewrongdoer was an independent contractor (on the general theory that phy-sicians occupy this position). Runyan v. Goodrum (1921) 147 Ark. 481, 228S. W. 397. Obviously this is an extreme case but it raises the question as tothe desirability, in all cases, of exempting the employer from liability forthe torts of his independent contractor.There is no logical ground for distinction between the copyright cases andthose of other business situations in which the independent contractor is in-volved. We are not ready to discard the law of independent contractor as ithas grown up; yet these cases are suggestive of a possible survey of thewhole field with a view to effecting changes of policy in those situations inwhich the results reached under the general rule are unsatisfactory.B. L. W., '31.CHARiTIEs-LLABILITY IN TORT-EFFEOT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE.-Plain-tiff was injured as the result of a fall upon ice on the sidewalk of a build-ing owned by defendant, a charitable corporation. Evidence that defend-Washington University Open ScholarshipCOMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONSant held a policy of insurance covering such accidents was excluded, and averdict directed for defendant. Held, the carrying of insurance did notdeprive defendant of the exemption from tort liability enjoyed by charitablecorporations. Eleanor Enman v. Trustees of Boston University (1930)170 N. E. 43.Charitable organizations are exempt from liability for some classes oftorts in almost all jurisdictions. 5 R. C. L. 374-379; 11 C. J. 374-378.Three reasons for this immunity have been advanced: first, that it is amatter of public policy that charity funds should not go to tort claims;second, that the funds are impressed with a trust for charitable purposes,from which they cannot be diverted; and third, that persons enteringcharitable institutions waive their recourse for torts committed. Williams'Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick (1928) 223 Ky.355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753. The third reason applies only to cases of inmatesof institutions, but the first and second cover the whole subject, and maybe applied to the principal case. The fundamental consideration is publicpolicy.The question is whether the public policy which is held to exempt chari-table corporations from tort liability applies to a case where the corporationcarries liability insurance. Where insurance is carried to indemnify itslosses, allowing recovery will not deplete its funds. The reason for therule having failed, it would seem that the rule is not applicable to the situa-tion. But the other two cases which have directly decided the point haveagreed with the principal case. Levy v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100; Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females andInfirmary for Sick, above. Their argument is as follows: a charitablecorporation is exempt from liability for torts. This institution has con-tracted with an insurance company that the latter should compensate itfor any losses it sustains because of certain torts. But this contract can-not make it liable for torts for which it was not liable before. From thisit follows that since the insurance company has assumed no risk of loss, thecontract is of no effect. The fallacy of this position is obvious. Usinga general rule as the starting point of reasoning, it decides that there canbe no exception to the rule. But if the basis of the rule-the policy thatcharitable funds should not be depleted-is considered, it is clear that anexception to the rule of exemption from liability should exist in cases whereinsurance is carried.The results of the application of the general rule of exemption from lia-bility have been so varied and there are so many glosses and exceptions inmany jurisdictions that it is apparent that courts are doubting the policywhich has been so often stated. New Hampshire has held liability in allcases. Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n (1906) 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl.190. When most charitable institutions were both small and poor, theremay have been good reason to exempt them from tort liability; but withlarge institutions, adequately supplied with funds and run just as businessesare run, a modern public policy would require that individuals be protectedfrom the negligence of charities rather than charities from the relativelyhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/12ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEWinfrequent suits of individuals. The rule of exemption was not adoptedwith such institutions in mind. Neither was it contemplated that insurancecould be successfully used to preserve charitable funds from damage claims.As times passes, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the applicationof the rule to any circumstances, and no justification whatever exists incases where insurance is carried. J. A. G., '31.CONSTiTUTIONAL LAw-CouRTs-PowER OVER ADMISSIONS TO BAn.-Anapplicant to the bar had passed the educational test, but the board of barexaminers refused to grant him a certificate of good moral character. Onapplication, the Supreme Court admitted him to practice despite the failureto obtain the required certificate, on the ground that it believed his characterto be good. Brydonjacc v. State Bar of California (Cal. 1929) 281 Pac.1018. The court declared that its decision was not necessarily contrary tothe statute creating the board, but the real issue was as to the legislature'spower to regulate the bar.Since attorneys are officers of the court, the power to admit applicants topractice is judicial and not legislative. But decisions generally concede thatthe legislature may, in the exercise of its police power, prescribe reasonablerules and regulations for admission to the bar. 6 C. J. 571, 2. With this asa basis, it has usually been held that compliance with statutory requirementsdoes not make the practice of law a matter of right and that courts may im-pose additional requirements upon applicants. Olmsted's Case (1928) 292Pa. 98, 140 Atl. 634; In Te Peters (1927) 221 App. Div. 607, 225 N. Y. S.144, aff'd 250 N. Y. 595, 166 N. E. 337; In Te Platz (1913) 42 Utah 439, 132Pac. 390. The only case which directly opposes this doctrine is In re Appli-cants for License to Practice Law (1906) 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, in whichtwo judges dissented.The question raised by the principal case, however, is not whether courtsmay impose additional requirements, but whether they may admit attorneysto practice in spite of their failure to comply -with existing statutory re-quirements. The only other case in which the question has been directlyraised is In Te Bowers (1918) 138 Tenn. 662, 200 S. W. 821, in which thecourt stated: "The question for determination now is whether upon excep-tions to the board's report, this court will go into evidence and determine foritself contrary to the recommendations of the board that the applicantshould be admitted to practice. It seems to us that the mere statement ofthe proposition is its own answer. . . The certificate of the board is theonly thing which the Legislature intended that we should consider, and whenthe board refuses to make a certificate, or, as in this case, certifies that theapplicant is an unfit person to be admitted to the practice, that ends thematter in the absence of allegation and proof of fraud, corruption, or op-pression on the part of the board."The police-power theory of the legislature's control over bar admissionsis that the legal profession can be regulated just as other professions andbusinesses. But the legislature, under the police power, can regulate nobusiness, profession, or occupation unless a reasonable necessity exists. 6Washington University Open Scholarship