The area of electricity is politically poorly explored. Yet, it is something that affects citizens of the European Union daily. In 2003 the electricity market became a part of the internal market project. This thesis is a case study of the case of Swedish interconnectors, which principal-supervisor-agent analysis to illustrate the institutional conflicts that arise when national and European institutions cooperative in a post-compliance process. Due to a complaint in 2006 the Swedish transmission operator, Svenska Kraftnät, was reported to the European Commission for possible breach of article 102 Treaty of the functioning of the European Union. This eventually led to a division of the Swedish electricity market’s core grid system into four bidding zones. This thesis explores the interaction between the different actors of the case, Svenska Kraftnät, the European Commission and the Swedish state, and how the interaction affected the institutions’ ability to reach an internal market. This thesis will find that even though the institutions strive towards the same objective, conflict tend to arise nonetheless, which affects the institutions’ ability to fulfil the political ambition of an internal market. Instead the turnout is politically suboptimal, where a lack of objectives, possible accountability and information can be noted
