In January 2021, the South Sudanese government announced the long-awaited Hybrid Court to bring accountability to the country’s conflict and purported war crimes. Researcher Abraham Diing talks to former soldiers, civil servants, youth groups and community elders in South Sudan to understand responses to the announcement, finding a mix of scepticism and concern for inflamed ethnic divisions

Diing Akoi, Abraham

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Abraham Diing Akoi July 1st, 2021The Hybrid Court in South Sudan could be arecipe for further con ict0 comments | 10 sharesEstimated reading time: 6 minutesIn January 2021, the South Sudanese governmentannounced the long-awaited Hybrid Court to bringaccountability to the country’s con ict and purported warcrimes. Researcher Abraham Diing talks to formersoldiers, civil servants, youth groups and communityelders in South Sudan to understand responses to theannouncement,  nding a mix of scepticism and concernfor in amed ethnic divisions.This post is part of a series exploring ‘publicauthority’ based on research at LSE’s Centre for PublicAuthority and International Development at the Firoz LaljiCentre for Africa.On the 30 January 2021, the government of South Sudan  nallyagreed to form the Hybrid Court, as stipulated in the 2015Agreement on the Resolution of the Con ict in the Republic ofSouth Sudan (ARCSS) and the 2018 Revitalized ARCSS. Thecourt was one of the mechanisms proposed to deal with pastabuses committed during more than six years of con ict in thecountry, alongside the Commission for Truth, Healing andReconciliation (CTHR), and the Compensation and ReparationsAuthority (CRA).The move was quickly welcomed by the internationalcommunity. For example, the African Union Commission’sChairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, sees the agreement asputting ‘an end to the delays in establishing the court,transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation and healinginstitutions in order to bring justice and healing to all SouthSudanese.’ Similarly, South Sudanese researchers like NyagoahTut Pur view the move as ‘a glimmer of hope for South Sudan’svictims’. This announcement also generated debates on theground among ordinary people.To assess these views and uncover what people think of thecourt, I conducted interviews and focus group discussions inJuba, Bor and the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites in Bor. Ispoke with former Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA)soldiers, youth groups, community elders, civil servants andactive soldiers. The  ndings described below present mixedreactions towards the Hybrid Court. Broadly speaking, there ishigh apprehension and scepticism about the government’sability to allow the court to successfully operate and, equally,the court’s ability to bring perpetrators of abuses to justice.‘I know the commander whose soldiers killed my father,brother and my cousin, I know his family where they live inJuba. If the hybrid court gives him justice for other abusesand I don’t get justice I am coming after him and his family.I let it go because killing him and his family will not bringmy relatives back but if he gets justice and I don’t then it isanother matter.’ – A Dinka man and former SPLA soldier in Juba, SouthSudan.Forgiveness and reconciliation over openingold woundsThe majority of South Sudanese are tired of war, and many Ispoke to believe the Hybrid Court will create another ethniccon ict. Everyone knows the SPLA-In Government, SPLA-InOpposition, various militias factions, different ethnic groupsand their allied militias have committed different kinds ofcrimes and abuses. But few believe the court is going toidentify the victims and perpetrators.The simple argument I heard repeated was that everyone is avictim and a perpetrator. Most South Sudanese societies preferforgiveness and reconciliation among warrying parties overindividual punishment. In a society where revenge is a normand where everybody knows who committed which atrocities,the Hybrid Court cannot be an appropriate approach fortransitional justice during the current, delicate situation.‘In 1991, when SPLA- Nasir came to my village and wiped outeverything including my husband and son, I was angry and I amstill angry, will the hybrid court give me justice?’ – A widow of 1991 SPLA-Nasir’s Bor Massacre, Bor, SouthSudan.‘If we go to the ballot box today, I’ll vote President Salva Kiirout, he has failed our country, he has instituted hatred,corruption, he has neglected our freedom  ghters, ourveterans, he has abandoned widows and orphans of liberation,he has destroyed our SPLM, our legacy. But if someone comesafter him, hybrid court or anyone else, I will die  rst because hedid protect me when I had no one. He fought for our countryside by side with our Dr John Garang de Mabior. He is SouthSudan, SPLM, Garang and Beny e Jieng, ‘a Dinka leader’. Hecannot be humiliated when we are alive, it is impossible.’ – An assessment of the hybrid court by a former child soldierin Bor, South Sudan.Putting the cart before the horseOther people I spoke to asked how a government that presidesover broken institutions, run by ethnic mercenaries, and whichhave lost legitimacy, will be able to see the court properlyestablished. Surely, they argued, this makes a mockery of thevictims and their families – a clear indication that transitionaljustice supporters and friends of South Sudan have no realdesire to help the country.Even if the court is established, people in government andamong the grassroots are asking which atrocities the court willaddress. The ones committed in 2013? The ones committed in1991? The ones committed by warlords? The ones committedby various ethnic militias? Who will be held accountable andwho is going to trial them are pertinent questions. A Dinka, aNuer, an Equatorian?‘I fought Riek’s SPLA-Nasir in 1991 and I also fought Riek’sforces in 2013, I know exactly what happened. If I haveauthority, I will shut down the hybrid court because it is goingto open wounds that cannot be closed.’ – An interview with a South Sudan People Defense Forcesoldier in Juba.Answers risk the formation of alliances among theperpetrators, especially those currently in government, andplunging the country into fratricidal con icts before the court’ssessions even begin. Already there are suspicions amongthose I consulted that the government and opposition arekeeping the country in war so that they can remain in power.Some believed that the Hybrid Court will give these actorsmore reasons to cling on to power and avoid accountability.The need for elections in South SudanPeople are aware of the situation in the country; they knowwhat happened during periods of con ict; they know about theabuses committed; they know the victims and the perpetrators.The idea that some will be punished worries many because itis rarely acceptable to isolate an individual from his/her ethnicgroup. Furthermore, people will always protect their own, guiltyor not, and this closing of ranks often leads to cycles of ethniccon icts. For people in South Sudan, the path to stability and –maybe in the future – accountability is through elections.To a former SPLA soldier I spoke to, the best approach is to letSouth Sudanese elect a leader who will open a path fortransitional justice and, consequently, stability. As far as thecivil population is concerned, the current leadership in Jubahave lost trust and legitimacy.‘I was shot four times in various Dinka-Nuer con icts, theykilled my relatives, we killed their relatives, now we are livingand eating together despite the atrocities we committedagainst each other. I am worried about the opening of thewounds because the so-called hybrid court will not providejustice to everyone; it will never  nd out the real truth.’– Interview with a former SPLA soldier in Bor.‘Now is not the right time for the hybrid court,  nd us a way tochoose our leader and stop trying to come after President Kiirbecause it can be messy.’ – Interview with a retired SPLA soldier in Juba.Reconciliation without punishmentWhile the court’s potential is being romanticised in Juba, thegrassroots is dreaming of an approach to peace that supportsforgiveness, reconciliation and healing. People I spoke withargued it will be di cult to bring accountability when manyperpetrators still hold positions of power, many powerful ethnicmilitias are uncontained, the government has lost legitimacyand the country remains divided along ethnic lines. For them,the lack of authority and institutions to enforce law and orderwill render the court ineffective.‘Taking a nail hammer approach without a government thatpeople believe in is a mistake, because after the hybrid courtcomes revenges, because no one will enforce law and order,the hybrid court should be the last phase of transitionaljustice.’ – Interview with a civil servant in Juba.The Hybrid Court also lacks widespread understanding – seenas foreign, which opens space for perpetrators in position ofpower to manipulate it. Instead, people want an approach thatis familiar. A sense of justice among many South Sudanese,especially the Dinka and the Nuer, is not about guilt andpunishment per se but reminding people of their socialobligations and responsibilities as members of society. That iswhy in many cases across the country people come togetherand agreed to stop con ict without calling for punishment.Understanding justice from belowMy respondents con rmed a common fear among many SouthSudanese: conventional wisdom views transitional justicemechanisms as ineffective in a country where the governmentpresides over a broken system awash with arms, divided alongethnic lines and lacking legitimacy. Hence, the internationalcommunity and peace partners need to pressure thegovernment to  rst address these issues through diplomaticmeans, including restricting the movement of war criminalsand freezing their assets in neighbouring countries.At the same time, the international community needs a betterunderstanding of South Sudanese society’s ideas of justicethrough nuanced research among ordinary people. In addition,support for local peace and reconciliation mechanisms run bychiefs and churches could produce more substantive resultsthan top-down approaches. These public authorities still havelegitimacy among the population, including the youth thatengage in con icts organised by politicians.Photo: UNDP Launches Pilot Projects for Recovery andReconciliation in South Sudan. UN Photo/JC McIlwaine. 20October 2014. Juba, South Sudan. Photo # 608079. Licensedunder CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.About the authorPosted In: Con ict | Human Rights | RecentAbraham Diing Akoi is a researcher at the LSE Centre forPublic Authority and International Development at theFiroz Lalji Institute for Africa. He began his formaleducation in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya, andgraduated from LSE with a Masters in DevelopmentStudies. He remains part of the PfAL network at LSE.Abraham Diing Akoi

The Hybrid Court in South Sudan could be a recipe for further conflict

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The Hybrid Court in South Sudan could be a recipe for further conflict

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