In numerous research programs based on the concept of cognitive dissonance, participants play a role that is ostensibly in conflict with their pre-existing values. A strict reading of dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) leads us to suppose that these role-playing, or 'forced compliance', procedures generally create results that are not implied by the theory. We spell out a theoretical position that comes to terms with these effects of role-playing, one that approaches role-playing procedures from the standpoint of the development of multiple value repertoires. From this viewpoint the outcomes of role-playing do not stem from contradictions-or cognitive dissonance-within the person's sets of values.We are indebted to the following for their expert advice and criticism of an earlier version of this manuscript: C. Daniel Batson, Guido Gendolla, Eddie Harmon-Jones, Giuseppe Pantaleo, Peter Schönbach, and Paul Silvia, and we are indebted to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for support in the form of a Senior Research Award to the second author
