Mancino, Paul A.

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Case Western Reserve University School of Law

Case Western Reserve Law ReviewVolume 14 | Issue 11962Torts--Prenatal Injury--Recovery AllowedPaul A. MancinoFollow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrevPart of the Law CommonsThis Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law ScholarlyCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve UniversitySchool of Law Scholarly Commons.Recommended CitationPaul A. Mancino, Torts--Prenatal Injury--Recovery Allowed, 14 W. Res. L. Rev. 151 (1962)Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol14/iss1/13Torts - Prenatal Injury.. . to comprehend why a life interest in a residuary trust which attestator's death amounted to $200,000 and a qualifying power to appoint$100,000 out of it or a life interest in such a trust and a qualifyingpower to appoint all but $100,000 out of it, do not relate to a 'specificportion,' namely, $100,000, quite as much as if the testator had used afraction or a percentage with respect to the power over corpus.'2Furthermore, the court recognized that Congress used the phrase "specificportion" and not "fractional or percentile share" and that it had notindicated a policy that deductibility of a "specific portion" should begoverned by the possibility that the spouse's portion will change in valuerelatively more or less than the dearly nonqualifying part'"In effect, the court held that a trust will qualify for the marital de-duction to the extent that the surviving spouse is entitled to a specificsum out of the entire trust, provided the other conditions requisite tothe marital deduction are met. 4 No portion of the trust would havequalified for the marital deduction if the invasion provision for theyoungest daughter had not been limited to a specific amount. 5It is submitted that the court was justified in its holding. Themarital deduction provision was designed to equalize the tax treatmentof decedents in common-law states with decedents in community propertystates.'" In Gelb, the court took another step toward equalization bygiving a liberal construction to the enactment.MILAN D. KARLANTORTS - PRENATAL INJURY - RECOVERY ALLOWEDSeattle-First National Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962)Ever since the initial attack upon the citadel of non-liability for pre-natal torts in the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz,' the trend toward allowingrecovery for prenatal injuries has been ". . so definite and marked soas to leave no doubt that this will be the law of the future in the United12. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1962).13. The Commissioner had also argued that a specific dollar amount does not meet thestatutory test in that there is no certainty that the value of the entire corpus will be the sameon the date of the surviving spouse's death as it was on the date of the decedent's death and,therefore, it fails to meet the regulation's proviso that the surviving spouse's "share mustreflect its proportionate share of the increment or decline in the whole of the property in trust."Ibid.14. See notes 6 and 7 supra and accompanying text.15. Hull, Fractional Test for Marital Deduction Trust Upset by CA-2, 16 J. TAXATION222, 224 (1962). If the invasion provision was for an indefinite amount, it would haveprecluded determination of the portion of the trust reserved to the surviving spouse. Ibid.The court ruled that the surviving spouse's qualifying power was over the entire corpus lessthe present value of $5,000 multiplied by the joint expectancy of the surviving spouse andthe youngest daughter, which can be actuarially determined.16. See generally Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family - The Revenue Act of 1948, 61HARV. L. Riv. 1097 (1948).1962]WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEWStates."2  In a recent Washington case,8 the court allowed recovery byaa infant who was born with cerebral palsy. This condition resultedfrom the negligence of the physician in caring for the mother both dur-ing pregnancy and in the subsequent delivery. The court concluded thatthe more enlightened position allows recovery for prenatal injuries, andalthough this type of action ". . . is prone to present difficult causationissues .... Difficulty of proof does not prevent the assertion of a legalright."4Today, most jurisdictions allow a foetus subsequently born alive torecover for prenatal injuries.' The theory of jurisdictions denying re-covery is a remnant of the common-law rule that an unborn child, beinga part of the mother, is not a person in being. Thus, in the latter juris-dictions it is reasoned that the unborn child is owed no duty, and it isone in whom a cause of action cannot accrue because of its legal nonex-istence.6 The catalyst in this overwhelming about-face of jurisdictionsrejecting their former common-law non-liability position and adoptingthis new type of tort liability ".... is the current state of medical knowl-edge on the point of the separate existence of a foetus."71. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Bonbrest is the first American decision allowing re-covery. The Canadian Supreme Court in an earlier case allowed a foetus subsequently bornalive to recover for its prenatal injuries. See Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille, [1933] Can.Sup. Ct. 456, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).2. PROSSER, TORTS § 36 at 175 (2d ed. 1955).3. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962). One judge concurredin the result because the evidence of proximate cause was so overwhelming. However, heagreed with the two dissenting judges that there was an improper use of defendant's deposition,which he had repudiated, and that it was error to use textbooks to establish medical facts. Id.at 841.4. Id. at 838.5. Of the jurisdictions which have expressly ruled on this point, twenty-one states and theDistrict of Columbia allow recovery. In five other states it is unlikely that the non-liabilityrule will withstand another attack. See Annots., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953); 10 A.LR.2d 1059(1950). Michigan and Wisconsin have all but overruled their past decisions denying re-covery and have strongly intimated that they will do so when the issue is next presented. SeeLaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins.Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).6. See Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901); Lewis v. Steves Sash & DoorCo., 177 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). This minority position was epitomized by aTexas court when it said that a reasonable man ". . . reckons life from the time of birth. Hisconscious care and solicitude are for the expectant mother and not for the unborn child apartfrom her." Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 359, 78 S.W.2d 944,949 (1935). But see Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951),where the court said: "To hold, as a matter of law, that no viable foetus has any separateexistence which the law will recognize is for the law to deny a simple and easily demonstrablefact. This child, when injured, was in fact, alive and capable of being delivered and of re-maining alive, separate from its mother. We agree with the dissenting Justice below that'To deny the infant relief in this case is not only a harsh result, but its effect is to do reverenceto an outmoded, timeworn fiction not founded on fact and within the common knowledgeuntrue and unjustified.'"7. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 272, 164 A.2d 93, 95 (1960). In PATTEN, HUMANEMBRYOLOGY 181 (2d ed. 1953), it is stated: "... a new individual must be regarded ascommencing at the moment of fertilization."[VOL 14:11962] Torts - Prenatal InjuryA point upon which the court did not dwell, in the instant case, waswhether the injury must occur when the foetus is viable.' Six states,and possibly a seventh,1" now allow a foetus subsequently born alive torecover against a tortfeasor whether or not it was viable at the time ofthe injury. This seems to be the more rational view, for the duty oweda viable foetus should be no greater than that owed a non-viable one."Furthermore, since there can be a comparatively wide difference ofopinion as to the moment viability occurs,"2 the arbitrary viability rulecauses injustices in borderline cases, unless the child is born immediatelyafter the injury.In law, there is an implicit recognition of an interest in a childbeing born alive. The law gives a foetus subsequently born alive a causeof action for the death of its father even though the foetus was not yetviable when the death occurred.'" Similarly, a child en ventre sa mere '4at the time of the death of the intestate, and subsequently born alive,is regarded as living for the purposes of the statutes of descent and dis-tribution.' 58. A viable foetus is one which, had it been born at the time of the injury, could live apartfrom its mother. The period of fetal development is divided into three stages. The firsttwo weeks are called the ovum period. From the third to the fifth week is the embryonicperiod in which certain rudiments of organs appear. The remainder of the prenatal life isthe fetal period in which a definite human shape is acquired. Usually the foetus will becomeviable sometime between the twentieth and twenty-eighth week of gestation. WLLIAMS,OBSTERMCS 182-85 (11th ed. Eastman 1956).9. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Sana v.Brown, 183 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. Ct. App. 1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178N.E.2d 691 (1961); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v.Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Von Elbe v.Studebaker-Packard Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (C.P. 1958).10. In Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (1951), the courtfirst espoused the viability theory but concluded by noting that "... as soon as it becomesalive it has rights which it can exercise. When it becomes alive is a medical question to bedetermined in each case according to the facts." From the opinion it is not clear whether theword "alive" means the time of conception or the time of viability.11. Duty determines one's conduct before acting. Use of the viability rule necessitates adetermination of one's duty after the act is completed, for the actor has no outward indicia ofwhether the unborn is viable or not. In effect, the viability rule does violence to fundamentaltort concepts, for it applies one's duty retrospectively instead of prospectively, and one willnot know whether his negligent act is actionable until a determination of viability is made.12. In some states it is sixteen weeks. See e.g., Biegun v. State, 206 Ga. 618, 58 S.E.2d 149(1950); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 276, 164 A.2d 93, 97 (1960) (dissenting opinion).In another state it is anytime from six to eight months. See Cooper v. Blandc, 39 So. 2d 352(La. Ct. App. 1923). Others hold that viability occurs when the child "quickens," i.e., whenthe mother first feels the child's movements. See, e.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael &Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d550 (1951).13. LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960). See Quinlan v. Welch,23 N.Y. Supp. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1893), aff'd, 141 N.Y. 158, 36 N.E. 12 (1894).14. Literally translated, it means "in the mother's womb." BLACK, LAw DIcroNARY (4thed. 1951).15. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1127 (3d ed. 1939). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (1961):WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEWThe argument of those advocating abrogation of the viability ruleis that the foetus should not be treated as a legal person, but rather asa separate entity or human being from the moment of conception, havinga potential personality which is not realized until birth. At birth liabilitybecomes complete so that injuries incurred prior to birth are subject toa conditional liability so far as the child is concerned. Thus, if the per-sonality is not achieved, there is no liability because there was no damageto a legal person.'"The argument of those who would deny recovery because of the po-tentialities of fraudulent claims is casuistic. The argument fails to dis-tinguish between the right to institute suit and the subsequent ability toprove the allegations. The first should not be denied because the lattermight not be susceptible of proof.The crux of the problem is proof of causation. Though such proofmay be difficult, 7 scrutiny by a sedulous court will prevent any fraud.With the present advanced state of medical knowledge, there is no logicalreason why the viability rule should become another example of "... . thepower of a sonorous phrase to command uncritical acceptance [which!has often been encountered in the law."'18Considering the other legal rights of the non-viable child, 9 it be-comes a question of whether those rights should be deemed more im-portant than the right to be compensated for being born deformed anddebilitated through the negligence of another. Repudiation of the via-bility rule vitiates the medico-legal limbo in which it is uncertain whetherthe foetus could live separately from its mother.PAUL A. MANCINO"A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may benecessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth ......16. Difficulty of proving the extent of damages is one factor which adversely affects therights of recovery for the wrongful death of a foetus in the early stages of its development."Considering the highly speculative nature of the pecuniary value of an unborn child [borndead], even if viable, it is apparent that practically everything that could be recovered in anaction for the death of an unborn child can now be recovered by the mother in connectionwith her own claim for general damages." Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99,268 P.2d 178, 180 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954). But cf. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.Iowa 1960), and Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), whereactions for the wrongful deaths of unborn viable children subsequently stillborn were upheld.17. This will allay the objection that an over-sympathetic jury will grant relief where theproof of causation is, at most, fragmentary. See, e.g., Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), where the plaintiff child failed to show by clearconvincing evidence that its prenatal injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence. Seealso Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 274, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960) (dissenting opinion).18. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.1033 (1936).19. See notes 13-14, sapra and accompanying text.[VoL 14:1

Torts--Prenatal Injury--Recovery Allowed

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Torts--Prenatal Injury--Recovery Allowed

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