Dugan, Thomas A.

English

bepress Legal Repository

Constitutional Law--Coerced Confessions--Length of Confinement as a Test

Case Western Reserve University School of Law

Case Western Reserve Law ReviewVolume 8 | Issue 41957Constitutional Law--Coerced Confessions--Lengthof Confinement as a TestThomas A. DuganFollow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrevPart of the Law CommonsThis Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law ScholarlyCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve UniversitySchool of Law Scholarly Commons.Recommended CitationThomas A. Dugan, Constitutional Law--Coerced Confessions--Length of Confinement as a Test, 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 538 (1957)Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol8/iss4/9WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEWRecent DecisionsCONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COERCED CONFESSIONS -LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT AS A TESTPrivate citizens found a 21 year old Negro loitering in an alley in awhite neighborhood of a small southern town. In an effort to solve aseries of burglaries, some involving rape, the local police took the de-fendant to a state prison in a neighboring county for interrogation.'There he was held without arraignment for ten days until a satisfactoryconfession was obtained.2  No close friends or counsel were permitted tosee defendant until his father gained admittance on the eighth day. De-fendant was represented by counsel from the tune of arraignment. Thetrial resulted in a conviction for first degree burglary with intent toravish, and the accused was sentenced to death. The Alabama SupremeCourt rejected petitioner's plea that the methods used to obtain his con-fessions violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendmentto the United States Constitution 8aThe United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, in the case of Fikesv. Alabama,4 reversed petitioner's conviction on the ground that the statehad violated due process of law. The majority disregarded the fact thatthe police had advised petitioner of his rights, because a person of hismentality could not be expected to appreciate the significance of suchadvice.5 Although illegal delay in arraignment was common in Alabamaand confessions obtained during the period of such detention were ad-missible in evidence, the Court insisted that delay was a telling circum-stance in determining the voluntariness of the confession. The interro-gations were not continuous, nor were they at odd hours, but prolongeddelay in the taking before a magistrate plus petitioner's low mentalityconvinced the Court that the confession was involuntary and that its use'The reason given by the officers for transporting the petitioner outside the countywas a threat of mob violence, although the record fails to justify this belief.'A confession given during the fifth day proved unsatisfactory to the police becauseit consisted of short answers to leading questions. The second confession was ob-tained on the tenth day.Fikes v. State, 263 Ala. 89, 81 So. 2d 303 (1955) Other grounds consideredand dismissed by the state court in a per curam opinion were that Negroes hadbeen systematically excluded from the grand jury, and that the trial judge had refusedto let petitioner take the stand solely for the purpose of testifying to the involuntari-ness of the confessions.'352 U.S. 191 (1957)'Petitioner is said to be "thick-headed." He started school at the age of eight andleft at age sixteen while in the third grade.[SeptemberRECENT DECISIONSat the trial violated due process of law.6 The Court reiterated the testit had adopted in Sten v. New York 7 by weighing the circumstances ofpressure against petitioner's power of resistance.Physical brutality in obtaining confessions has long been condemnedby the Umted States Supreme Courts and really presents no litigable.issue.9 The controversies of the past seventeen years have revolved aboutthe elements of the more subtle mental coercion. The police practice ofgrilling a suspect intensively into the late hours, usually by relay teamsof officers, has been given the label of "continuous interrogation" andhas uniformly been held to constitute mental coercion and grounds forreversal of a conviction.10 When continuous interrogation was notpresent, the Court failed to find mental coercion, and the state convictionwas sustained.1 The vigorous dissent in the Fikes case points out theabsence of the usual grounds relied on for reversal in the past.-2The sole basis for reversal in the Fikes case -is that the pressure of thedelay in arraignment overcame pettoner's low mentality. The Courthas enunciated a rule for federal courts which prohibits the use of a'The Court is in doubt as to whether the police methods themselves or the use attrial of confessions obtained by those methods constituted a denial of due process.At 352 U.S. 191, 197, the Court says, "The use of the confessions secured in thissetting was a denial of due process"; but at page 198, "the circumstances of pressureapplied against the power of resistance of this petitioner deprived him of dueprocess of law."7346 U.S. 156 (1953).8 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).'Police brutality is still very much alive as a practical matter even though the practiceis definitely unconstitutional: At the recent hearings on the new civil rights bill,Arkansas Attorney General Bruce Bennett testified that nearly every police depart-ment occasionally finds it necessary to resort to physical coercion. Civil RightsHearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 1, at 1176 (1957).'Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68(1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.227 (1940). As an interesting aftermath of the Turner case, see The Saturday Eve-mng Post, March 2 1957 The defendant is still in jail while an appeal from hisfifth trial is going through the courts. In another case, Malinsks v. New York, 324U.S. 401 (1945), there were threats of physical violence; this was held to be suf-ficient ground for reversal of a conviction even though there was no continuousinterrogation.n Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S: 443 (1953);Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55(1951); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944)." Justice Harlan wrote the dissent which was joined in by Justices Reed and Burton.The dissenters also argued that the power of review of state decisions was narrowerthan a case from the lower federal courts and that this decision overstepped thebounds of federal interference with state police power.1957]WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEWconfession obtained through illegal delay in arraignment's This federalrule has had a haphazard existence, as the Court has held it inapplicablewhen -the defendant is arraigned on some minor charge while beingquestioned about a major crune,14 or when the delay takes place after aconfession.' 5 The federal doctrine has definitely been rejected by theCourt when considering state decisions,'6 although -the Fikes case seemscontra in applying the spirit, if not the letter, of the federal rule to astate proceeding.' 7In the past, the Supreme Court has made a distinction between theillegal police methods themselves and the use of a confession which wasinvoluntary. With three possible exceptions,' 8 the Court has held thatthe denial of due process consisted of the use of an involuntary con-fession.19 Illegal police methods used to obtain confessions have beenconsidered only as they influence the voluntariness of the confessions.The Fikes case seems preoccupied with the police methods of illegal de-lay in arraignment, and the conviction seems to have been reversed inorder that police officers will be deterred from using such methods again,rather than because the defendant lost his power to resist the pressure.It is readily comprehensible that physical brutality will sap the willof the accused and actually render his confession involuntary. Althoughthe effect of mental coercion is less obvious, it would also -be safe to saythat modern society recognizes that mental coercion can -have the sameresult. But every police activity cannot be labeled as mental coercion;to constitute such, the activity should be of such a nature that theaccused has no will to resist the suggestion of guilt. To say that mere'McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)'United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951)' United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944) For a complete discussion of thefederal rule, see Anno., 19 A.L.R. 2d 1331 (1951)1'Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949)'Only one prior case expressed such disfavor of delay in arraignment in a state con-viction, and this was obviously dicta. "This Court has set aside convictions basedupon confessions extorted from ignorant persons who have been subjected to per-sistent and protracted questioning, or who have been threatened with mob violence,or who have been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or coun-sel, or who have been taken at night to lonely and isolated places for questiomng.Any one of these grounds would be sufficient cause for reversal. All of them are tobe found in this case." Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942)'Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), wavers between "'use" and "methods."Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) discusses police methods as violating due proc-ess, but the case is finally decided on the use of the confession. Ashcraft v. Tennes-see, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) seems to be decided on the premise that the police methodsthemselves violated due process." Even the famous physical brutality case, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),reversed the conviction only on the ground that the use of the confession violated dueprocess of law.(September

https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3672&amp;context=caselrev

Constitutional Law--Coerced Confessions--Length of Confinement as a Test

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

bepress Legal Repository

Case Western Reserve University School of Law