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Testing for the principal’s monopsony power in agency contracts
Authors
A Levy
AM Azzam
+20 more
Atsushi Inoue
BC Murray
DA Black
E Appelbaum
F Hayashi
G Tauchen
GW Scully
JB Kliebenstein
JB Rebitzer
JG Altonji
JM Wooldridge
JR Schroeter
LL Martin
LP Hansen
P Dubois
P Leegomonchai
TC Schroeder
TF Bresnahan
Tomislav Vukina
WM Boal
Publication date
Publisher
Doi
Abstract
Oligopsony, Principal–agent model, Production contracts, C33, D43, J41, J43, L13,
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Last time updated on 04/12/2019
Research Papers in Economics
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Last time updated on 06/07/2012