thesis

Conservation policies, environmental valuation and the optimal size of jurisdictions

Abstract

The size of a jurisdiction is crucial in determining the efficiency, equity or efficacy of environmental regulations. However, jurisdictions are usually taken to coincide with political boundaries even if environmental externalities may transcend them. This paper illustrates the design and implementation of a Choice Modelling experiment to determine the spatial distribution of environmental benefits of Kings Park (Western Australia). The objective is to understand if federal, state or local resources are the appropriate form of funding a conservation policy. Results indicate that there are interstate spillovers of benefits, hence justifying federal contributions to Kings Park. They also show that some benefits are homogeneously spread within Western Australia, and this is an indication that state funding is also appropriate. Other benefits are distance-dependent; some level of local/council funding is warrantedfederal regulation, decentralised policies, benefits spillovers, environmental valuation, choice modelling, distance

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