Stabilité stratégique et pollution-stock transnationale : le cas linéaire

Abstract

Most of the contributions that deal with cooperation issues in transfrontier pollution problems, bear only on pollutants that do not accumulate. Moreover, most articles that deal with the dynamics of the problem (implied by the pollutant's accumulation) leave aside the issue of the voluntary implementation of an international cooperative optimum. The aim of the present contribution is to overtake these two limitations. Using both differential and cooperative game theory, we define at each moment of time a scheme for abatement costs through financial transfers between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation (defined as a Nash equilibrium). This sharing scheme is also "strategically stable", in the sense that no coalition is capable to make its members better off than what they would obtain at the optimum with transfers. This results is obtained under the hypothesis that the countries' environmental damage functions are linear, in a framework where countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not, given the current stock of pollutant.pollution internationale; externalités; jeux différentiels; jeux coopératifs; transferts financiers