We study an extension of the DeGroot model where part of the players may be
rebels. The updating rule for rebels is quite different with that of normal
players (which are referred to as conformists): at each step a rebel first
takes the opposite value of the weighted average of her neighbors' opinions,
i.e. 1 minus that average (the opinion space is assumed to be [0,1] as usual),
and then updates her opinion by taking another weighted average between that
value and her own opinion in the last round. We find that the effect of rebels
is rather significant: as long as there is at least one rebel in every closed
and strongly connected group, under very weak conditions, the opinion of each
player in the whole society will eventually tend to 0.5.Comment: 7 pages, Proceedings of The 6th International Conference on
Knowledge, Information and Creativity Support Systems, Beijing, 201