If Joe Biden and Andrés Manuel López Obrador are to rescue moribund US-Mexico security cooperation, they will need to meet each other halfway in any new agreement, write Yulia Vorobyeva (Florida International University) and Ryan Berg (American Enterprise Institute)

Berg, Ryan

Vorobyeva, Yulia

English

LSE Research Online

The	Mérida	Initiative	may	be	dead,	but	restarting	US-Mexico	security	cooperation	will	be	crucialIf	Joe	Biden	and	Andrés	Manuel	López	Obrador	are	to	rescue	moribund	US-Mexicosecurity	cooperation,	they	will	need	to	meet	each	other	halfway	in	any	newagreement,	write	Yulia	Vorobyeva	(Florida	International	University)	and	RyanBerg	(American	Enterprise	Institute).In	a	recent	press	conference,	Mexico’s	president	Andrés	Manuel	López	Obrador	(AMLO)derided	the	Mérida	Initiative	–	the	country’s	security	cooperation	framework	with	the	US	–	for	adopting	a	militarisedapproach	to	organised	crime	instead	of	focusing	on	the	development	and	wellbeing	of	the	Mexican	people.	TheMinistry	of	Foreign	Affairs	followed	this	up	by	announcing	that	the	Mérida	Initiative	had	officially	ended,	as	it	was	nolonger	meeting	Mexico’s	needs.The	relationship	has	been	fraught	with	mutual	distrust,	culminating	in	the	recent	arrest	and	the	subsequent	releaseof	former	Mexican	Secretary	of	Defence	General	Salvador	Cienfuegos,	accused	of	high-level	corruption	by	USauthorities.	However,	despite	the	differences,	it	has	never	been	more	important	for	US-Mexico	security	cooperationto	reach	for	the	defibrillator,	and	finding	common	ground	could	be	easier	than	it	might	initially	seem.Former	Mexican	Secretary	of	Defence	Salvador	Cienfuegos	(left),	seen	here	with	Chairman	of	the	USJoint	Chiefs	of	Staff	Martin	Dempsey	(right)	at	a	meeting	on	US-Mexico	security	cooperation	in	2013,has	since	been	accused	of	high-level	corruption	by	US	authorities	(public	domain)AMLO	and	the	“War	on	Drugs”In	2019,	AMLO	declared	an	end	to	the	“war	on	drugs”	in	Mexico.	Throughout	his	presidency,	he	has	been	critical	ofprevious	governments	and	advocated	a	“softer”	approach	to	security,	focused	on	using	social	policy	to	preventcrime	and	delinquency.	That	said,	he	has	remained	reticent	to	outline	the	details	of	such	a	strategy	and	insteadexpanded	the	Mexican	Army’s	power	to	unprecedented	levels.LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: The Mérida Initiative may be dead, but restarting US-Mexico security cooperation will be crucial Page 1 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-01-06Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2021/01/06/the-merida-initiative-may-be-dead-but-restarting-us-mexico-security-cooperation-will-be-crucial/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/One	of	the	few	things	that	AMLO	has	articulated	is	the	extent	to	which	he	would	like	to	reduce	the	US	role	inMexico’s	security.	Recent	legislation,	which	was	fast-tracked	through	Mexico’s	Congress,	aims	to	hamper	UScounter-narcotics	investigations	on	Mexican	territory	by	reducing	immunity	for	officers	of	the	Drug	EnforcementAgency	and	curtailing	the	ability	of	Mexican	officials	to	cooperate	without	prior	approval.	However,	with	Mexicancriminal	groups	in	control	of	large	swaths	of	the	country’s	territory	and	homicide	rates	shattering	records	despiteCOVID-related	lockdowns,	effectively	ending	security	cooperation	will	save	neither	Mexican	nor	American	lives.Despite	the	mutual	recriminations,	the	tough	reality	is	that	a	Mérida-style	security	agreement	remains	the	bestopportunity	for	Mexico	and	the	US	to	jointly	address	their	highly	interdependent	security	concerns.	Rather	thanabandoning	the	principles	of	“shared	responsibility”,	both	countries	should	rethink	and	renegotiate	bilateral	securitycooperation	for	the	next	decade.The	Mérida	InitiativeThe	Mérida	Initiative,	signed	in	2007,	deepened	and	institutionalised	security	assistance	from	the	US	to	Mexico.Previously,	Mexico’s	deep-rooted	concern	for	sovereignty	over	internal	affairs	had	meant	that	it	was	not	a	majorrecipient	of	US	security	funds.	Under	Mérida,	security	assistance	has	totalled	nearly	$3	billion	and	run	the	gamutfrom	traditional	military	hardware	to	institution	building,	anti-money	laundering	operations,	prison	reform,	and	anambitious	modernisation	of	Mexico’s	judicial	system.Bilateral	assistance	has	been	organised	around	four	main	pillars:1.	 Disrupting	the	capacity	of	organised	crime2.	 Improving	and	sustaining	the	rule	of	law3.	 Creating	a	21st	century	border	structure4.	 Building	strong	and	resilient	communitiesThe	first	pillar	sought	to	roll	back	the	gains	of	Mexico’s	potent	criminal	groups	by	transferring	high-end	equipment,sharing	intelligence,	and	conducting	joint	law-enforcement	operations.	Both	countries	tout	the	capture	of	cartelkingpins	and	major	seizures	of	US-bound	drugs	as	examples	of	success.	Still,	the	toll	in	Mexico	can	be	seen	inastronomically	high	homicide	figures,	as	criminal	organisations	diversify	their	activities	and	become	increasinglyfragmented,	due	in	part	to	neglecting	the	middle	operational	layer	of	cartels	in	favour	of	arresting	kingpins.	The	US,meanwhile,	continues	to	see	tens	of	thousands	of	overdose	deaths	every	year.LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: The Mérida Initiative may be dead, but restarting US-Mexico security cooperation will be crucial Page 2 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-01-06Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2021/01/06/the-merida-initiative-may-be-dead-but-restarting-us-mexico-security-cooperation-will-be-crucial/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/Amongst	other	things,	the	Mérida	Initiative	aimed	to	improve	the	equipment	and	training	available	toMexico’s	security	forces	(Eneas	de	Troya,	CC	BY	2.0)The	second	pillar	aimed	to	bolster	key	institutions	of	internal	control,	including	reform	of	Mexico’s	badly	brokencriminal	justice	system.	The	US	helped	to	develop	national	training	standards	for	Mexico’s	police,	prosecutors,	andjudges,	as	well	as	leveraging	the	attraction	of	accreditation	to	encourage	reform.	Hundreds	of	millions	of	dollarshave	been	spent	on	increasing	the	use	of	forensics	in	evidentiary	procedure	and	boosting	the	capacity	of	specialcrime-scene	units.	Nevertheless,	impunity	continues	to	reign:	it	is	estimated	that	only	1%	of	crimes	are	reported	andsolved,	with	cases	often	stymied	by	government	officials	that	are	too	easily	co-opted	by	well-financed	cartels.	Thearrest	of	General	Cienfuegos	manifested	worrying	levels	of	criminal	penetration	in	Mexico’s	state	institutions.Further,	the	volume	of	criminal	cases	easily	overwhelms	Mexico’s	judiciary.	Clearly,	much	still	needs	to	be	done	tostrengthen	the	rule	of	law	in	Mexico.Mérida’s	third	pillar	is	another	longstanding	focus	of	US-Mexico	security	cooperation.	Although	over	$200million	have	been	allocated	to	modernisation	of	Mexico’s	air,	land,	and	sea	borders,	they	remain	woefullyunderstaffed	and	are	increasingly	reliant	on	the	military.	A	Bilateral	Executive	Steering	Committee	meets	annuallyto	develop	binational	action	plans,	but	collaboration	in	these	areas	has	been	fraught	with	resentment	sinceconstruction	of	a	border	wall	became	the	centrepiece	of	the	US	response.	This	has	damaged	the	securityrelationship	and	exacerbated	a	humanitarian	catastrophe	on	the	US’	doorstep,	while	doing	little	to	solve	the	issuesthat	cause	people	to	migrate	in	the	first	place.By	shortsightedly	choosing	to	view	progress	through	the	lens	of	immigration,	the	US	also	diverted	the	attention	ofMexican	law	enforcement	away	from	flows	of	drugs	to	the	north	and	guns	to	the	south.	While	Mexican	cartelsdiversify	into	fentanyl	and	heroin	to	meet	US	demand,	thousands	of	US-based	arms	dealers	are	meeting	thegrowing	demand	from	cartels	for	assault	rifles.	Territorial	contestation	between	groups	coupled	with	theineffectiveness	of	Mexico’s	state	institutions	creates	an	ideal	market	for	US-made	weapons,	with	one	recent	studyby	the	Mexican	government	estimating	that	2.5	million	illicit	weapons	have	been	trafficked	across	the	border.While	modernising	border	checkpoints	is	essential	to	countering	illicit	flows,	the	Mérida	Initiative	paired	this	effortwith	a	focus	on	the	underlying	conditions	that	drive	these	flows.	This	fourth	pillar	has	seen	the	US	Agency	forInternational	Development	fund	projects	on	crime	prevention	and	human	rights,	while	also	providing	technicalassistance	to	NGOs	in	Mexico.	Its	budget,	however,	has	tended	to	lag	behind	military	assistance.	Between	2014and	2018,	it	accounted	for	roughly	one	third	of	the	total	US	funds	allocated	to	security	cooperation	with	Mexico.Given	the	need	to	address	socioeconomic	factors	in	tackling	persistent	crime,	this	neglect	is	puzzling.	If	the	US	iscommitted	to	achieving	a	more	balanced	approach	to	its	security	cooperation	with	Mexico	–	something	which	couldalso	earn	AMLO’s	endorsement	–	then	channelling	50%	of	the	total	funds	into	long-term	community-basedinterventions	would	be	a	good	place	to	start.LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: The Mérida Initiative may be dead, but restarting US-Mexico security cooperation will be crucial Page 3 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-01-06Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2021/01/06/the-merida-initiative-may-be-dead-but-restarting-us-mexico-security-cooperation-will-be-crucial/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/“The	discourse	of	President	López	Obrador	provides	a	potential	bridge	between	US	and	Mexicansecurity	interests”	(Octavio	Hoyos/Shutterstock.com)Tapping	into	the	popular	sentiment	against	pervasive	corruption,	violence,	and	a	lack	of	opportunities	has	helpedAMLO	maintain	a	64%	approval	rating	during	the	most	violent	year	in	the	country’s	history.	Even	though	AMLO’srhetoric	frequently	contradicts	his	actions,	the	Mexican	president’s	discourse	provides	a	potential	bridge	betweenUS	and	Mexican	interests.	Economic	and	social	development	could	bring	policymakers	from	both	sides	of	theborder	together	to	chart	a	course	towards	a	deepening	of	preventive	policies.The	future	of	US-Mexico	security	cooperationIn	rejecting	the	Mérida	Initiative,	AMLO’s	goal	is	to	reduce	the	US	role	in	Mexico’s	security	policies,	which	haveincreasingly	gone	awry	even	as	military	involvement	has	intensified.	The	good	news	is	that	the	US	Congress	andPresident-elect	Biden	are	both	disposed	to	continue	cooperation	on	joint	security	challenges,	and	AMLO’s	newcounterpart	in	Washington	may	prove	amenable	to	renegotiating	current	arrangements.	Any	revived	frameworkmust	be	forward-looking	and	take	full	stock	of	the	new	complexities	in	Mexico’s	criminal	landscape	and	the	lessonslearned	from	years	of	the	Mérida	Initiative.While	it	is	clear	that	AMLO	does	not	want	joint	interdiction	efforts	to	dominate	bilateral	security	discussions,	theyremain	a	necessary	component	of	any	serious	plan	to	implement	a	balanced	approach	to	public	security.Intelligence	sharing	based	on	mutual	trust	is	a	major	prerequisite	for	such	cooperation.	Although	restoringconfidence	may	be	challenging	in	the	short	term,	the	US	should	signal	its	intent	to	engage	in	an	equal-partnerdialogue	by	focusing	any	new	framework	on	institution	building	and	social	services,	especially	at	the	local	and	statelevels.	Increased	cooperation	on	social	development	will	bring	tangible	results	in	countering	criminal	groups	and	willcontribute	to	firming	up	the	long-term	security	partnership.LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: The Mérida Initiative may be dead, but restarting US-Mexico security cooperation will be crucial Page 4 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-01-06Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2021/01/06/the-merida-initiative-may-be-dead-but-restarting-us-mexico-security-cooperation-will-be-crucial/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/The	US	should	also	nudge	AMLO	towards	focusing	his	anti-corruption	rhetoric	and	his	country’s	beefed-up	financialintelligence	unit	on	anti-money	laundering	efforts	and	high-profile	corruption	cases,	including	within	the	MexicanArmy.	Like	other	criminals,	Mexican	cartels	have	also	taken	full	advantage	of	an	opaque	international	financialsystem	and	the	advent	of	cryptocurrencies;	a	concerted	US	effort	to	prevent	criminal	groups	and	their	governmentenablers	from	enjoying	their	ill-gotten	gains	could	dovetail	nicely	with	the	strong	focus	on	institutional	corruption	thatis	so	central	to	AMLO’s	persona.Given	his	experience	in	the	region,	President-elect	Biden	has	the	capacity	to	rescue	moribund	US-Mexico	securitycooperation.	His	first	task	will	be	to	convince	AMLO	of	the	urgent	need	for	a	new	framework	and	then	to	meet	himhalfway.	The	two	partners	can	call	the	agreement	whatever	they	like,	but	without	finding	common	ground,	bothcountries	risk	allowing	Mexico’s	cartels	to	perpetrate	even	greater	violence	and	bloodshed	than	they	do	today.	Notes:•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	rather	than	the	Centre	or	the	LSE•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commentingLSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: The Mérida Initiative may be dead, but restarting US-Mexico security cooperation will be crucial Page 5 of 5		Date originally posted: 2021-01-06Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2021/01/06/the-merida-initiative-may-be-dead-but-restarting-us-mexico-security-cooperation-will-be-crucial/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/

The Mérida Initiative may be dead, but restarting US-Mexico security cooperation will be crucial

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108783/1/latamcaribbean_2021_01_06_the_merida_initiative_may_be_dead_but.pdf

The Mérida Initiative may be dead, but restarting US-Mexico security cooperation will be crucial

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

LSE Research Online