The UK might have left the European Union on 31 January 2020, but it has not left its gravitational field, nor will it in 2021. The challenge for all sides is somehow to stabilise British exceptionalism outside the EU’s legal order, writes Martin Westlake (LSE/College of Europe)

Westlake, Martin

English

LSE Research Online

The	UK	might	be	outside	the	European	Union	but	notoutside	its	gravitational	fieldThe	UK	might	have	left	the	European	Union	on	31	January	2020,	but	it	has	not	left	its	gravitational	field,	nor	will	it	in2021.	The	challenge	for	all	sides	is	somehow	to	stabilise	British	exceptionalism	outside	the	EU’s	legal	order,writes	Martin	Westlake	(LSE/College	of	Europe).Those	on	the	‘remain’	side	of	the	Brexit	argument,	must	acknowledge	that	British	exceptionalism	was	reaching	itslimits	long	before	David	Cameron’s	fateful	2013	Bloomberg	Speech	promise	of	an	in-out	referendum.	Though	nowcompletely	forgotten,	the	then	Prime	Minister	followed	up	that	promise	with	‘renegotiations’	leading	to	the	23February	2016	New	Settlement	for	the	United	Kingdom	within	the	European	Union,	described	by	Sir	Ivan	Rogers	asa	very	last	attempt	to	entrench	British	exceptionalism	within	the	EU’s	legal	order.	In	the	end,	Cameron’s	NewSettlement	was	washed	away	by	a	referendum	campaign	focused	almost	exclusively	on	emotive	issues	related	toimmigration,	money	and	sovereignty	rather	than	his	more	cerebral	(and	justified)	concerns	about	the	risk	ofeurozone	members	outvoting	the	UK’s	financial	interests	within	the	internal	market.	But	for	all	sorts	of	reasons	–sixth-largest	economy	in	the	world,	major	trading	partner,	currently	home	to	a	lot	of	Europe’s	venture	capital,	UNsecurity	council	permanent	member,	nuclear	power,	and	so	on	–	the	UK	remains	exceptional	so	that	now	thechallenge	for	all	sides	is	somehow	to	stabilise	British	exceptionalism	outside	the	EU’s	legal	order	–	the	samechallenge,	ironically,	both	sides	faced	before	1	January	1973.But	how	to	respond	to	that	challenge,	especially	given	that	the	23	June	2016	Brexit	referendum	result	was	anegative?	Leave	voters	knew	only	what	they	were	voting	against.	For	the	Remain	camp,	there	was	only	onealternative,	but	for	the	Leave	side,	there	seemed	to	be	all	sorts	of	alternatives.	Post-referendum,	undefined	politicalslogans	(‘take	back	control’,	‘Brexit	means	Brexit’,	‘get	Brexit	done’,	‘global	Britain’)	vied	with	‘models’	described	ineuphemistic	shorthand	country	terms	(‘Norway’,	‘Switzerland’,	‘Turkey’,	‘Ukraine’,	‘Canada	+’,	‘Australia’,‘Singapore-on-the-Thames’…)	while,	through	a	succession	of	set-piece	speeches	and	negotiations,	first	TheresaMay	and	then	Boris	Johnson	painted	a	series	of	red	lines	that	gradually	cut	down	options;	most	importantly,	the	UKwill	be	outside	the	customs	union	and	it	will	be	outside	the	single	market.	But	the	basic	assumption	with	which	allwould	surely	agree	is	that,	in	the	longer	run,	there	must	and	will	be	a	future	relationship	between	the	UK	and	itslargest	trading	partner,	whatever	form	it	ultimately	takes	(and	it	is	probably	going	to	take	a	long	time	for	the	rhetoricto	dissipate	and	the	dust	to	settle).In	Outside	the	EU:	Models	for	Britain,	leading	experts	describe	and	analyse	various	country	models	and	considerhow	relevant	they	might	be	to	the	case	of	the	UK.	(The	real	Singapore,	for	example,	is	neither	low	tax,	nor	lowregulation,	nor	particularly	open	trade	and	therefore	not	of	particular	relevance	to	the	so-called	‘global	Britain’vision.)	Other	contributing	authors	look	at	historical	precedents	(the	original	1954	Association	Agreement	betweenthe	European	Coal	and	Steel	Community	and	the	UK,	for	example)	and	how	they	might	illuminate	the	debate.	Theylook	also	to	important	aspects	of	the	future	relationship,	such	as	the	position	of	the	Crown	dependencies,	forexample,	and	security	cooperation.	As	editor,	I	deliberately	avoided	writing	a	concluding	chapter;	the	expertcontributions	make	their	own	cases	and	the	reader	is	free	to	make	up	her	or	his	mind.	The	exercise	was	aboutilluminating	the	debate	and	not	about	axe-grinding.LSE Brexit: The UK might be outside the European Union but not outside its gravitational field Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2020-12-04Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/12/04/the-uk-might-be-outside-the-european-union-but-not-outside-its-gravitational-field/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/Four	general	observations	can	nevertheless	be	made.	A	first	is	that	the	EU	is	far	from	being	monolithic	in	itsconstruction.	Consider	the	eurozone;	not	all	EU	member	states	are	in	it,	but	a	number	of	non-EU	dependentterritories	and	micro	states	are	effectively	members,	while	Kosovo	and	Montenegro	have	adopted	the	euro	as	theirsole	currency	without	any	official	agreement	(and	therefore	without	issuing	rights).	Consider	similarly	the	Schengenarea;	not	all	EU	member	states	are	in	it	but	a	number	of	non-member	states	are	de	facto	members	(the	EFTAcountries,	for	example).	Seen	from	close	up,	the	EU	is	variegated	in	appearance.	A	second	is	that,	although	the	EUtends	to	place	emphasis	on	the	momentum	of	the	integration	process,	that	process	is	not	consistentlyunidirectional.	Territories	do	leave	occasionally	(Algeria	in	1962,	Greenland	in	1985,	the	UK	in	2020).	The	EU	doessay	‘no’	on	occasion.	Its	predecessor,	the	EEC,	first	said	‘no’	to	the	UK,	Denmark,	Ireland	and	Norway	in	1963.Most	recently,	in	2012,	the	EU	said	‘no’	to	Andorra,	Monaco	and	San	Marino.	Lastly,	countries	do	decide	againstfull	membership	on	occasion;	in	their	different	ways,	Norway,	Switzerland	and	Iceland,	for	example.A	third	general	observation	is	that	states	decide	what	is	best	for	themselves	according	to	their	own	democraticdevices	and	traditions;	Switzerland	is	in	EFTA,	for	example,	but	not	in	the	EEA.	Fellow	EFTA	state	Norway	is	in	theEEA,	but	not	in	the	EU.	These	relationships	result	from	various	referendums	where	the	Swiss	and	Norwegianpeople	have	expressed	their	democratic	point	of	view.	In	1972,	in	a	referendum,	the	Norwegians	decided	againstmembership	of	the	EEC.	In	1972	there	was	no	such	tradition	for	referendums	in	the	UK,	which	subsequentlybecame	a	member	state	of	the	EEC	through	a	parliamentary	act.	Had	there	been	a	referendum	in	1972,	the	countrywould	almost	certainly	not	have	joined	the	EEC.	But	by	2016	referendums	had	been	constitutionalised	(notablyunder	the	2000	Political	Parties,	Elections	and	Referendums	Act),	so	that	the	use	of	a	referendum	to	settle	the	EUmembership	issue	–	once	Parliament	had	given	its	approval	–	could	not	be	presented	as	an	aberration.	(In	thiscontext,	frustrated	Remainers	should	note	that	the	Norwegian	people	confirmed	their	position	by	a	similar	margin	ina	second	referendum	in	1994	–	twenty-two	years	after	the	first.)LSE Brexit: The UK might be outside the European Union but not outside its gravitational field Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2020-12-04Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/12/04/the-uk-might-be-outside-the-european-union-but-not-outside-its-gravitational-field/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/Fourth,	when	countries	decide	what	is	felt	to	be	best	(or	most	comfortable)	for	themselves,	there	are	always	trade-offs	to	be	made	between	competing	interests,	with	advantages	and	disadvantages	on	both	sides	of	the	balance.There	are	demonstrable	economic	advantages	to	full	EU	membership,	but	many	would	argue	that	there	are	all	sortsof	political,	constitutional,	democratic,	sentimental,	cultural,	historical	and	geographical	considerations	to	beconsidered	as	well.	To	take	some	examples,	countries	like	Iceland,	Liechtenstein	and	Norway	enjoy	all	the	benefitsof	the	EU’s	internal	market	through	their	membership	of	the	EEA,	but	they	have	had	to	accept	in	return	that	they	willhave	no	direct	say	in	the	market	rules	by	which	they	have	to	abide.	Much	to	the	EU’s	discomfiture,	Switzerlandprefers	to	manage	its	affairs	through	a	complicated	series	of	bilateral	sectoral	agreements	that	have	to	befrequently	adjusted	and	renegotiated.	Turkey	enjoys	a	customs	union	with	the	EU	that	was	intended	as	a	stagingpost	to	full	EU	membership	but	has	increasingly	come	to	seem	like	a	finalité	politique.	The	Turkish	economy	–particularly	its	car	industry	–	has	benefitted	greatly	from	tariff-free	access	to	the	EU’s	internal	market,	but	Turkeyhas	had	to	accept	in	return	that	it	cannot	cut	its	own	trade	deals.Earlier	this	year,	in	her	seminal	work,	The	Brussels	Effect:	How	the	European	Union	Rules	the	World	(OxfordUniversity	Press),	Anu	Bradford	convincingly	demonstrated	how,	through	sheer	dint	of	the	size	of	its	market	and	itsstrong	regulatory	institutions,	the	EU	unilaterally	regulates	global	markets.	Without	any	need	for	internationalorganisations	or	agreements,	the	EU	shapes	the	world’s	business	markets	and	‘Europeanizes’	many	aspects	ofglobal	commerce.	This	invisible	hand	of	the	EU	regulator	is	every	bit	as	strong	and	inexorable	as	Adam	Smith’sinvisible	hand	of	competition.	From	this	point	of	view,	as	Bradford	put	it	at	a	recent	LSE	seminar,	whatever	itthought	it	was	doing,	the	UK	has	effectively	swapped	rule-making	for	rule-taking.	Of	course,	the	UK	economy	willnot	wither	and	die	once	the	UK	has	entirely	left	the	EU	–	far	from	it;	but,	because	of	the	‘Brussels	effect’,	it	cannever	entirely	escape	the	gravitational	pull	of	the	EU	and	its	internal	market.This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	ofEconomics.	LSE Brexit: The UK might be outside the European Union but not outside its gravitational field Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2020-12-04Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/12/04/the-uk-might-be-outside-the-european-union-but-not-outside-its-gravitational-field/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/

The UK might be outside the European Union but not outside its gravitational field

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108258/1/brexit_2020_12_04_the_uk_might_be_outside_the_european_union_but_not.pdf

The UK might be outside the European Union but not outside its gravitational field

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

LSE Research Online