Scotland voted No to independence on 18 September, in part because the leaders of the three main parties in Westminster offered the country a deal to devolve more powers to the Scottish Parliament. Ainslie Noble writes on the differences between the campaigns in Scotland and Catalonia. She argues that with the Spanish government acting to prevent Catalonia from holding a referendum, the popular support for independence could similarly be used as leverage to push for more devolved powers

Noble, Ainslie

LSE Research Online

Credit: Steve Oldham (CC-BY-SA-3.0)17/09/2014Catalonia could follow Scotland in using its independencemovement as leverage to win more devolved powersblogs.lse.ac.uk /europpblog/2014/09/17/catalonia-could-follow-scotland-in-using-its-independence-movement-as-leverage-to-win-more-devolved-powers/Scotland voted No to independence on 18 September, in part because the leaders of the three mainparties in Westminster offered the country a deal to devolve more powers to the Scottish Parliament. Ainslie Noblewrites on the differences between the campaigns in Scotland and Catalonia. She argues that with the Spanishgovernment acting to prevent Catalonia from holding a referendum, the popular support for independence couldsimilarly be used as leverage to push for more devolved powers.On 9 November, 2014, Catalonia plans to hold a non-binding referendum for independence from Spain. This willfollow Scotland’s referendum on 18 September, when the country opted to stay in the UK. Yet, while there aresimilarities between these two regions, such as a 300 year old union with their parent state, they each have differentreasons for wanting independence.It might seem that the recent European economic crisisis to blame for the Catalan independence initiative.Indeed, the region’s current leader Artur Mas haslamented Spain’s refusal to re-negotiate Catalonia’sfiscal agreement, while politicians such as SoledatBalaguer, journalists such as Pilar Rahola andeconomists such as Mireia Borrell-Porta and XavierSala-i-Martin resent a central government which doesnot re-distribute Catalonia, Spain’s most prosperousregional economy‘s contributions fairly.Many economists agree with Catalan claims that thedeficit between what the region pays to Madrid and whatit receives in return for public spending amounts toaround 16 billion euros annually. Catalan historian EnricUcelay Da Cal agrees that the economic crisis hasinfluenced the rise of Catalan separatism but he arguesthat this is because it is seen as destroying distinctivehallmarks of Catalan culture such as small business.Spain’s lack of consideration for the Catalan languageand culture has also become a common gripe among Catalans themselves.These accusations have put Madrid in a precarious position. A long tradition of negotiation has allowed Catalans tosuccessfully bargain with Spain for a level of political and cultural recognition. Indeed, it seemed that the latestreward for this pragmatism was Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of autonomy including mention of the region as a ‘nation’and affirming further control in legal, linguistic and financial matters.However, in mid-2010, the Constitutional Court of Spain ruled that fourteen out of the 129 articles of the Statute wereunconstitutional and that another twenty-seven would need to be interpreted as per the Court’s ruling. What followedwas a discernable change in Catalan attitudes towards Madrid and increased support for independence. Forexample, over one million Catalan demonstrators took to the streets in Barcelona to protest the ConstitutionalCourt’s decision and the nationalist leaning CiU returned to power later that year.1/3The Catalan national day or diada of 2012 was marked by the presence of a new slogan “Catalan, new EuropeanState”. An estimated 1.5 million participants in the traditional march made it the largest to date. Two months later inmid-December, the Catalan Parliament set the date of the referendum for 9 November 2014, which was immediatelydeclared illegal by the Spanish Parliament. Yet, while Artur Mas concedes that a ‘Yes’ vote would not give Cataloniaindependence, it would provide greater leverage to negotiate more powers for Catalonia within Spain.With recent polls indicating that Catalan support for independence sits around 45 per cent, Catalonia is clearlyenvious of Scotland’s legally sanctioned referendum. The Scottish National Party (SNP) has been similarly enviousof Catalan popular support for independence as many polls leading up to the Scottish referendum originallysuggested that Scots were not as keen for independence as their Catalan counterparts, although they narrowedsharply as the vote approached.A major factor influencing Catalonia’s desire for secession is that many Catalans feel that Spain does not respectCatalan culture. Yet, unlike many ‘ethno-nationalisms’ which use language such as in Catalonia or religion as strongrallying points, Scotland lacks such a common cause. Scots-Gaelic has all but fallen into disuse and unlike the Irish,religion is not a marker of Scottish identity.History is, however, an important basis for Scottish national identity. Indeed, the date of Scottish referendum fell onthe 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314. Perhaps the SNP had been optimistic that thecommemorations of Robert the Bruce’s epic defeat over the English Army would re-awaken Scottish nationalism.Scottish identity is complex, however, with many Scots retaining a sense of belonging to the UK and the SNPstating, for instance, that had Scotland opted for independence the Queen would have remained its head of state.Furthermore, according to Britain’s National Center for Social Research, when given a choice of listing severalidentities, up to 40 per cent (45 per cent in 2012) of Scots have consistently chosen British and Scottish.The current road to Scottish independence has been driven by the SNP. As Holyrood’s first majority government in2011, it moved ahead with its plans for an independence referendum. As polls taken around this time indicated thatScottish support for independence was sitting around 30 per cent, the success of the SNP cannot be attributedsolely to its independence platform. So what is the rationale for secession from the UK?The SNP’s White Paper, a document outlining the SNP’s plans for an independent Scotland, provides an instructiveinsight into why some Scots wish to leave the Union. A recurrent theme in the White Paper is that Scotland lacks theappropriate decision making power in important domains such as taxation and public spending. According to theWhite Paper, the main principles underpinning the need for independence are: “Democracy, Prosperity andFairness”. In other words, freedom from British rule.A bone of contention since the 1970s has been the UK’s alleged mismanagement of the vast oil reserves offScotland’s North Sea. Another is the controversial ‘bedroom tax’ and poll tax. SNP leader, Alex Salmond is also anardent supporter of the environment and believes that independence will allow Scotland the freedom to explorerenewable energy and enact legislation on the reduction of emissions. He promised that an independent Scotlandwould be nuclear free with the intended removal of the British Trident programme, which houses the UK’s nuclearweapons system on Scotland’s west coast.Despite the positives presented in the White Paper, there has been hesitancy over the benefits of independence,likely due to the uncertainty it raises. For example, there were doubts over the issue of whether Scotland would havebeen able to seamlessly transfer its EU membership and maintain the UK specific opt-outs it currently enjoys suchas generous EU subsidies, non-membership of the Eurozone and Schengen area. The SNP banked on the principleof “continuity of effects”, according to which, an independent Scotland should, more or less, have been able to pickup where it left off as part of the UK. Yet, Scotland would have potentially had to formally apply as a separatemember of the EU. Furthermore, Spain or Belgium, fearful that Scotland’s EU membership might provide anincentive for their own separatist movements, could in theory have vetoed Scotland’s entry into the EU.2/3With Scotland voting against independence on 18 September, the Catalans will have watched the result withanticipation. An independent Scotland would have buoyed the Catalan cause and set a hopeful precedent forCatalonia’s own public debate. The No vote however has brought a collective sigh of relief to those in Scotland andthe UK who do not want to see a three centuries old Union ripped apart to face an uncertain future. However, theCatalans need not necessarily be discouraged by the No vote, though Madrid will no doubt be pleased.Furthermore, while a positive result in Catalonia’s own plebiscite will not mean secession, at least in the near future,it will likely provide Catalonia the leverage it needs to achieve its political, cultural and fiscal desires.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, norof the London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1woIF2B_________________________________About the authorAinslie NobleAinslie Noble is the author of Memory, Identity and Violence: Comparing Contemporary Catalonia and the BasqueCountry in France and Spain. She has a PhD from the University of Melbourne. She is a contributing analyst atWikistrat and has expertise in secessionist movements in Europe including those in France, Spain, Italy andScotland. Her current research involves examining the role of history in separatist movements in the context of the‘supra-national’ European Union.3/3

Catalonia could follow Scotland in using its independence movement as leverage to win more devolved powers

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

LSE Research Online