What role do academics have in contributing to the debate over Europe’s refugee crisis? Abel Bojar writes that the crisis comes as close to a ‘natural experiment’ as it gets in the social sciences and highlights the members of four particular research disciplines – economists, political economists/political scientists, scholars of electoral and party politics, and experts in international relations and EU studies – that should rise to the opportunity

Bojar, Abel

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blogs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/09/14/how-academia-should-respond-to-europes-refugee-crisis/Oxford University’s Bodleian Library. Credits: Tejvan Pettinger / WikimediaCommons (CC-BY-SA-3.0)How academia should respond to Europe’s refugee crisisWhat role do academics have in contributing to the debate over Europe’s refugee crisis? Abel Bojarwrites that the crisis comes as close to a ‘natural experiment’ as it gets in the social sciences andhighlights the members of four particular research disciplines – economists, politicaleconomists/political scientists, scholars of electoral and party politics, and experts in internationalrelations and EU studies – that should rise to the opportunity.Facing what the EU’s Migration Commissioner, Dimitris Avramopoulos, called the “worst refugeecrisis the world has seen since World War II”, European citizens can’t help reacting to dailydevelopments with emotional outbursts of sympathy, prejudice and fears of the unknown.Once the powerful imagery of the crisis — ranging from the tragic picture of the dead boy washed ashore in Turkey tothe heart-warming video footages of German crowds greeting refugees with joy — sink in the collective memory, it willbe time to make a sober assessment of the summer of 2015. In particular, once the dust settles, social scientists of allstripes will have to engage in a meaningful and constructive debate on what we have learnt and yet to learn in thefuture. In this post, I wish to highlight four particular research disciplines that should rise up to this opportunity thatcomes as close to a “natural experiment” as it gets in the social sciences.First, economists studying the impact of migration willget ample material to test existing arguments on whatlabour mobility implies for the economy. It is importantto note that today’s wave of migrants is nothingradically new in some of the EU member states interms of numbers; the UK, for instance, receives morethan a quarter of a million of citizens in a year fromother EU member states alone. However, the influx ofmigrants from the Middle East and Africa may imply asupply shock afflicting several countries at the sametime with an arguably different age and skillcomposition compared to day-to-day intra-EUmigration.On the one hand, few dispute the benefits thatmigrants bring by increasing the supply of labour,creating new and arguably more efficient allocation ofjobs, filling up state coffers, relieving some of theburden from creaking pay-as-you-go pension systemsand adding to aggregate demand as new consumers. On the other hand, there are valid concerns over theimplication of this supply shock for wages at the lower-end of the wage distribution, especially if the skill distribution ofthe new migrants is skewed towards the unskilled end of the scale. Moreover, the ongoing debate on the merits andflaws of minimum wage systems in the EU as well as their impact on unemployment may come under scrutiny with arenewed force.Second, political economists and political scientists  in the state-centred tradition may get new inspiration for debateson state capacity. Being a latent concept that is intrinsically difficult to measure, quantitative scholars often rely onvery crude proxies such as government revenues/GDP or the estimated size of the grey and black economy, ignoringcrucial non-monetary aspects of the concept. Some of these aspects came to the fore during this summer. EUcandidates, such as Macedonia, struggling to build strong institutions for EU accession, were always going to find itdifficult to cope with this challenge of unprecedented scale.More troubling is the fact that institutions of existing member states, such as Hungary, a country in the eye of thestorm, often failed to function in the way a “strong state” is expected to function. Failures of the Hungarian state in thecrisis include the breakdown of routine administrative tasks, such as processing registration and asylum applicationswith the required speed, the failure to deliver basic social services (temporary accommodation facilities, sanitation,food distribution etc.), the failure to employ police forces not only as instruments of the coercive apparatus but also asagents of the state to calm nerves, provide instructions and cooperate with an unexpectedly vibrant civil society in aneffective way.Cynics and opponents of the highly controversial Hungarian government may argue that all this has been intentionalin order to send a strong message to potential migrants to reconsider their perilous journey ahead. This argument willnot be the least plausible one ever made. That said, it is equally plausible that the optimistic and at times euphorictone of the transition and EU accession literature needs to be seriously reconsidered when it comes to state capacityin Central and Eastern Europe.Third, scholars of electoral and party politics should pay attention to developments in the party-political arena.Observers of party competition have often framed their arguments in terms of issue-ownership. The basic logic ofissue-ownership is simple: due to their historically accrued reputation, parties come to own issues where they enjoy ahigh level of trust by the electorate in their capacity to address them more effectively than their political rivals. Asmuch as competing along alternative proposals, parties, therefore, compete along the prioritisation of issues that theyperceive to own. Immigration is a perfect example of such an issue long owned by the Right.On the face of it, the current migration crisis is a perfect storm that the Right is ready to ride. Having been amongvoters’ top concerns for a while, the crisis has now rendered immigration the single most salient issue among theEuropean electorate. When in opposition, right-wing parties are therefore likely to capitalise on their issue-ownership.This is particularly true for the extreme and new populist right that has long been a merciless advocate of a restrictive,“tough love” approach to immigration.Where right-wing parties are in power, the picture may be more nuanced. If their professed solutions fail to achievetheir abstract promise of social harmony and national self-preservation, voters may become increasingly sceptical ofright-wing parties’ ability to walk the walk, rather than just talk the talk. Equally questionable is the Left’s ability to offera credible alternative. Short of that, it is highly plausible that they will have no choice but to give in, just like a numberof “third-way” left-wing parties did on the economy in the 1990s. The list of possible scenarios is of course endless.Scholars in the field will have ample opportunity to follow the changing fortune of parties with the refugee crisis,almost beyond doubt, in the centre of the debate.Fourth, the refugee crisis is also a litmus test for scholars of international relations and EU studies. As the increasinglyobvious tension between the elimination of border control (Schengen agreement) and the current asylum regime ofthe EU (Dublin III agreement) calls for policy innovation at the highest levels, old concepts of neo-functionalistspillovers and inter-governmental bargaining between member states in areas of high politics will come to the fore.While a more effective asylum regime than the current one is in the interest of all, the asymmetric exposure to thecrisis as well as the uneven gains to be made is likely to complicate any smooth policy reform emanating from theCommission through the Council.Joint decision traps at the EU level will have to be overcome (potentially involving side-payments and opt-outs) andtwo-level games between the national and supra-national levels will have to be played out before a final settlementcan be reached. The current flagship proposal aiming to resettle 160,000 migrants from the three most exposedcountries (Greece, Italy and Hungary) is the first, but unlikely to be the last episode of this saga. Moreover, bilateralreadmission agreements with third countries may also come under strain if EU member states adopt an increasinglyrestrictive stance towards migrants.This list is by no means exhaustive and different scholars, depending on their background and expertise, will drawdifferent conclusions regarding their research priority. Students of sociology, for instance, will surely focus theirattention on the social integration of refugees. Scholars of public policy will inquire about the role of education andtraining to prepare migrants for their new home. Researchers of security studies will surely look at the threats thathundreds of thousands of migrants traveling without documents may imply for the EU and radicalised Islamist groupsresiding within its borders. The avenues for research inspired by the crisis are almost limitless. One can only hopethat the diversity of the research agenda will mirror the increasing diversity of the European Union itself.Please read our comments policy before commenting .Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor ofthe London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1UKf6bK _________________________________About the authorAbel Bojar – LSE, European InstituteAbel Bojar is LSE Fellow in Political Economy of Europe at the LSE’s European Institute.

How academia should respond to Europe’s refugee crisis

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