Leaning primarily on Duverger\u27s Law, which credits minor party votes as wasted momentum, current research on institutional obstacles to minor party voting largely overlooks the influence of constituency size. This research reexamines the electoral hindrances that minor parties face when competing against the two dominant political parties. Specifically, I hypothesize there is a negative relationship between constituency size and minor party vote share. This thesis adopts an institutional approach to explain the success of minor parties in constituencies of varying size. In the empirical models, I will control for minor party organizational strength, state ballot access laws and whether states allow fusion practices, which permit candidates to run under both a minor and a major political party label. The intent is to isolate the effects of constituency size. Using Ordinary Least Squares Regression and archival election data from the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of State offices from each of the fifty states, this research finds evidence that smaller constituencies improve minor party candidate success. The findings suggest smaller constituencies can neutralize other institutional barriers to electoral prowess put in place by the two-party duopoly or Democratic and Republican Party dominance
