International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
Abstract
Fresh fish trade in Kribi, Cameroon is characterized by high uncertainty in a context of specific assets. Facing this uncertainty, actors have developed hybrid coordination mechanisms centered on contractual arrangements and networks. These implicit contractual arrangements involve price negotiation, delivery agreements between fishermen and buyers, as well as transactions including the provision of various types of credit. Supply networks help build trust among trading partners. Trust is based not only on strong ties through ethnic network but also on the trading partner‟s credibility brought about through repeated and lasting relationships. In theory our case study concurs with some of the Williamson‟s intuitions. The study further shows that the establishment of an "organized" market with a view to building transparency in the transactions has prompted the majority of actors to adopt this institution. At the same time, it has also loosened some of the social relationships otherwise indispensible in the absence of a viable marketing institution. Institutional trust does not, however, completely replace relational trust between actors given the low development of microcredit in the area.Keywords: Markets and Trade, Fisheries Economics, Markets and LabelsKeywords: Markets and Trade, Fisheries Economics, Markets and Label
