ManagementRecruiting practices within the Department of Defense have received criticism during recent audits because of increased costs and inefficiencies. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported many of the existing problems within the recruiting commands are caused by the goal-based recruiting systems used by the services. This thesis discusses management theories on goal-based systems and analyzes U.S. Navy recruiting data in order to identify possible explanations why individual recruiter productivity has declined since 1990 and why less than 20% of Navy recruiting districts are achieving their assigned mission requirements. The author presents an alternative system, which is an incentive-based system, known as Production Recruiting Incentive Model (PRIME). PRIME is a mechanism designed to maximize market potential, provide an equitable reward program, and obtain important market information in order to allow for better resource allocation decisions. PRIME is currently being prototyped by the U.S. Army recruiting command. The author recommends the Navy Recruiting Command adopt and experiment with PRIME as it is designed to allow various incentive tools to be incorporated within its framework.http://archive.org/details/annalysisofusnav1094532114NAU.S. Navy (U.S.N.) author.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
