Self-reliant detection of route leaks in inter-domain routing

Abstract

Route leaks are among the several inter-domain routing anomalies that have the potential to cause large scale service disruptions on the Internet. The reason behind the occurrence of route leaks is the violation of routing policies among Autonomous Systems (ASes). There exist a few rudimentary solutions that can be used as a first line of defense, such as the utilization of route filters, but these palliatives become unfeasible in large domains due to the administrative overhead and the cost of maintaining the filters updated. As a result, a significant part of the Internet is defenseless against route leak attacks. In this paper, we examine the different types of route leaks and propose detection methodologies for improving the reliability of the routing system. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows. We develop a relatively basic theoretical framework, which, under realistic assumptions, enables a domain to autonomously determine if a particular route advertisement received from a neighbor corresponds to a route leak. Based on this, we propose three incremental methodologies, namely Cross-Path (CP), Benign Fool Back (BFB), and Reverse Benign Fool Back (R-BFB), for autonomously detecting route leaks. Our strength resides in the fact that these detection techniques solely require the analysis of control and data plane information available within the domain. We analyze the performance of the proposed route leak identification techniques both through real-time experiments as well as simulations at large scale. Our results show that the proposed detection techniques achieve high success rates for countering route leaks in different scenarios

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