34 research outputs found
μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ μμ νΉμν μ± μμ κ΄ν μ°κ΅¬
νμλ
Όλ¬Έ (μμ¬)-- μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ : λ²κ³Όλν λ²νκ³Ό, 2019. 2. μ΄λ΄μ.λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ 곡μ κ±°λλ²μ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ λμμΈ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ νΉμν μ±
μμ κ΄ν μ°κ΅¬μ΄λ€. 곡μ κ±°λλ² λ²λ¬Έμλ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ νΉμν μ±
μμ κ΄ν λͺ
μμ μ μκ° μμΌλ©°, μ΄μ λ°λΌ μ°λ¦¬λλΌμμλ μ΄μ κ΄ν λ³λμ λ
Όμλ μ΄λ£¨μ΄μ§λ° μλ€. κ·Έλ¬λ μ°λ¦¬μ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ λ²λ¦¬κ° μ μ¬νλ€κ³ νκ°λλ μ λ½μ κ²½μ° 1979λ
μ Hoffmann-La Roche νκ²° μ΄ν μ§κΈκΉμ§ λ°λ³΅μ μΌλ‘ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ λνμ¬ μμ₯μμ λ μ΄μ κ²½μ쑰건μ μ
νμν€μ§ μμ λ³΄λ€ λμ μ£Όμμλ¬΄μΈ νΉμν μ±
μμ κΈμ νκ³ μκ³ , 2009λ
μ μ λ μ λ½ μ§νμμνμ λ°°μ λ¨μ©μ κ΄ν μ§νμ§μΉ¨μμ νΉμν μ±
μμ κ°λ
μ μμ©νκ³ μλ€. μ΄μ λ³Έ μ°κ΅¬λ 곡μ κ±°λλ² ν΄μλ‘ μΌλ‘λ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ νΉμν μ±
μμ μΈμ ν μ μμ κ²μΈμ§ λ° λμκ° μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ λνμ¬ νΉμν μ±
μμ μΈμ ν μ μλ κ·Όκ±°λ 무μμΈμ§λ₯Ό κ·λͺ
ν¨μ λͺ©μ μΌλ‘ νλ€.
μ΄λ₯Ό μνμ¬ λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ λ¨Όμ 곡μ κ±°λλ²μ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©νμ κ·μ μ λͺ©μ μ΄ λ¬΄μμΈμ§λ₯Ό λ°νλ€. κ·Έ κ³Όμ μΌλ‘ μ°μ μ°λ¦¬λλΌμ λ¨μ©κ·μ λ₯Ό κ°κ΄νκ³ , μ λ μν μ΄ν κ·Έ κ°μ μ§νμ€μ μ μ΄ν΄λ³Έλ€. κ·Έλ¦¬κ³ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©νμμ κ΄ν μ΅μ΄μ λλ²μ μ μν©μ체 νκ²°μΈ 2007λ
ν¬μ€μ½ νκ²°μ νμ λ΄μ©μ μ¬λμκ² μκ°νκ³ μ΄λ₯Ό νκ°νλ€. λν κ΅λ΄λ²μ κ²ν λ§μΌλ‘ λ¨μ© κ·μ μ λͺ©μ μ κ·λͺ
νλλ° μΆ©λΆνμ§ μμΌλ―λ‘ λνμ μΌλ‘ λ―Έκ΅, μ λ½μ°ν© λ° λ
μΌμ λ¨μ©κ·μ λ₯Ό κ°κ΄νκ³ κ° μ
λ²λ‘λ³λ‘ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ λͺ©μ μ μ΄λ»κ² μ΄ν΄νλμ§μ κ΄νμ¬ κ³ μ°°νλ€.
λ€μμΌλ‘ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ νΉμν μ±
μμ΄ μ λ½μμ μ΄λ»κ² λμ
λκ³ κ΅¬μ²΄νλμλμ§μ κ΄νμ¬ μ΄ν΄λ³Έλ€. ꡬ체μ μΌλ‘λ μ λ½ λ²μμ Hoffmann-La Roche νκ²°(1979), Michelin I νκ²°(1983), British Airways νκ²°(2007) λ° Intel νκ²°(2017)μ νμ λ΄μ© λ° λ¨μ©μ κ°λ
λ±μ κ΄ν μ λ½ μ§νμμνμ λ°°μ λ¨μ©μ κ΄ν μ§νμ§μΉ¨μ μκ°νλ€. μ΄νμ νΉμν μ±
μμ΄ μ λ½μμ μμ©λκ² λ μ΄λ‘ μ κ·Όκ±°κ° λλ λ
μΌμ μ§μμμ μ£Όμμ κ΄νμ¬ μ΄ν΄λ³΄κ³ , μ°λ¦¬ λ² ν΄μμμλ μ§μμμ μ£Όμμ μΈ ν΄μμ΄ μ ν¨ν¨μ λ°νλ€. μ΄μ΄μ νΉμν μ±
μμ΄ κ²½μλ²μ μΌλ‘ μ΄λ ν ν¨μλ₯Ό κ°μ§κ³ μλ κ²μΈμ§ μ΄ν΄λ³Έλ€. λ¨Όμ κ·Έ λ²μ μ±κ²©μ κ΄ν λ
Όμλ₯Ό μκ°νκ³ λ¨μ©νμμ κ°λ
μ λΉμΆμ΄ μ°λ¦¬λλΌ κ³΅μ κ±°λλ² ν΄μλ‘ μΌλ‘λ μλ²μ± μμλ‘ ν΄μν¨μ΄ νλΉν¨μ μ
μ¦νλ€. κ·Έλ¦¬κ³ μ΄λ¬ν ν΄μμ΄ μ±
μμ ν¬κΈ°κ° μ§λ°°λ ₯μ ν¬κΈ°μ λΉλ‘ν μ μκ² λλ©°, ν¨κ³Όμ€μ¬μ μ κ·Όλ²κ³Όλ μ‘°νλ₯Ό μ΄λ£° μ μμμ λ°νλ€.
μμ κ°μ λ
Όμλ₯Ό λ°νμΌλ‘ μ°λ¦¬λλΌμ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ€λ¬΄μ λν λΉνμ κ²ν λ₯Ό μ§ννλ€. ꡬ체μ μΌλ‘ 곡μ κ±°λμμνμ μ€λΌν΄ μ¬κ±΄ κ²°μ (2015), λ²μμ ν¬μ€μ½ νκ²°(2007), λμ
νλμ‘°ν© νκ²°(2009) λ° μ΄λ² μ΄μ§λ§μΌ νκ²°(2008)μ λΆμνκ³ κ° μ¬μ
μλ³λ‘ νΉμν μ±
μμ΄ μΈμ λ κ²½μ° μ΄λ ν κ²°λ‘ μ΄ λμΆ λ μ μλμ§ λΆμνμλ€.
λ§μ§λ§μΌλ‘ μ΄μμ λ
Όμλ₯Ό μ μ λ‘ κ³΅μ κ±°λλ² ν΄μλ‘ μΌλ‘λ μΆ©λΆν μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ νΉμν μ±
μμ μΈμ ν μ μμΌλ©°, μ΄λ₯Ό λͺ
νν νκΈ° μνμ¬ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©νμ μ¬μ¬μ§μΉ¨μ κ°κ΄μ κ°λ
μΌλ‘μμ λ¨μ©νμμ μ μκ·μ λ° νΉμν μ±
μμ κ΄ν λ΄μ©μ λ΄μ κ²μ μ μνμλ€. μ΄ κ°μ λ
Έλ ₯μ μ¬μ
μμ νμμ€μΉμ λͺ
νν νλ μΈ‘λ©΄μμλ μλ―Έκ° μμΌλ©° λ²μμ ν¬μ€μ½ νκ²° μ΄ν μμΆλ 곡μ κ±°λμμνμ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©νμ μ§ν νλλ₯Ό μ¬κ³ νλλ° λμμ μ€ μ μλ€λ μ μμ μλ―Έκ° μλ€.This thesis is a study on special responsibility of dominant undertaking subject to regulations on abuse under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(hereinafter referred to as the Korean competition law).T here is no explicit definition of special responsibilities of dominant undertaking in the Korean competition law, therefore any discussion on this issue has not been made in Korea. However, in Europe, where the laws of abuse are considered similar to ours, special responsibility of the higher duties of care not to aggravate the competition in the market has been accepted since the judgement of Hoffmann-La Roche was made in 1979 and the concept of special responsibility was admitted in the Guidance on the Commissions enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, which was established in 2009. This study is aimed to find out whether the special responsibility of dominant undertaking would be allowed by interpreting the Korean competition law and, in turn, why the special responsibility of dominant undertaking is allowed.
First of all, this thesis identifies the purpose of regulating abuse of market dominant position under the Korean competition law. Following this, we will first review the country's abuse regulations and the performance of its implementation since the system of abuse regulations started.
It also provides an in-depth introduction and assessment of the 2007 POSCO decision, which was made on the abuse of market dominant position by the first full bench of the Supreme Court of Korea. Also, the review of domestic laws is not sufficient to analyze the purpose of the abuse regulation, so we deal with the abuse regulations in the United States, the European Union and Germany, and discuss how to understand the purpose of the abuse regulations for each legislation.
Next, we look at how special responsibility of dominant undertaking has been introduced and specified in Europe. In detail, we introduce the European Court's judgement of Hoffmann-La Roche (1979), Michelin I (1983), British Airways (2007), Intel (2017) and the concept of abuse under the Guidance on the Commissions enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. Later, we look at Germany's ordo-liberalism as a theoretical basis for which special responsibility was accepted in Europe, and explain our law can be interpreted effectively by ordo-liberalism. We then discuss what special responsibility means in Korean competition law. First, we introduce a discussion on the legal nature of special responsibility and then prove it reasonable to consider special responsibility as the factor of illegality under Korean competition law. We also show that this idea allows the magnitude of responsibility to be proportional to the magnitude of control and can be harmonized with an effect-based approach.
Based on the above discussions, a critical review of Korea's practice of regulating abuse is conducted. Specifically, the Fair Trade Commission's decision on Oracle case (2015), the court's decisions on POSCO (2007), the Agricultural Cooperative Federation (2009) and the eBayGMarket (2008) are analyzed and what conclusions could be reached if special responsibility was applied to each enterpriser.
Finally, above discussions conclude that special responsibility of dominant undertakings can be fully admitted through interpreting Korean competition law and I proposed that the objective definition of abuse and the content of special responsibility should be included in the guideline on examination of abuse of market dominant position for clarification. These efforts are meant to clarify the standard for the conduct of the enterpriser and to help reconsider the Fair Trade Commission's enforcement for abuse of market dominant position, which has shrunk since the court made the decision on POSCO.μ 1 μ₯ μλ‘ 1
μ 1 μ μ°κ΅¬μ λͺ©μ 1
μ 2 μ μ°κ΅¬μ λ²μμ λ°©λ² 3
μ 2 μ₯ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ λͺ©μ 6
μ 1 μ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©κ·μ κ°κ΄ 6
1. λ¨μ©κ·μ μ λ²μ κ·Όκ±° 6
2. 곡μ κ±°λλ²μ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ νΉμ§ 8
3. λ¨μ©νμμ λΆλ₯ 9
4. 곡μ κ±°λλ²μ λ¨μ©νμμ λΆλ₯ 10
μ 2 μ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ§μ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ λͺ©μ 11
1. μμΈ 11
2. 곡μ κ±°λλ²μ λ¨μ©κ·μ μ λͺ©μ 11
μ 3 μ λΉκ΅λ²μ κ²ν 21
1. λ―Έκ΅ λ
μ κΈμ§λ²μ νλ 21
2. μ λ½ κ²½μλ²μ νλ 26
3. λ
μΌ κ²½μμ νλ°©μ§λ²μ νλ 30
μ 4 μ μκ²° 32
μ 3 μ₯ μμ₯μ§λ°°μ μ¬μ
μμ νΉμν μ±
μ 35
μ 1 μ ꡬ체ν κ³Όμ 35
1. μ λ½ λ²μμ νκ²°μ ν΅ν μμ©Β·λ°μ 35
2. μ λ½ μ§νμμνμ μ
μ₯ 45
3. μ 리 45
μ 2 μ νΉμν μ±
μμ μ΄λ‘ μ λ°°κ²½ 46
1. μ΄λ
μ λ°°κ²½ - μ§μμμ μ£Όμ 46
2. λ²μ λ°°κ²½ 49
μ 3 μ νΉμν μ±
μμ κ²½μλ²μ ν¨μ 50
1. λ²μ μ±κ²© 51
2. μ§λ°°λ ₯μ ν¬κΈ°μμ μκ΄κ΄κ³ 55
3. ν¨κ³Όμ€μ¬μ μ κ·Όλ°©μκ³Όμ λΆμ‘°ν μ¬λΆ 56
4. μκ²° 57
μ 4 μ₯ μ°λ¦¬λλΌ μ€λ¬΄μ λν λΉνμ κ²ν 59
μ 1 μ μμΈ 59
μ 2 μ μ¬κ²°λ‘ λ° νλ‘ κ²ν 59
1. μ¬κ²°λ‘ κ²ν 59
2. νλ‘ κ²ν 62
3. μκ²° 69
μ 3 μ μ
λ²λ‘ λ± μ λ 보μ μ¬ν 71
1. μ¬μ¬μ§μΉ¨ κ°μ κ²ν 71
2. ν¬μ€μ½ νκ²°μ μ ν λ
Έλ ₯ 73
μ 5 μ₯ κ²°λ‘ 75
μ°Έκ³ λ¬Έν 76
Abstract 80Maste
μλ―Έλ²μ λ Όμ λ° κ·Έ μμ¬μ μ μ€μ¬μΌλ‘
νμλ
Όλ¬Έ (λ°μ¬) -- μμΈλνκ΅ λνμ : λ²κ³Όλν λ²νκ³Ό, 2021. 2. λ
Ένμ€.Article 43(1) of the Korean Trust Act, enacted in 2012, states: Where a trustee has violated his duties incurring any loss to the trust property, the settlor, beneficiary, or other trustees where a number of trustees exist, may request the relevant trustee to restore, reinstate the trust property: Provided, that where it is impossible or substantially impracticable to reinstate the trust property, or excessive expenses are incurred in such reinstatement, or where any special ground exists making reinstatement inappropriate, a claim for damages may be raised.Furthermore, article 43(3) of the Korean Trust Act states that where a trustee is in breach of a duty of loyalty stipulated in Articles 33 through 37, he should disgorge all the profits acquired by himself or a third party to the trust property, even if no loss has incurred to the trust property.
The disgorgement remedy set out in Article 43(3) provides exceptional relief, preventing the trustee from realizing any gains resulting from a breach of the trustees fiduciary duty. Yet, this powerful gain-based remedy has not been applied by courts in South Korea. Thus, it is difficult to understand a clear rule for determining disgorgement of profits case.
Before the enactment of article 43(3), there have been debates by legal scholars whether any legal basis already existed for disgorgement of profits in South Korea. Unjust enrichment and management of anothers affairs(negotiorum gestio) were traditional remedies available to an injured party, however the legal basis for disgorgement of profits was tenuous. Thus, the legislature found it necessary to specially enact Article 43(3) to be able to impose this remedy. However, no case law has been developed so far and Article 43(3) is often overlooked due to its obscurity. The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the nature and function of a trustees fiduciary duty and the disgorgement of profits under Article 43(3) by analyzing the fiduciary duty of a trustee and the remedies available for breach of a trustees fiduciary duty in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
This dissertation will first examine the basic principles of disgorgement of profits in a breach of trustees fiduciary duty in Anglo-American jurisprudence. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the purpose of disgorgement of profits is to strip profits if they are gained in a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the trustee to its beneficiaries. The fiduciary duty of the trustee requires the fiduciary to exercise the highest duty of trust and confidence between the fiduciary and its beneficiaries. The fiduciary must exercise its powers and discretion carefully given the vulnerable and dependent nature of any beneficiarys relationship to its trustee. Given the special status of this relationship, a trustee owes the highest fiduciary duty to the beneficiary, which includes the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule.
The vitally important duty of loyalty is not self-enforcing, and when a breach occurs, the remedy should be in conformity with the duty. The rationale for disgorgement of profits is to deter a breach of the duty of loyalty. Deterrence and prophylaxis are the strongest rational for disgorgement of profits. The quantification of illegally gained profits must reflect the nuances of the fiduciary relationship and the manner in which the duty was breached; the uneasy interplay between causation, remoteness and allowances must be considered. In ordering a disgorgement of profits, a court should factor in the fiduciarys skill and effort in determining the amount of the profits that should be disgorged. Disgorgement of profits is a harsh remedy, and its effectiveness as a deterrent depends on its proportionality to the wrongs.
This paper will also address the liability of third parties to its beneficiaries in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The liability of third parties is based upon the concepts of knowing receipt and knowing assistance. When a third party receives a trust asset which has been disposed of by the trustee in breach of the trustees duty, and the third party has knowledge of the breach of duty, then the third party can be held liable to its beneficiaries for the value of the asset. Moreover, if the third party knowingly assists the trustee in a dishonest and fraudulent manner, the third party can be held independently liable to its beneficiaries for the third partys misconduct. Under the Korean Trust Act, when the trustee has engaged in a legal act in violation of the purpose of trust, the beneficiary is granted the right to seek recission. However, the remedy of recission is only available when the third party (and a subsequent purchaser) knows about the trustees breach of fiduciary duty at the time when the breach occurs, or the third party is unaware of the breach due to gross negligence of the third party.
Unlike Anglo-American jurisprudence, knowing assistance is not a basis for imposing liability on a third party in South Korea. However, this dissertation proposes that South Korea should adopt the basis for liability to include knowing assistance, to ensure that the third party does not profit from his wrongdoing. Most circumstances involving knowing assistance pertain to professionals, such as financial institutions, accountants, and legal professionals alleged to have fostered the fiduciarys misconduct.
Finally, this paper examines whether it is plausible to apply the disgorgement of profits remedy to a corporations board of directors. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, a director of a corporation is categorically treated as a status-based fiduciary who owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation. If unauthorized profits are made by a director in breach of his fiduciary duty to the corporation, the director should be required to disgorge the profits just as a disloyal trustee is required to disgorge profits under the Trust Act in South Korea.
Under the Korean Commercial Code, remedies exist that are functionally similar to the disgorgement of profits, yet these remedies are fragmented. For instance, directors are prohibited from engaging in a transaction which competes with their corporations interests without the consent of the board of directors. If a director violates his duty not to compete in the absence of the boards consent, the director may be held liable for monetary damages sustained by the corporation. Additionally, intervention rights are granted to a corporation under the Korean Commercial Code. The corporation may intervene and substitute itself for the director in the third-party transaction. Furthermore, a director may not usurp certain business opportunities available to the corporation without approval by the board of directors. If a director usurps the corporations business opportunity in contravention of his fiduciary duty, then the director may be held liable for damages based upon a presumption that the ill-gotten gains made by the director are the damages suffered by the corporation. Both intervention rights and the presumption that illegal profits are the corporations damages are modified forms of the remedy of disgorgement of profits. However, a breach of a general duty of loyalty under the Korean Commercial Code does not stipulate these gain-based remedies. The directors of a corporation are in charge of managing the companys business and thus, their role is similar to that of a trustee. Thus, this paper argues that the remedy of disgorgement of profits should be adopted for breach of a duty of loyalty by a director under the Korean Commercial Code.μ νλ² μ 43μ‘° μ 1νμ μνμμ μμν볡 μ±
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μ νλ² μ λ©΄κ°μ μ μλ―Έλ²μ μ μΈμ무μμ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ λμ
νλ €κ³ μ μ€ν κ·μ μ΄λ€. λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ μ νλ² μ 43μ‘°μ λν μνμμ μμν볡μ±
μ λ° μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μ±κ²©μ νμ
νκ³ λ°ν λ²μλ₯Ό νμ νλ λ²λ¦¬λ₯Ό κ²ν νμλ€.
μ μΈμ무λ νΉμ κ΄κ³μμ νμ±λ μ λ’°μ μ μμ 보νΈνλ λ²μ μ₯μΉλ‘ νμ
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μμ λΆκ³Όνλ λ°©μμ μ·¨νκ³ μ 3μ‘°λ ₯μ μ±
μμ λν λ
Όμλ μμ§ μ΄λ£¨μ΄μ§μ§ μκ³ μλ€. μ 3μλ Ήμμ κ²½μ°, μνμμκ² μ±
μμ μ μ©νλ λμμ μ νλ² μ 75μ‘° μμ΅μ μ·¨μκΆμ νμ©νλλ‘ νκ³ μλ€. λ
Όλ¬Έμμλ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ°μ μ 43μ‘°μ λ°λ₯Έ μνμμ μ±
μκ³Ό μ 75μ‘° μμ΅μ μ·¨μκΆμ κ΄κ³μ λνμ¬ κ³ μ°°ν΄λ³΄μλ€. λν μλ―Έλ²μ μ 3μ μ±
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Όμλ₯Ό ν΅νμ¬ μ°λ¦¬ μ νλ²μμλ μ 3μ μ±
μμ λμ
ν νμκ° μλμ§ μ΄ν΄λ³΄μλ€.
λ§μ§λ§μΌλ‘ λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ μνμ λΏλ§ μλλΌ μ νμ μΈ μ μΈκ΄κ³μ ν΄λΉνλ νμ¬μ μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ°μ λν μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ λμ
νμμ±μ κ²ν νμλ€. μλ―Έλ²μ νμ¬μ μ΄μ¬λ λνμ μΈ μ μΈμ무μμ ν΄λΉνκ³ μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ°μλ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μ μ©νλ€. μ°λ¦¬ νμ¬λ²μμλ μΌλ°μ μΈ μΆ©μ€μ무 κ·μ μΈμλ μκΈ°κ±°λκΈμ§, κ²½μ
κΈμ§ λ° νμ¬κΈ°ν μ μ©κΈμ§ λ± μΆ©μ€μ무μ μΈλΆκ·μ μ λκ³ μλ€. μΈλΆκ·μ μλ°μμλ κ°μ
κΆκ³Ό μ΄μ΅μ μν΄μΆμ κ·μ μ νμ©νλ ꡬμ μλ¨μ μ μ©νμ§λ§ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ°μλ μν΄λ°°μμ±
μλ§μ μ μ©νκ³ μμ λΏ λ³λμ ꡬμ μλ¨μ κ·μ νκ³ μμ§ μλ€. λ°λΌμ λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμμ μ΄μ¬μ μ격ν μΆ©μ€μ무 μ΄νμ μ΄κ΅¬νκΈ° μνμ¬ μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ°μ λνμ¬ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ λμ
ν κ²μ μ μνλ€.λͺ©μ°¨
μ 1μ₯ μλ‘ 1
μ 1μ μ°κ΅¬μ λ°°κ²½ λ° λͺ©μ 1
1. μ°κ΅¬μ λ°°κ²½ 1
2. μ°κ΅¬μ λͺ©μ 1
μ 2μ μ°κ΅¬μ κ΅¬μ± λ° μ©μ΄μ μ μ 2
1. μ°κ΅¬μ κ΅¬μ± 2
2. μ°κ΅¬μ λ²μ 3
3. μ©μ΄μ μ μ λ° λ¬Ένμ μΈμ© 4
μ 2μ₯ μλ―Έμ μ μΈμ무 μλ°μ λν ꡬμ μλ¨ λ° λΆλΉμ΄λλ²μ 7
μ 1μ μ μΈμ무μ μ±κ²©κ³Ό κΈ°λ₯ 7
1. μ μΈκ΄κ³ 7
κ°. μ μΈκ΄κ³μ λ³Έμ§ 7
λ. κ΅¬λΆ κ°λ
10
2. μ μΈμ무μ μ±κ²©κ³Ό λ΄μ© 11
κ°. μ μΈμ무μ λ΄μ© 11
λ. μκ·Ήμ κΈμ§μ무μΈκ° λͺ
λ Ήμ μμμ무μΈκ° 23
λ€. 곡νμ무μ μ§μ 25
3. μ μΈμ무μ κΈ°λ₯ 29
κ°. 보좩μ , 보쑰μ κΈ°λ₯ 30
λ. μλ°© λ° μ΅μ§ κΈ°λ₯ 30
μ 2μ μ μΈμ무 μλ°μ μ¬λ²μ ν¨λ ₯ 31
1. μκ΅λ²μ κ²½μ° 31
κ°. λ¬Έμ μ μμ¬ 31
λ. 견ν΄μ λ립 32
λ€. μ·¨μκΆ νμ¬μ ꡬμ μλ¨μ κ΄κ³ 34
2. λ―Έκ΅λ²μ κ²½μ° 34
κ°. μ 3μ°¨ μμνλ³΅λ² λ° λΆλΉμ΄λλ² λ¦¬μ€ν
μ΄νΈλ¨ΌνΈ 34
λ. μ 3μ°¨ μ νλ² λ¦¬μ€ν
μ΄νΈλ¨ΌνΈ 35
λ€. ν΅μΌμ νλ² 35
μ 3μ μλ―Έμ μ μΈμ무 μλ°μ ꡬμ μλ¨ 36
1. ννλ²μ ꡬμ μλ¨μ νΉμ§ 36
2. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ 37
3. μμ μ ν 38
κ°. μκ΅μ μμ μ ν 38
λ. λ―Έκ΅μ μμ μ ν 42
λ€. μμ μ νμ μμ 43
4. ννλ²μ μν΄λ°°μ 45
κ°. ννλ²μ μν΄λ°°μ μ μ© 45
λ. μν΄λ°°μμ±
μκ³Ό μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μ²κ΅¬κΆ κ²½ν© 46
5. μμ΅μ μ·¨μκΆ 47
κ°. μμ΅μ μ·¨μκΆμ ꡬμ μλ¨μΈκ° 47
λ. μμ΅μ μ·¨μκΆκ³Ό λ€λ₯Έ ꡬμ μλ¨μ κ΄κ³ 47
6. κΈμ§λͺ
λ Ή 48
μ 4μ μλ―Έμ λΆλΉμ΄λλ²μ 48
1. μκ΅μ λΆλΉμ΄λλ² 48
κ°. λΆλΉμ΄λλ²μ λ°μ κ³Όμ 48
λ. μμν볡λ²μ μ ν΅μ μΈ κ΅¬λΆ 49
λ€. λΆλΉμ΄λλ²κ³Ό μμν볡λ²μ κ΄κ³ 54
λΌ. μ΄λμ κΈ°λ°μ λ ꡬμ μλ¨ 56
2. λ―Έκ΅μ λΆλΉμ΄λλ² 57
κ°. μμ€μμ μ¬μ°κ°μμ μν μμν볡 57
λ. μλ²νμμ μν μμν볡 58
λ€. μμν볡μ±
μ: ꡬμ μλ¨κ³Ό μ μ©λ²μ 60
3. μκ²° 61
κ°. μ°λ¦¬ λΆλΉμ΄λλ²λ¦¬μμ λΉκ΅ 61
λ. μ μΈμ무μμ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μκ³Ό λΆλΉμ΄λλ² 62
μ 3μ₯ μλ―Έμ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ 63
μ 1μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μμ 64
1. κ°λ
λ° κ·Όκ±° 64
κ°. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ κ°λ
λ° μ°μ 64
λ. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ κ·Όκ±° 65
2. λ²μ μ±κ²©κ³Ό ꡬλ³κ°λ
73
κ°. λ²μ μ±κ²© 73
λ. ꡬλ³κ°λ
κ³Ό μ μ©λ²μ 78
μ 2μ μκ΅μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ 80
1. μ±
μμ λ²μ 81
κ°. μ±
μμ λ²μ νμ μ μ΄λ €μ 81
λ. μΈκ³Όκ΄κ³ 81
λ€. 곡μ 85
λΌ. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ λν μ΄μ 88
2. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μκ³Ό μ 3μ μ±
μ 90
κ°. μ 3μ μ±
μμ κ΅¬λΆ 90
λ. μ 3 μλ Ήμ μ±
μ 91
λ€. μ 3 μ‘°λ ₯μ μ±
μ 96
3. μκ΅μ ꡬ체μ μΈ νλ‘ λΆμ 101
κ°. μΆ©μ€μ무μ μκ²©μ± 101
λ. μΈκ³Όκ΄κ³, 격μμ± λ± 104
λ€. 곡μ 107
μ 3μ λ―Έκ΅μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ 111
1. λ―Έκ΅μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ λ²μ(ζ³ζΊ) 111
κ°. μ 3μ°¨ μ νλ² λ¦¬μ€ν
μ΄νΈλ¨ΌνΈ 111
λ. μ 2μ°¨ μ νλ² λ¦¬μ€ν
μ΄νΈλ¨ΌνΈ 114
λ€. ν΅μΌμ νλ² 116
λΌ. μ 3μ°¨ μμνλ³΅λ² λ° λΆλΉμ΄λλ² 117
λ§. μκ΅κ³Όμ μ°¨μ΄μ 118
2. μ±
μμ λ²μ 119
κ°. μΈκ³Όκ΄κ³ λ° κ³΅μ 119
λ. κ·μμ λ¬Έμ 120
λ€. μ
μ¦μ±
μκ³Ό λΆνμ€μ± μν 122
λΌ. Friedmann κ΅μμ κ²¬ν΄ 122
3. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μκ³Ό μ 3μ μ±
μ 123
κ°. μ 3μ°¨ μμνλ³΅λ² λ° λΆλΉμ΄λλ²μ μ 3μ μ±
μ 123
λ. μ 3μ°¨ μ νλ² λ¦¬μ€ν
μ΄νΈλ¨ΌνΈμ μ 3μ μ±
μ 124
λ€. μ 2μ°¨ μ νλ² λ¦¬μ€ν
μ΄νΈλ¨ΌνΈμ μ 3μ μ±
μ 125
λΌ. ν΅μΌμ νλ²μ μ 3μ μ±
μ 130
4. λ―Έκ΅μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ νλ‘ 131
κ°. μκΈ°κ±°λ 131
λ. κ·Έ μΈ μ΄μ΅μΆ©λκΈμ§ μλ° 134
λ€. μ΄μ΅ν₯μκΈμ§ μλ°: 보λμ€, 컀미μ
μλ Ή 139
λΌ. μ 3μ μ±
μ 140
μ 4μ μλ―Έμ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ νμ₯ 141
1. μκ΅λ²μμ μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 λ° κ΅¬μ μλ¨ 141
κ°. νμ¬λ²μ μ΄μ΅μΆ©λκΈμ§ λ° μ΄μ΅ν₯μκΈμ§ 142
λ. νμ¬λ²μ μκΈ°κ±°λ 145
λ€. νμ¬λ²μ κΈ°νμ μ© λ° κ²½μ
κΈμ§ 148
λΌ. μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ° νλ‘ 150
2. λ―Έκ΅λ²μμ μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 λ° κ΅¬μ μλ¨ 156
κ°. λͺ¨λ²νμ¬λ² 157
λ. λ―Έκ΅λ²λ₯ νν μμΉ 159
λ€. λΈλΌμ¨μ΄μ£Ό νμ¬λ² 161
λ§. μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ° νλ‘ 163
3. μλ―Έμ λΉκ΅λ²μ λΆμ 167
κ°. μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 κΈ°μ€μ μ°¨μ΄ 167
λ. μκ΅μ μ격ν μΆ©μ€μ무μ λν λΉν λ° μ΄μ λν κ²ν 172
μ 5μ μκ²°λ‘ 173
μ 4μ₯ μλ―Έ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ λΉκ΅λ²μ νΉμ± 172
μ 1μ μΌλ³Έκ³Όμ λΉκ΅ 172
1. μΌλ³Έ μ νλ²μ μ μΈμ무 172
κ°. μΌλ³Έ μ νλ²μ μΆ©μ€μ무 172
λ. μ£Όμμ무μ μΆ©μ€μ무μ κ΄κ³ 174
2. μΌλ³Έ κ°μ μ νλ²μ μΆ©μ€μ무 ꡬμ μλ¨ 177
κ°. μμ€μ 보μ±
μμ μμ€μΆμ κ·μ 178
λ. μ νμ¬μ° κ·μμμΉ 181
λ€. κ°μ
κΆ 181
λΌ. μμ΅μ μ·¨μκΆ 183
3. κ²ν 185
κ°. μμ€μΆμ κ·μ λΉν 185
λ. κ°μ
κΆκ³Ό μμ€μΆμ κ·μ 187
λ€. μΆ©μ€μ무μ μ΄μ΅ν₯μκΈμ§ 187
μ 2μ λ€λ₯Έ λλ₯λ² κ΅κ°λ€κ³Όμ λΉκ΅ 187
1. λ
μΌμ κ²½μ° 188
κ°. λ
μΌλ²μ μ ν κ³μ 188
λ. λ
μΌλ²μ μ μΈμ무μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ 188
λ€. λ
μΌλ²μμ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ μ μ© μ ν 189
λΌ. μ μΈμ무 μλ°κ³Ό ꡬμ μλ¨ 190
λ§. λ
μΌ νκ³μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ κ²¬ν΄ 193
2. κ·Έ μΈ κ΅κ°λ€μ κ²½μ° 202
κ°. μ€μ½νλλ 202
λ. 루μ΄μ§μ λμ£Ό 205
λ€. λ¨μν리카 곡νκ΅ 206
3. κ²ν 209
μ 3μ μκ²°λ‘ 210
μ 5μ₯ μ νλ²μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μκ³Ό κ·Έ νμ₯ κ°λ₯μ± 209
μ 1μ μ μΈμ무 λ° κ·Έ μλ° κ΅¬μ μλ¨ λ° λ²λ¦¬ 212
1. μ νλ²μ μ μΈμ무μ μμ 212
κ°. μ νλ²μ μ£Όμμ무 212
λ. μ νλ²μ μΆ©μ€μ무 214
λ€. μ£Όμμ무μ μΆ©μ€μ무μ κ΄κ³ 217
2. μ νλ²μ μ μΈμ무 μλ°μ κ΄ν ꡬμ μλ¨ 221
κ°. κ°μ μ μ νλ²μ ꡬμ μλ¨ 221
λ. κ°μ μ νλ²μ ꡬμ μλ¨ 222
λ€. νκ° 226
μ 2μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μ
λ²κ²½μμ λ²μ μ±κ²© 226
1. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μ
λ²κ²½μ 226
κ°. μ
λ² λΉμμ λ
Όμ 226
λ. μ κ·Ήμ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ λμ
226
2. λ€λ₯Έ λ²λ¦¬μμ κ΅¬λΆ 227
κ°. λΆλΉμ΄λλ²λ¦¬ 228
λ. μ€μ¬λ¬΄κ΄λ¦¬ 229
λ€. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ λ²μ μ±κ²© 231
μ 3μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ λ°μμ건 λ° μμ κ²ν 232
1. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μ건 λ° μ±κ²© 232
κ°. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μ건 232
λ. μ΄λν μΆμ²κ΅¬κΆμ λ° μλλ°© 235
λ€. μ΄λν μΆμ²κ΅¬κΆ μ±κ²© 236
2. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ μ μ©μ λ¬Έμ μ 237
κ°. μ²κ΅¬κΆ κ²½ν© 237
λ. μ무μ λ²μ 238
λ€. μμ΅μ μ·¨μκΆκ³Όμ κ΄κ³ 243
λΌ. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ μΈμ λ²μ: μ 3μ μ±
μ 250
μ 4μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ μ μ©μ νμ₯ κ°λ₯μ±: μλ²μ μ΄μ¬ 253
1. μ μΈκ΄κ³ λ° μ΄λν μΆμ±
μμ νμ₯ κ°λ₯μ± 253
2. μλ²μ μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μ‘°ν 255
κ°. μλ²μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μ‘°ν λ° μλ―Έ 255
λ. μΆ©μ€μ무μ ꡬ체μ κ·μ μ‘°ν 257
3. νμ¬λ²μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μΈλΆμ‘°ν λ° κ΅¬μ μλ¨ 257
κ°. μκΈ°κ±°λ 258
λ. κ²½μ
κΈμ§ λ° κ²Έμ§κΈμ§ 260
λ€. νμ¬μ κΈ°νμ μ©κΈμ§ 261
4. μ΄μ¬μ μΆ©μ€μ무 μλ°μ μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ μ μ© κ²ν 263
κ°. μνμμ μ΄μ¬μ μ§μ λΉκ΅: μ μΈκ΄κ³μ μ§νλ₯Ό ν λλ‘ 263
λ. μ΄λν μΆμ±
μ κ·Όκ±° μ μ© 264
λ€. μΆ©μ€μ무 ꡬμ μλ¨μ λ¬Έμ μ 265
λΌ. νμ€λ‘ 267
μ 6μ₯ κ²°λ‘ 266
μ°Έκ³ λ¬Έν 268
ABSTRACT 293Docto
νκ΅ μ λΆμ ν΅μ μ μ± κ΄ν κΆ λ³νλ₯Ό μ€μ¬μΌλ‘
νμλ
Όλ¬Έ(μμ¬) -- μμΈλνκ΅λνμ : μ¬νκ³Όνλν μ μΉμΈκ΅νλΆ(μΈκ΅νμ 곡), 2021.8. λ°μ’
ν¬.ν΅μ μ‘°μ§μ μ΄λ»κ² μ΄μν κ²μΈμ§, ꡬ체μ μΌλ‘λ μΈκ΅λΆμ μ°μ
λΆ μ€ λκ° ν΅μ μ μ±
μ κ΄ν ν κ²μΈμ§μ μ¬λΆλ λͺ¨λ κ΅κ°κ° λ§μ£Όνκ³ μλ ν΅μ νμμ κ°μ₯ ν¨μ¨μ μΌλ‘ μ²λ¦¬νκΈ° μν κ³ λ―Όμμ μμνλ€. μΈκ΅λΆμ μ°μ
λΆλ κ΅κ° κ° μ΄ν΄κ° 첨μνκ² λ립νλ WTO λΆμ λμμ λκ³ μλ‘ μμ λ€μ΄ μ
무μ λ μ ν©ν¨μ μ£Όμ₯νλ€. νκ΅ μ λΆλ μλ‘μ΄ μ κΆμ΄ λ±μ₯ν λλ§λ€ μ¦μ μ‘°μ§ κ°νΈμ κ²ͺμκ³ , ν΅μ μ‘°μ§μ μμλ μΈκ΅λΆμ μ°μ
λΆ μ¬μ΄λ₯Ό μ€κ°λ©° λΉλ²ν λ°λμλ€. κ·Έ μ€ 2013λ
μ μΌμ΄λ μ λΆ μ‘°μ§ κ°νΈμ λꡬλ μμμΉ λͺ»νκ² μΌμ΄λ μ λμ λ³νλ‘μ κ΅λ΄ μ λμ λ³νκ° WTO λΆμ λμ κ³Όμ κ³Ό κ²°κ³Όμ μ΄λ€ μν₯μ λΌμ³€λμ§, λ°λ‘ κ·Έ ν¨κ³Όλ₯Ό κ°λ ν΄λ³Ό μ μλ νμμ΄μλ€.
λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ βνκ΅ μ λΆ λ΄ ν΅μ μ μ±
κ΄ν κΆμ μ΄λμ΄ WTO λΆμ λμ κ³Όμ κ³Ό κ²°κ³Όμ μ΄λ€ μν₯μ λΌμ³€λκ°?β λΌλ μ°κ΅¬ μ§λ¬Έμ λν λ΅μ μ°Ύλλ€. WTO λΆμ λμ κ³Όμ μ κ°μ
νλ μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨, μ λΆ, λ³νΈμΈλ¨ κ°κ°μ μ νΈμ νλμ μ€λͺ
νκΈ° μνμ¬ λ€μΈ΅μ μ£ΌμΈ-λλ¦¬μΈ μ΄λ‘ μ λΆμνλ‘ μΌλλ€. ν΅μ μ μ±
κ΄ν κΆ μ΄λμ λ°λ₯Έ WTO λΆμ λμ κ³Όμ μ λ³νλ μ λΆμ λ³νΈμΈλ¨(λ리μΈ) μ ν κ΄μ μμ λΆμνκ³ , λΆμ λμ κ²°κ³Όμ λ³νλ WTO νκ²°μ΄ κ°μ§λ μ λ‘μ κ°μΉμ μ¦κ°μΌλ‘ λΆμνλ€. λΆμ λμμ΄ λλ νλ‘λ νλ―Έ μ² κ° λΆμ(DS179), νλ―Έ μ λ‘μ λΆμ(DS402), νλ―Έ μΈνκΈ° λΆμ(DS464)μΌλ‘ μ΅λμ μ¬μ²΄κ³ λμμΈμ λ°λΌ ν΅μ μ μ±
κ΄ν κΆμ μ μΈν μμλ€μ ν΅μ ν ν μ μ νμλ€.
λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ νκ΅μ ν΅μ μ μ±
κ΄ν κΆμ μ΄λμ΄ μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨-μ λΆ-λ³νΈμΈλ¨ μ¬μ΄μ λ€μΈ΅μ μ£ΌμΈ-λλ¦¬μΈ κ΄κ³μ μν₯μ μ£Όμλ€κ³ μ£Όμ₯νλ€. 2013λ
μ λμ λ³ν μ΄ν μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨κ³Ό μ λΆ μ¬μ΄μ κ΄κ³κ° κ°κΉμμ§λ©°, μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨μ΄ μ λΆμ λν΄ νμ¬ν μ μλ μν₯λ ₯μ΄ μ»€μ‘λ€. λν, λΆκ³΅μ 무μ νμμ λμνλ μμ¬κ²°μ 체κ³λ₯Ό μ¬λ²μ μ±κ²©μ κ°κΉκ² λ°κΎΈμλ€. μ΄λ¬ν λ³νμ WTO λΆμν΄κ²°μ μ°¨μ νΉμ±μ λν΄ νκ΅ μ λΆμ κ΅λ΄ λ²λ₯ νμ¬μ λν μ νΈλκ° μ¦κ°νμλ€. μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨-μ λΆ-λ³νΈμΈλ¨ μ¬μ΄μ μνΈμμ©μ΄ κ°νλμ, νκ΅ μ λΆμ λ³νΈμΈλ¨μ λΆκ³΅μ 무μ νμμ νμ€ν μ² νλ₯Ό μνλ μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨μ μ νΈλ₯Ό λ°μνμ¬ κ΅¬μμ± μλ μ λ‘λ₯Ό ν립νκ³ μ λ
Έλ ₯νμλ€. κ²°κ³Όμ μΌλ‘ ν΅μ μ μ±
κ΄ν κΆμ μ΄μ ν WTO νκ²°μ μ λ‘μ κ°μΉκ° λμμ‘λ€.
λ³Έ λ
Όλ¬Έμ μ°κ΅¬ κ²°κ³Όλ κ΅λ΄ ν΅μ μ‘°μ§μ νΉμ§κ³Ό μ λμ λ³νμ λ°λΌ λ κ΅κ°κ° WTO λΆμν΄κ²°μ μ°¨λ₯Ό νμ©νλ μμμ΄ λ¬λΌμ§ μ μμμ ν¨μνλ€. κ·Έλ¦¬κ³ λ κ΅κ°κ° μ΄λ₯Ό ν΅νμ¬ μκ΅μκ² μ 리ν WTO λΆμ μ λ‘λ₯Ό νμ±νλ κ²κΉμ§ μλνλ€λ©΄ WTO νμ μ μ΄νκ³Ό μμ 무μ체μ μ μ μ°©μ΄ νΉμ κ΅κ°μ μν₯λ ₯ μλ λμΌ μλ μμμ μμ¬νλ€. κ·Έλ¬λ―λ‘ μ°κ΅¬ λμμ WTO νμκ΅ μ μ²΄λ‘ νλνμ¬ κ΅λ΄ ν΅μ μ λμ λ°λ₯Έ WTO λΆμ λμ κ³Όμ κ³Ό κ²°κ³Όκ° μ΄λ»κ² μ°¨μ΄ λλμ§, ν₯ν WTO 체μ μ μ§μμ μν λ°©μμ 무μμΈμ§ κ΄μ¬μ κ°κ³ μ°κ΅¬λ₯Ό μνν νμκ° μλ€.How does a domestic institutional change affect political and non-political actorsβ behaviors in the WTO dispute settlement process. This study explores how trade bureaucracies who are in charge of WTO disputes react to domestic changes in their institutions. In my current case study on South Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA) used to hold jurisdiction over trade policies, however, this authority was transferred to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy(MOTIE) in 2013.
Specifically, I investigate how the selection of law firms which delegate South Korean government in the WTO dispute settlement process has changed based on their bureaucratic incentive before and after the institution reform in 2013. Moreover, I trace how the jurisprudence of dispute cases have changed in the perspective of leading case in the WTO dispute settlement. Using the most similar systems design, I analyze three dispute cases, US-Stainless Steel(DS179), US-Zeroing(DS402), US-Washing Machines(DS464), which are different only in trade policy jurisdiction.
Bureaucrats have a target population as a principal to respond to and employ a law firm as a agent to delegate the government. In addition, they have their own organizational interest. A domestic institutional change has affected this multiple principal-agent relationship between three actors. I find that the transfer of trade policy jurisdiction from MOFA to MOTIE has increased preference of South Korean government on local law firms. Also, I find that the jurisprudence of those three dispute cases as a leading case has increased after the institutional change.
This study implies that the pattern of the WTO members in using the WTO dispute settlement process can varies depending on each of their domestic institutional design. It also suggests that the WTO members can intentionally influence the WTO jurisprudence by forming a leading case in their favor of.μ 1 μ₯ μλ‘ 1
μ 1 μ λ¬Έμ μ κΈ° 1
μ 2 μ μ°κ΅¬ μ§λ¬Έκ³Ό λͺ©ν 4
μ 3 μ μ°κ΅¬ κ°μ€ 6
μ 4 μ μ°κ΅¬ λ°©λ² 8
μ 5 μ λ
Όλ¬Έμ κ΅¬μ± 10
μ 2 μ₯ WTO λΆμμ λν κ΅μ μ μΉν μ°κ΅¬ 12
μ 1 μ WTO λΆμ λμ 주체λ‘μμ κ΄λ£ μ°κ΅¬ 12
μ 2 μ λ² ν΄μ λ° νκ²°μ λν μν₯λ ₯ μ°κ΅¬ 14
μ 3 μ₯ κ΅λ΄ μ λ μ νκ³Ό WTO λΆμ 19
μ 1 μ μ£ΌμΈ-λλ¦¬μΈ μ΄λ‘ κ³Ό WTO λΆμμμ μ μ© 19
μ 2 μ ν΅μ κ΄ν κΆ μ΄λκ³Ό κ΅λ΄μ λ³ν 21
1. μ λΆ-μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨ κ° μνΈμμ©μ λ³ν 21
1) ν΅μ μ‘°μ§ νΉμ± λΉκ΅ 21
2) μ λΆ-μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨ κ° κ΄κ³ λΉκ΅ 22
2. ν΅μ λΆμ λμ μ‘°μ§μ μμ¬κ²°μ μ²΄κ³ λ³ν 24
μ 3 μ ν΅μ κ΄ν κΆ μ΄λκ³Ό WTO λΆμ λμ λ³ν 26
1. μ λΆμ λ³νΈμΈλ¨ μ ν λ³ν 26
2. νκ²°μ μ λ‘μ κ°μΉ λ³ν 28
μ 4 μ μκ²° 29
μ 4 μ₯ νκ΅ μ¬λ‘ λΆμ 31
μ 1 μ μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨-μ λΆ κ° μνΈμμ© λ³ν 31
1. μΈκ΅λΆμ μ°μ
λΆμ μ‘°μ§μ νΉμ± λΉκ΅λ₯Ό ν΅νμ¬ 31
2. μ μ±
λμμ§λ¨-μ λΆ κ° κ΄κ³ λΉκ΅λ₯Ό ν΅νμ¬ 34
μ 2 μ ν΅μ μ‘°μ§μ μμ¬κ²°μ μ²΄κ³ λ³ν 37
μ 3 μ WTO λΆμ λμ κ³Όμ λ° κ²°κ³Ό λ³ν λΆμ 41
1. μ λΆμ λ³νΈμΈλ¨ μ ν μΈ‘λ©΄μμ 41
2. νκ²°μ μ λ‘μ κ°μΉ λ³ν μΈ‘λ©΄μμ 45
1) ν-λ―Έ μ² κ°λΆμ(DS179) 45
(1) μ¬κ±΄ κ°μ 45
(2) μ¬κ±΄μ λ²μ μμ 45
(3) νκ° 50
2) ν-λ―Έ μ λ‘μ λΆμ(DS264) 51
(1) μ¬κ±΄ κ°μ 51
(2) μ¬κ±΄μ λ²μ μμ 52
(3) νκ° 55
3) ν-λ―Έ μΈνκΈ° λΆμ(DS464) 56
(1) μ¬κ±΄ κ°μ 56
(2) μ¬κ±΄μ λ²μ μμ 57
(3) νκ° 58
μ 5 μ₯ κ²°λ‘ 60μ