1,235,257 research outputs found

    Banking Fees in Australia

    Get PDF
    The Reserve Bank has conducted a survey on bank fees each year since 1997. In 2009 growth in fee income increased slightly from recent years though it was again slower than growth in banks’ balance sheets. Growth in fee income was higher for businesses than for households. Banks reacted to the financial crisis by competing more aggressively for deposit funding which resulted in total fee income from deposit accounts falling, and repricing loan products which contributed to an increase in fee income from lending.bank; fees; Australia; exception; deposits; loans

    Banking Fees in Australia

    Get PDF
    The Reserve Bank has conducted a survey on bank fees each year since 1997. The results of the latest survey show that banks’ aggregate fee income was unchanged in 2010. Fee income from households declined as exception fee income and ATM revenue fell sharply, while fee income from businesses grew.banking, fees, fee income, exception, ATM, survey

    Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs

    Get PDF
    We study the impact of public and secret reserve prices in auctions where buyers have independent private values and heterogeneous entry costs. We find that in a standard auction the optimal (i.e., revenue maximizing) public reserve price is typically above the seller's value. Moreover, an appropriate entry fee together with a public reserve price equal to the seller's value generates greater revenue. Secret reserve prices, however, differ across auction formats. In a second-price sealed-bid auction the secret reserve price is above the optimal public reserve price; hence there is less entry, a smaller probability of sale, and both the seller revenue and the bidders' utility are less than with an optimal public reserve price. In contrast, in a first-price sealed-bid auction the secret reserve is equal to the seller's value, and the bidders' expected utility (seller revenue) is greater (less) than with an optimal public reserve price

    Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing

    Get PDF
    We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multiple item auction with interdependent values. By withholding quantity in some circumstances, the seller can improve revenues or mitigate collusion. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings where resale exhausts all the gains from trade among the bidders, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.Auctions, Vickrey Auctions, Multiple Item Auctions, Resale

    For the record

    Get PDF
    Recent discussion papers, news releases and publications from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand

    Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type

    Get PDF
    If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of pooling equilibria. If one eliminates belief systems that violate the "intuitive criterion", one obtains a unique equilibrium reserve price equal to the seller's own valuation. Paradoxically, even if bidders initially believe that the auctioneer is bound by his reserve almost with certainty, commitment has no value

    Complete volume

    Get PDF
    corecore