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The frame of reference for new economic thinking
After the crisis of 2018-2010, which led to the complete discrediting of neoclassical theory, the demand for new scientific ideas and an alternative vision of the most fundamental economic problems has sharply increased in economic science. At the same time, the discrediting of the neoclassical theory led to a critical attitude to the very idea of a general economic equilibrium, which is the central idea of neoclassical paradigm. The emphasis is increasingly shifting to the creation of disequilibrium models of economy. This book argues that this approach is incorrect. The wrong is not the very idea of equilibrium, but its neoclassical understanding and its concepts and equilibrium models, which are caused by false methodologies of neoclassicists.
Without a preliminary dialectic analysis of economic categories and the operationally closed model of commodity-money flows of a market economy created on its basis, it is impossible to find out feedbacks that ensure the self-regulation of the economic system. The โSymmetrical modelโ of general economic equilibrium, which shows how economic forces arise, where they are directed and how interact with each other, which provide the homeostasis of a decentralized economic system, is proposed. This model shows the attractor of a real disequilibrium economy. It is shown that the evolution of market economy, which due to the immanent logic of intrasystem processes generates extreme inequality in income distribution, leads to a disruption in the harmony and symmetry of counter flows of commodity and money, thus destroying the system of positive and negative feedbacks that provide the homeostasis of economic system.
This book is a collection of articles. Since each of them is a complete whole, the reader can get acquainted with the articles in any sequence, but after reading all of the articles, he will get a new non-standard understanding of functioning of a market economy. Although each article gives a complete analysis of a specific topic, nevertheless, all of them are arranged in such a sequence that they serve as different stages in the development of a single original concept, beginning with a methodology and ending with a mathematical model of a general economic equilibrium
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แกแแฅแแ แแแแแแก แ แแกแแฃแแแแแ N80 (8217)
Al tijdens de voorbereiding van 'Het retorische weten' was duidelijk dat een groot deel van het pluriforme werk van filosoof Emanuel Rutten er niet in kon worden opgenomen. Wat toen werd vermoed is nu geschied. Het is een tweeluik geworden. Dit tweede en laatste deel is wederom ruim opgezet. Zo vinden we teksten over niet-feitelijke waarheid, retorica als presocratische wijsheid, Platoโs begrip van negatie, het denken van Husserl en Spengler over wiskunde, de grondslagen van de metafysica, het Aristotelische vormbegrip, en wederom aan het eind een reeks van uiteenlopende kortere bespiegelingen. Bekende themaโs van Rutten, zoals zijn wereld-voor-ons kennisleer en zijn semantisch argument, komen in dit deel opnieuw aan de orde en worden verder verdiept. Vergeleken met het eerste deel bevat dit werk zowel recentere bijdragen als teksten uit de vroegste periode van het denken van de Amsterdamse filosoof. Het is het slotstuk op de zielsbepalende weg die Rutten met zijn intense en soms wilde, maar altijd diep en grondig doordachte denken is gegaan. De lezer stuit op een allesomvattend en begeerlijk denken waarbij denken, leven en spreken bijeenkomen en uiteindelijk verschijnen als een hechte eenheid
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According to a familiar story about class actions in the United States, aggregation promotes access to counsel by increasing the amount of money from which counsel fees can be taken. Courts usually award class counsel a percentage of the monetary recovery obtained on behalf of the class, and class treatment can turn a 3 million case. But what about class actions that do not involve monetary relief at all? Some civil rights plaintiffs seek to stop a violation, rather than to obtain compensation for past harm, and therefore choose to pursue only an injunction or declaratory judgment. Other civil rights plaintiffs have no choice but to pursue only injunctive or declaratory relief, for reasons ranging from statutory constraints to immunity doctrines. Unlike in aggregated-damages cases, class treatment in injunction-only cases does not have a multiplicative effect that makes the litigation more lucrative โ and thus more attractive โ from a law firmโs perspective. Indeed, one might expect that the prospect of class certification would decrease access to counsel in such cases, because federally funded legal aid organizations are prohibited from working on class actions
แแแแ N77 (15 069)
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Judicial independence seems under siege. President Trump condemns federal courts for their political bias; his erstwhile presidential opponents mull various court-packing plans; and courts, in turn, are lambasted for abandoning a long-held constitutional convention against institutional manipulation. At the same time, across varied lines of jurisprudence, the Roberts Court evinces a deep worry about judicial independence. This preoccupation with threats to judicial independence infuses recent opinions on administrative deference, bankruptcy, patent adjudication, and jurisdiction-stripping. Yet the Court has not offered a single, overarching definition of what it means by the term โjudicial independence.โ Nor has it explained how its disjointed doctrinal interventions add up to a coherent theory of institutional autonomy. And it remains unclear how debates on judicial independence among jurists relate to debates about the same term in the larger public sphere.
This Articleโs first contribution is to analyze how the Roberts Court understands the term judicial independence and how its doctrinal rules fall far short of realizing even the aspirations the Court has for that term. This case study in doctrinal specification illuminates the gap between the Justicesโ own ethical aspiration toward judicial independence and its institutional realizationโa gap that generates confusion, uncertainty, and opportunities for circumvention.
This Article then abstracts away from the particulars of the Roberts Courtโs jurisprudence to explore the origins of this aspirationโ implementation gap. To motivate this more general analysis, it first demonstrates that there is a large range of constitutional-design options for a founder seeking to create independent courts. The Framers of Article III embraced certain of these options and rejected others. Specifically, they preferred ex post to ex ante checks on political interference in the judiciary. Subsequent experience, though, has demonstrated that their choice of judicial independenceโs institutional forms rested on flawed presuppositions. In particular, the Framers failed to anticipate the rise of partisanship as a motivating principle for national political action, and also the unexpectedly strong incentives that push legislatures toward vague or ambiguous statutory texts, leaving ample discretion for judgesโ policy preferences. Today, it is possible to identify a range of instruments through which elected actors can achieve such unraveling. The three most important can be labeled cracking, packing, and stacking by analogy to techniques of partisan gerrymandering. This taxonomical exercise illuminates how, in practice, the jurisprudence and politics of judicial independence fall so far short of professed ethical aspirations. This exercise further points toward the possibility of a more institutionally grounded account of what plausibly can be expected in terms of federal court autonomy from the partisan currents of American political life
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