The Innocence Effect

Nearly all felony convictions—about 95 percent—follow guilty pleas, suggesting that plea offers are very attractive to defendants compared to trials. Some scholars argue that plea bargains are too attractive and should be curtailed because they facilitate the wrongful conviction of innocents. Others contend that plea bargains only benefit innocent defendants, providing an alternative to the risk of a harsher sentence at trial. Hence, even while heatedly disputing their desirability, both camps in the debate believe that plea bargains commonly lead innocents to plead guilty. This Article shows, however, that the belief that innocents routinely plead guilty is overstated. We provide varied empirical evidence for the hitherto neglected innocence effect, revealing that innocents are significantly less likely to accept plea offers that appear attractive to similarly situated guilty defendants. The Article further explores the psychological causes of the innocence effect and examines its implications for plea bargaining. Positively, we identify the striking cost of innocence, wherein innocents suffer harsher average sanctions than similarly situated guilty defendants. Yet our findings also show that the innocence effect directly causes an overrepresentation of the guilty among plea bargainers and an overrepresentation of the innocent among those who choose trial. In this way, the innocence effect beneficially reduces the rate of wrongful convictions—including accepted plea bargains—even when compared to a system that does not allow plea bargaining. Normatively, our analysis finds that both detractors and supporters of plea bargaining should reevaluate, if not completely reverse, their long-held positions to account for the causes and consequences of the innocence effect. The Article concludes by outlining two proposals for minimizing false convictions, better protecting the innocent, and improving the plea bargaining process altogether by accounting for the innocence effect

Unilateral Invasions of Privacy

Most people seem to agree that individuals have too little privacy, and most proposals to address that problem focus on ways to give those users more information about, and more control over, how information about them is used. Yet in nearly all cases, information subjects are not the parties who make decisions about how information is collected, used, and disseminated; instead, outsiders make unilateral decisions to collect, use, and disseminate information about others. These potential privacy invaders, acting without input from information subjects, are the parties to whom proposals to protect privacy must be directed. This Article develops a theory of unilateral invasions of privacy rooted in the incentives of potential outside invaders. It first briefly describes the different kinds of information flows that can result in losses of privacy and the private costs and benefits to the participants in these information flows. It argues that in many cases the relevant costs and benefits are those of an outsider deciding whether certain information flows occur. These outside invaders are more likely to act when their own private costs and benefits make particular information flows worthwhile, regardless of the effects on information subjects or on social welfare. And potential privacy invaders are quite sensitive to changes in these costs and benefits, unlike information subjects, for whom transaction costs can overwhelm incentives to make information more or less private. The Article then turns to privacy regulation, arguing that this unilateral-invasion theory sheds light on how effective privacy regulations should be designed. Effective regulations are those that help match the costs and benefits faced by a potential privacy invader with the costs and benefits to society of a given information flow. Law can help do so by raising or lowering the costs or benefits of a privacy invasion, but only after taking account of other costs and benefits faced by the potential privacy invader

Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?

This Essay examines the role of multinational corporations in protecting human rights around the globe. Part I analyzes the conduct of corporations, describes examples of corporations\u27 involvement in human rights violations, and discusses the merits of greater responsibility of corporations. Part II suggests that the level of responsibility for a multinational corporation depends on the proximity of the corporation\u27s operations to human rights violations, in combination with the seriousness of the violations, and proposes five gradations of responsibility. This Essay concludes that the evolving nature of the global economy is producing a shift in responsibilities from government to the private sector, particularly multinational corporations, and that those responsibilities may include the power and duty to safeguard human rights

The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping

Forum shopping gets a bad name. This is even more true in the context of transnational litigation. The term is associated with unprincipled gamesmanship and undeserved victories. Courts therefore often seek to thwart the practice. But in recent years, exaggerated perceptions of the “evils” of forum shopping among courts in different countries have led U.S. courts to impose high barriers to global forum shopping. These extreme measures prevent global forum shopping from serving three unappreciated functions: protecting access to justice, promoting private regulatory enforcement, and fostering legal reform. This Article challenges common perceptions about global forum shopping that have supported recent doctrinal developments. It traces the history of concerns about global forum shopping and distinguishes between domestic and global forum shopping to discern the core objections to the practice. It then identifies these unappreciated virtues of global forum shopping and suggests balanced ways for courts to protect them

Communicative Content and Legal Content

This essay investigates a familiar set of questions about the relationship between legal texts (e.g., constitutions, statutes, opinions, orders, and contracts) and the content of the law (e.g., norms, rules, standards, doctrines, and mandates). Is the original meaning of the constitutional text binding on the Supreme Court when it develops doctrines of constitutional law? Should statutes be given their plain meaning or should judges devise statutory constructions that depart from the text to serve a purpose? What role should default rules play in the interpretation and construction of contracts? This essay makes two moves that can help lawyers and legal theorists answer these questions. First, there is a fundamental conceptual distinction between communicative content (the linguistic meaning communicated by a legal text in context) and legal content (the doctrines of the legal rules associated with a text). Second, the relationship between communicative content and legal content varies with context; different kinds of legal texts produce different relationships between linguistic meaning and legal rules

The State of the Death Penalty

The death penalty is in decline in America and most death penalty states do not regularly impose death sentences. In 2016 and 2017, states reached modern lows in imposed death sentences, with just thirty-one defendants sentenced to death in 2016 and thirty-nine in 2017, as compared with over three hundred per year in the 1990s. In 2016, only thirteen states imposed death sentences, and in 2017, fourteen did so, although thirty-one states retain the death penalty. What explains this remarkable and quite unexpected trend? In this Article, we present new analysis of state-level legislative changes that might have been expected to impact death sentences. First, life without parole (LWOP) statutes, now enacted in nearly every state, might have been expected to reduce death sentences because they give jurors a non-capital option at trial. Second, legislatures have moved, albeit at varying paces, to comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring v. Arizona, which requires that the final decision in capital sentencing be made not by a judge, but by a jury. Third, states at different times have created state-wide public defender offices to represent capital defendants at trial. In addition, the decline in homicides and homicide rates could be expected to contribute to the decline in state-level death sentencing. We find that contrary to the expectations of many observers, changes in the law such as adoption of LWOP and jury sentencing, did not consistently or significantly impact death sentencing. The decline in homicides and homicide rates is correlated with changes in death sentencing at the state level. However, this Article finds that state provision of capital trial representation is far more strongly and robustly correlated with reduced death sentencing than these other factors. The findings bolster the argument that adequacy of counsel has greater implications for the administration of the death penalty than other legal factors. These findings also have implications beyond the death penalty and they underscore the importance of a structural understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in our system of criminal justice

The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations

This Article explains how the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) began in the late eighteenth century as a national security statute that the First Congress and early federal district judges saw as a way to afford damages remedies to British merchants, creditors, and other subjects whose persons or property were injured under circumstances in which treaties or the law of nations assigned responsibility to the United States. Torts committed within the United States by private American citizens were the most likely such circumstances. The ultimate aims of the statute were to avoid renewed war with Great Britain and the other European powers and to encourage commerce and trade with the same. Two centuries later, the ATS was reborn as an international human rights statute at a time when the United States had become a global superpower with a global human-rights agenda during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Now that the Supreme Court\u27s holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. has undermined the international human rights vision of the ATS, this Article suggests that the statute be used once again as a way to afford aliens money damages when they suffer torts under circumstances where the United States bears sovereign responsibility under contemporaneous international law

Incommensurable Goods, Alternative Possibilities, and the Self-Refutation of the Self-Refutation of Determinism

In his paper, "Free Choice, Incommensurable Goods and the Self-Refutation of Determinism,"' Joseph Boyle seeks to show how the argument for the self-refutation of determinism - first articulated over twenty-five years ago - is an argument whose force depends on (first) a proper understanding of just what free choice is, and (secondly) a proper understanding of how free choice is a principle of moral responsibility. According to Boyle, a person can make a genuinely free choice only if he is presented with alternative options that are incommensurable in their goodness or desirability. If the goodness or desirability of alternative options could be commensurated, or compared in accordance with some common standard, then it would be possible in principle for a person to determine which of the two options offered more, and which offered less, of the same sort of good represented by the two options. But if this sort of commensuration or comparison were possible, according to Boyle, then there would really be no need to choose. Rather, the only task that would have to be performed in order to determine the person's selection among alternative options would be the task clarifying or calculating which of the alternative options offered most fully what it is that makes both options desirable in the first place. Once the clarification or calculation is done, there would be no need-and in fact, no possibility--of really choosing: the calculation alone would settle which option is the best option, and thus which option is to be selected. Now if genuinely free choice requires that the choosing person be presented with options that are incommensurable in goodness or desirability, then it also seems to be the case that genuine choice-and the moral responsibility that goes along with it-requires that the person be presented with alternative possibilities from which to choose. And yet some compatibilist thinkers have held that moral responsibility does not really require the presence of alternative possibilities. In particular, Harry G. Frankfurt has sought to show (by means of counter-example) that a person can be a moral agent and morally responsible, even if the person did not, in fact, have any alternative possibilities available to him (that is, even if the person could not have done otherwise). Frankfurt's counter-example offers a direct challenge to the sort of incompatibilism that Boyle seeks to defend; and so Boyle is quite right to address Frankfurt head-on. For if Frankfurt is right, then it is erroneous to hold "the principle of alternative possibilities" (the principle that a person can be morally responsible for what he has done, only if he had alternative possibilities, or only if he could have done otherwise). But if it is erroneous to hold the principle of alternative possibilities, then it also seems erroneous to hold the more robust position that Boyle wishes to defend: namely, the position that moral responsibility requires not only alternative possibilities, but also alternative possibilities representing options that are incommensurable in their goodness

New Trends in Latin American Constitutionalism: An Overview

In this introduction to the issue on New Trends in Latin American Con-stitutionalism, Santiago Legarre offers his remarks at the opening of the con-ference on New Trends in Latin American Constitutionalism held at NotreDame Law School in 2013. After briefly recounting the origins of the con-ference, Legarre summarizes some of the key modern challenges in LatinAmerica and the role of constitutionalism in addressing these challenges.Legarre pays particular attention to the rapid growth of income inequalityin the region. He ultimately concludes that some of the major challengesto the region are rooted in a lack of consensus about the common goodas well as a lack of respect for the law. Legarre argues that the solutionto these problems lies in fostering conversations about the proper goals ofLatin American societies and in the political and judicial leaders of LatinAmerica displaying greater fidelity to the principles underlying their respec-tive constitutionsFil: Legarre, Santiago. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentin

Going Rogue: Mobile Research Applications and the Right to Privacy

This Article investigates whether nonsectoral state laws may serve as a viable source of privacy and security standards for mobile health research participants and other health data subjects until new federal laws are created or enforced. In particular, this Article (1) catalogues and analyzes the nonsectoral data privacy, security, and breach notification statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia; (2) applies these statutes to mobile-app-mediated health research conducted by independent scientists, citizen scientists, and patient researchers; and (3) proposes substantive amendments to state law that could help protect the privacy and security of all health data subjects, including mobile-app-mediated health research participants