Climatic and oceanic associations with daily rainfall extremes over southern Africa

Changes in climate variability and, in particular, changes in extreme climate events are likely to be of far more significance for environmentally vulnerable regions than changes in the mean state. It is generally accepted that sea-surface temperatures (SSTs) play an important role in modulating rainfall variability. Consequently, SSTs can be prescribed in global and regional climate modelling in order to study the physical mechanisms behind rainfall and its extremes. Using a satellite-based daily rainfall historical data set, this paper describes the main patterns of rainfall variability over southern Africa, identifies the dates when extreme rainfall occurs within these patterns, and shows the effect of resolution in trying to identify the location and intensity of SST anomalies associated with these extremes in the Atlantic and southwest Indian Ocean. Derived from a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the results also suggest that, for the spatial pattern accounting for the highest amount of variability, extremes extracted at a higher spatial resolution do give a clearer indication regarding the location and intensity of anomalous SST regions. As the amount of variability explained by each spatial pattern defined by the PCA decreases, it would appear that extremes extracted at a lower resolution give a clearer indication of anomalous SST regions

Can Rats Reason?

Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah, 2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. I evaluate the case for rat rationality by analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats

Public Legal Reason

This essay develops an ideal of public legal reason--a normative theory of legal reasons that is appropriate for a society characterized by religious and moral pluralism. One of the implications of this theory is that normative theorizing about public and private law should eschew reliance on the deep premises of deontology or consequentialism and should instead rely on what the author calls public values--values that can be affirmed without relying on the deep and controversial premises of particular comprehensive moral doctrines. The ideal of public legal reason is then applied to a particular question--whether welfarism (a particular form of normative law and economics) provides the sort of reasons that appropriate for legal practice. The answer to that question is no--to the extent that welfarism contends that the normative assessment of legal policies should rely exclusively on information about individual preferences, welfarism relies on deep and controversial premises of consequentialist moral theory that fail the test of public reason. The essay also investigates the thesis--advanced by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell--that any fairness principle (a nonwelfarist method of policy assessment) can violate weak Pareto (making everyone worse off). Whatever the implications of Kaplow and Shavell\u27s argument, it does not show that welfarism can provide public legal reasons. The essay concludes that law\u27s justifications should rely on normative principles that are accessible to reasonable citizens, whether they are theists or atheists, deontologists or consequentialists, moral philosophers or economists. Law\u27s deliberations should be shallow and not deep. Law\u27s reason should be public

Redefining economic reason

Despite of Martin Heidegger’s warning not modern technology but modern economizing destroys the Being. With its exclusive focus on profit-making modern economizing endangers the integrity and diversity of natural ecosystems, autonomy and culture of local communities, and chances of future generations for a decent life. This paper gives a critique of the profit principle and redefines economic rationality in a more holistic, substantive and humanistic form