284,758 research outputs found

    How to Cope with Resistance to Persuasion?

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    The main goal of this study is to develop a conceptual framework meant (a) to present the essential traits of persuasion, (b) to explain resistance to persuasion (mainly when the persuader tries to shape, reinforce, or change an attitudinal response), and (c) to provide a feasible strategy to overcome the coping behaviors associated with resistance to persuasion. Defined as the communication process in which “someone makes other people believe or decide to do something, especially by giving them reasons why they should do it, or asking them many times to do it”, persuasion ensures a noncoercive social control by shaping, reinforcing, or changing target audience’s cognitions, feelings, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Persuasion involves volitional behaviors (that are inextricably intertwined with spontaneous, impulsive, mindless, or compulsive behaviors) and a significant cognitive load. Even if persuasion does not elicit negative feelings like various shortcuts to compliance (coercion, bribery, deception, manipulation of the dominant instincts, etc.), it generates ipso facto resistance to persuasion. Public relations specialists and other communication professionals can reduce or cope with resistance to persuasion by creating a low-pressure persuasion context, using evidential reasons, and following evidential rules

    Bayesian Persuasion

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    When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respect to the alignment of the sender's and the receiver's preferences. Finally, we apply our results to persuasion by litigators, lobbyists, and salespeople. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K40, M31)

    Abstract Argumentation / Persuasion / Dynamics

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    The act of persuasion, a key component in rhetoric argumentation, may be viewed as a dynamics modifier. We extend Dung's frameworks with acts of persuasion among agents, and consider interactions among attack, persuasion and defence that have been largely unheeded so far. We characterise basic notions of admissibilities in this framework, and show a way of enriching them through, effectively, CTL (computation tree logic) encoding, which also permits importation of the theoretical results known to the logic into our argumentation frameworks. Our aim is to complement the growing interest in coordination of static and dynamic argumentation.Comment: Arisaka R., Satoh K. (2018) Abstract Argumentation / Persuasion / Dynamics. In: Miller T., Oren N., Sakurai Y., Noda I., Savarimuthu B., Cao Son T. (eds) PRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11224. Springer, Cha

    The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in the Courtroom

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    Epistemology is important in the debate about science and technology in the courtroom. The epistemological issues and the arguments about them in the context of scientific and technical evidence are now well developed. Of equal importance, though, is an understanding of norms of persuasion and how those norms may differ across disciplines and groups. Norms of persuasion in the courtroom and in legal briefs differ from norms at a scientific conference and in scientific journals. Here, Kritzer examines the disconnect between science and the courtroom in terms of the differing norms of persuasion found within the scientific community and within the legal community

    Applying persuasive design in a diabetes mellitus application

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    This paper describes persuasive design methods and compares this to an application currently under development for diabetes mellitus patients. Various elements of persuasion and a categorization of persuasion types are mentioned. Also discussed are principles of how successful persuasion should be designed, as well as the practical applications and ethics of persuasive design. This paper is not striving for completeness of theories on the topic, but uses the theories to compare it to an application intended for diabetes mellitus patients. The results of this comparison can be used for improvements of the application

    Long Persuasion Games

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    This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart (2003), we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.cheap talk, communication, diconvexification, dimartingale, disclosure of certifiable information, jointly controlled lotteries, long conversation, persuasion, verifiable types

    Product Placement and the Effects of Persuasion Knowledge

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    This study examines the effect of persuasion knowledge and cognitive busyness on attitude toward a brand embedded in a popular movie. Product placement is filling an increasingly important role in marketing strategy as conventional techniques have been rendered ineffective by their own ubiquity. Cognitive busyness was hypothesized to cause a product placement message to be processed on a superficial, peripheral level. If joined with persuasion knowledge, the subject’s lack of ability to devote resources to critically evaluate the message would activate compartmentalized knowledge of products and brands increasing the ease of this information’s mental accessibility and thus aid the formation of favorable brand attitudes. A controlled laboratory experiment reveals that when viewers watch the movie in a natural setting, viewers with persuasion knowledge exhibit lower attitude toward the placed brand than viewers without persuasion knowledge. However, such backlash brand-damaging effects are absent, if not reversed, when viewers watch the movie in a cognitively busy setting

    Persuasion in Finance

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    Persuasion is a fundamental part of social activity, yet it is rarely studied by economists. We compare the traditional economic model, in which persuasion is communication of objectively valuable information, with a behavioral model, in which persuasion is an effort to fit the message into the audience's already held beliefs. We present a simple formalization of the behavioral model, and compare the two models using data on financial advertising in Money and Business Week magazines over the course of the internet bubble. The evidence on the content of the persuasive messages is broadly consistent with the behavioral model of persuasion.

    Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion

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    Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in the US. This paper examines persuasion through a computational lens, focusing on what is perhaps the most basic and fundamental model in this space: the celebrated Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow. Here there are two players, a sender and a receiver. The receiver must take one of a number of actions with a-priori unknown payoff, and the sender has access to additional information regarding the payoffs. The sender can commit to revealing a noisy signal regarding the realization of the payoffs of various actions, and would like to do so as to maximize her own payoff assuming a perfectly rational receiver. We examine the sender's optimization task in three of the most natural input models for this problem, and essentially pin down its computational complexity in each. When the payoff distributions of the different actions are i.i.d. and given explicitly, we exhibit a polynomial-time (exact) algorithm, and a "simple" (11/e)(1-1/e)-approximation algorithm. Our optimal scheme for the i.i.d. setting involves an analogy to auction theory, and makes use of Border's characterization of the space of reduced-forms for single-item auctions. When action payoffs are independent but non-identical with marginal distributions given explicitly, we show that it is #P-hard to compute the optimal expected sender utility. Finally, we consider a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution of action payoffs presented by a black box sampling oracle, and exhibit a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) with a bi-criteria guarantee. We show that this result is the best possible in the black-box model for information-theoretic reasons
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