New and old social risks in Korean social policy: the case of the National Pension Scheme

This is a study of old and new social risks in Korean social policy, in relation to the National Pension Scheme (NPS). It provides a comprehensive overview of the Korean pension structure and the emergence of new social risk groups. Based on the Korean Labour and Income Panel Study undertaken over eleven years and using bivariate and multivariate analysis, this thesis examines the effectiveness of the NPS and its reforms in protecting new social risk groups. The analytical framework of this thesis is based on the New Social Risk theory. Its limitation in explaining developing welfare states like Korea is also highlighted. Over the past two decades, the NPS has undergone dramatic financial cuts as its coverage expands rapidly. Given Korea’s aging population, the reliance on such public schemes will further increase, which will have a profound impact particularly, on those with low income. Societal and economic changes in the Korean society, as a result of de-industrialisation, have given rise to new social risks groups that differ from those that predominate in the post-war welfare era. These new groups are vulnerable because they cannot afford to contribute to their pension even during their working life with the likelihood that they will have little or no benefit from the NPS when they retire. They tend to be the atypical contract holders and workers of small-scale enterprises without unions. Contrary to expectation, women with care responsibility and young workers are less vulnerable

"Better Safe than Sorry" - Individual Risk-free Pension Schemes in the European Union - Macroeconomic Benefits, the Mobile Working Citizen's Perspective and Why Nots

Variations between the diverse pension systems in the member states of the European Union hamper labour market mobility, across country borders but also within the countries of the European Union. From a macroeconomic perspective, and in the light of demographic pressure, this paper argues that allowing individual instead of collective pension building would greatly improve labour market flexibility and thus enhance the functioning of the monetary union. I argue that working citizens would benefit, for three reasons, from pension saving in a risk-free savings account. First, citizens would have a clear picture of the accumulation of their own pension savings throughout their working life. Second, they would pay hardly any extra costs and, third, once retired they would not be subject to the whims of government or other pension fund managers. This paper investigates the feasibility of individual pension building under various parameter settings by calculating the pension saved during a working life and the pension dis-saved after retirement. The findings show that there are no reasons why the European Union and individual member states should not allow individual risk-free pension savings accounts. This would have macroeconomic benefits and provide a solid pension provision that can enhance mobility, instead of engaging workers in different mandatory collective pension schemes that exist around in the European Union

Veterans’ Benefits: Pension Benefit Programs

[Excerpt] The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers pension programs for certain low-income veterans and their surviving spouses and dependent children. This report discusses the Improved Disability Pension, which makes payments to certain low-income veterans, and the Improved Death Pension, which makes payments to certain low-income surviving spouses and dependent children of deceased veterans. To qualify for either program, individuals must have become eligible for payments on or after January 1, 1979. Both pension programs were created by P.L. 95-588, the Veterans and Survivors Pension Improvement Act of 1978. In addition, this report discusses a special pension program for Medal of Honor recipients. This report does not discuss several other pension programs that are administered by the VA, such as the Old Law Disability Pension and the Section 306 Disability Pension, which make payments to low-income veterans, and the Old Law Death Pension and the Section 306 Death Pension, which make payments to low-income surviving spouses and dependent children of veterans; these programs apply only to veterans and their survivors who became entitled to such benefits before 1979. This report also does not discuss pension programs for veterans of specific periods of war before World War I, such as the Civil War, the Indian Wars, and the Spanish-American War. Finally, this report does not address the military retirement system. For information on that system, see CRS Report RL34751, Military Retirement: Background and Recent Developments, by Kristy N. Kamarck

Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis. IHS Political Science Series 126, December 2011

Basic public pension schemes and cut backs in earnings-related public pensions led to an increasing role of supplementary pensions such as pension funds for old-age incomes. In addition to demographic changes that challenge public pensions, private pensions face financial market risks. To what extent are the scope of pension fund capitalism and the impact of financial crises on pension funds related to different institutional arrangements? Given that different production regimes reflect different pension systems, we expect systematic diversities with regard to the public-private pension mix and the specific design of supplementary pensions. These varieties should be mirrored in different forms of vulnerability of pension funds to financial market crises. We hypothesize a higher scope of pension fund capitalism and vulnerability to financial market crises in countries with predominant market-based coordination mechanisms and short term strategies on financial markets (i.e. Liberal Market Economies)

Pension Reform in Japan

This paper aims to establish guidelines for public pension reform in Japan, using a numerical simulation approach. The paper introduces the example of a minimum guaranteed pension in the Swedish pension system and compares this with the basic pension in Japan’s public pension system, with regard to methods of income redistribution through a public pension scheme. Simulation results show that the switch from the basic pension to the guaranteed pension does not always generate favorable results. If we consider a public pension program with the same scale as the current Japanese program, the highest level of social welfare is attained when a public pension system consists of only a basic pension and is financed by a consumption tax.Public pension reform; Swedish pension system; Minimum guaranteed pension; Basic pension; Life-cycle general equilibrium simulation model

Multiemployer Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plans: A Primer and Analysis of Policy Options

Multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans are pensions sponsored by more than one employer and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. About 3.2% of all DB pension plans, covering 25% of all DB pension plan participants, are multiemployer plans. Nearly all of the remaining DB pension plans are maintained by a single employer. A few DB pension plans are maintained by more than one employer but are not maintained under a collective bargaining agreement. In DB pension plans, participants receive a monthly benefit in retirement that is based on a formula. In multiemployer DB pensions, the formula typically multiplies a dollar amount by the number of years of service the employee has worked for employers that participate in the DB plan. DB pension plans are subject to funding rules in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §431) to ensure they have sufficient resources from which to pay promised benefits. Because single employer and multiemployer DB pension plans have different structures, Congress has established separate funding rules for these plans. Although most multiemployer DB pension plans have sufficient resources from which to pay their promised benefits, a few large plans are expected to become insolvent in the next 20 years. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a U.S. government agency that insures the benefits of participants in private-sector DB pension plans. As with the funding rules, Congress established separate PBGC programs to insure single and multiemployer DB pensions. For example, PBGC becomes the trustee of terminated single employer DB pension plans. PBGC does not become the trustee of multiemployer DB pension plans; rather, it makes loans to insolvent multiemployer DB plans so the plans may continue to pay participants’ guaranteed benefits. Although PBGC has sufficient resources to make loans to smaller multiemployer DB plans, the insolvency of a large multiemployer DB pension plan would likely result in a substantial strain on PBGC’s multiemployer insurance program. In the absence of increased financial resources for PBGC, participants in insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans might not receive all of the benefits guaranteed by PBGC. In a report released in June 2014, PBGC indicated that the multiemployer insurance program is highly likely to become insolvent by 2025. The Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014, enacted as Division O in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (MPRA; P.L. 113-235) made changes to some of the funding rules for multiemployer DB pensions and allowed plans that are expected to become insolvent to cut benefits to plan participants or to apply for a partition of the plan

Modelling the pension system in an overlapping-generations general equilibrium modelling framework

This article presents a theoretical contribution to the field of overlapping-generations general equilibrium modelling, i.e. an upgrade of this branch of models with a pension system. Within the pension block we model both the first pension pillar, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and the fully-funded second pillar of the Slovenian pension system. The modelling of the first pension pillar is based on cash flows of the mandatory pension insurance institution, the relationship between the pension base and the pension, and the process of harmonising pension growth to wage growth. The modelling of the second pillar centres on implementation of the liquidity constraint. Use was made of supplementary pension profiles, and the ratio between premia paid and pensions paid out from supplementary pension insurance. The category of total pension was also introduced, and the model ensured that at every point households adjusted the scope of labour supply and their current consumption towards the target total pension.first pension pillar; general equilibrium models; liquidity constraint; MCP; overlapping generations; PAYG; pension system; second pension pillar

Retirement expectations, pension reforms and their impact on private wealth accumulation

We estimate the effect of pension reforms on households' expectations of retirement outcomes and private wealth accumulation decisions exploiting a decade of intense Italian pension reforms as a source of exogenous variation in expected pension wealth. The Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large random sample of the Italian population, elicits expectations of the age at which workers expect to retire and of the ratio of pension benefits to pre-retirement income between 1989 and 2002. We find that workers have revised expectations in the direction suggested by the reform and that there is substantial offset between private wealth and perceived pension wealth, particularly by workers that are better informed about their pension wealth. Klassifikation: E21, H5