The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our Choquet expected utility model allows for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist (resp. pessimist) overweights good (resp. bad) outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents’ change of actions. With qualifications we show that optimistic (resp. pessimistic) complete ignorance is evolutionary stable / yields a strategic advantage in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games

Routing Games with Progressive Filling

Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived

Fuzzy measures and integrals in MCDA

This chapter aims at a unified presentation of various methods of MCDA based onfuzzy measures (capacity) and fuzzy integrals, essentially the Choquet andSugeno integral. A first section sets the position of the problem ofmulticriteria decision making, and describes the various possible scales ofmeasurement (difference, ratio, and ordinal). Then a whole section is devotedto each case in detail: after introducing necessary concepts, the methodologyis described, and the problem of the practical identification of fuzzy measuresis given. The important concept of interaction between criteria, central inthis chapter, is explained in details. It is shown how it leads to k-additivefuzzy measures. The case of bipolar scales leads to thegeneral model based on bi-capacities, encompassing usual models based oncapacities. A general definition of interaction for bipolar scales isintroduced. The case of ordinal scales leads to the use of Sugeno integral, andits symmetrized version when one considers symmetric ordinal scales. Apractical methodology for the identification of fuzzy measures in this contextis given. Lastly, we give a short description of some practical applications.Choquet integral; fuzzy measure; interaction; bi-capacities

A decade of application of the Choquet and Sugeno integrals in multi-criteria decision aid

The main advances regarding the use of the Choquet and Sugeno integrals in multi-criteria decision aid over the last decade are reviewed. They concern mainly a bipolar extension of both the Choquet integral and the Sugeno integral, interesting particular submodels, new learning techniques, a better interpretation of the models and a better use of the Choquet integral in multi-criteria decision aid. Parallel to these theoretical works, the Choquet integral has been applied to many new fields, and several softwares and libraries dedicated to this model have been developed.Choquet integral, Sugeno integral, capacity, bipolarity, preferences

Designing Electricity Auctions

Motivated by the new auction format introduced in the England andWales electric- ity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. We ¯nd that uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive e±ciency is ambiguous. The comparative e®ects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are also analysed. We also consider the relationship between market structure and market performance in the two auction formats. Finally, we clarify some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular, we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as ¯rms are restricted to a ¯nite number of bids