Robust capacitated trees and networks with uniform demands

We are interested in the design of robust (or resilient) capacitated rooted Steiner networks in case of terminals with uniform demands. Formally, we are given a graph, capacity and cost functions on the edges, a root, a subset of nodes called terminals, and a bound k on the number of edge failures. We first study the problem where k = 1 and the network that we want to design must be a tree covering the root and the terminals: we give complexity results and propose models to optimize both the cost of the tree and the number of terminals disconnected from the root in the worst case of an edge failure, while respecting the capacity constraints on the edges. Second, we consider the problem of computing a minimum-cost survivable network, i.e., a network that covers the root and terminals even after the removal of any k edges, while still respecting the capacity constraints on the edges. We also consider the possibility of protecting a given number of edges. We propose three different formulations: a cut-set based formulation, a flow based one, and a bilevel one (with an attacker and a defender). We propose algorithms to solve each formulation and compare their efficiency

The failure tolerance of mechatronic software systems to random and targeted attacks

This paper describes a complex networks approach to study the failure tolerance of mechatronic software systems under various types of hardware and/or software failures. We produce synthetic system architectures based on evidence of modular and hierarchical modular product architectures and known motifs for the interconnection of physical components to software. The system architectures are then subject to various forms of attack. The attacks simulate failure of critical hardware or software. Four types of attack are investigated: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and random attack. Failure tolerance of the system is measured by a 'robustness coefficient', a topological 'size' metric of the connectedness of the attacked network. We find that the betweenness centrality attack results in the most significant reduction in the robustness coefficient, confirming betweenness centrality, rather than the number of connections (i.e. degree), as the most conservative metric of component importance. A counter-intuitive finding is that "designed" system architectures, including a bus, ring, and star architecture, are not significantly more failure-tolerant than interconnections with no prescribed architecture, that is, a random architecture. Our research provides a data-driven approach to engineer the architecture of mechatronic software systems for failure tolerance.Comment: Proceedings of the 2013 ASME International Design Engineering Technical Conferences & Computers and Information in Engineering Conference IDETC/CIE 2013 August 4-7, 2013, Portland, Oregon, USA (In Print