42 research outputs found

    Sekwencyjna dwuosobowa gra konkurencyjna o sumie niezerowej. Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne, 2006, nr 3-4

    Get PDF
    Rozwa┼╝ono sytuacje decyzyjne danego gracza, dla ustalonych kolejno┼Ťci ruch├│w graczy. Wskazano na problem nieznanego charakteru kryterium gracza konkurencyjnego i niejednoznaczno┼Ťci jego odpowiedzi. Zaproponowano analityczne narz─Ödzia wspomagaj─ůce proces podejmowania decyzji

    Wpływ rozwoju technik komunikacji elektronicznej na rynek usług pocztowych w dobie tworzenia społeczeństwa informacyjnego. Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne, 2006, nr 3-4

    Get PDF
    Opisano zmiany zachodz─ůce w otoczeniu prawnym, ekonomicznym i technicznym rynku pocztowego. Wskazano szanse i zagro┼╝enia, jakie powstaj─ů przed poczt─ů w zwi─ůzku z rozwojem technik komunikacji elektronicznej. Zwr├│cono uwag─Ö na nowe miejsce i zadania dla poczty w najbli┼╝szych latach, a tak┼╝e na wykorzystanie przez publicznych operator├│w pocztowych internetu do ┼Ťwiadczenia us┼éug online

    Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and power plants. Part I ÔÇô Split of profit proposals

    Get PDF
    Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice (in long run) or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract (in short run e.g. one of year). It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase.Bilateral monopoly; pit optimisation; bargaining; price negotiation; fair division; Nash bargaining solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; lignite price; lignite mine; lignite power plant; coal mine; coal power plant

    Negocjacje pomi─Ödzy kopalni─ů w─Ögla brunatnego a elektrowni─ů jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej

    Get PDF
    Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Based on the simple model of the lignite deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account nested pits generated by the pit optimisation process. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of two-stage game. In the first step (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution ÔÇô excavation of the smaller pit. Due to existence of information asymmetry and the mine predominant strategy attainment of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation techniques, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further research.bilateral monopoly; opencast mine; pit optimisation; price negotiation;

    Wst─Öp do wiedzy o grach tradycyjnych

    Get PDF
    This book is in a sense a compendium of knowledge about the games falling within the realm of human behaviour, which we define as the concept of fun. The aim of the work is orienting a reader in the intricacies and diversity of traditional games that existed and still exist today, that has beguiled the time of the old and the modern man

    Nash bargaining solution and the split of profit in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Part two ÔÇô applications in strategic and tactical negotiations

    Get PDF
    The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation have been presented. The novel approach is the creation of lignite price contours on the mine and power plant profit distribution chart. It shows the inherent contradiction between individual and group rationality in bilateral monopoly (BM) and the reduction of incentive to opportunism together with the increase of lignite price. The opportunism due to asymmetry of information and possession of dominant strategy of mine (optimization of ultimate pit) creates a real threat to cooperation between both sides of BM. The full confidence in joint profit maximization and full control of accepted profit sharing without increase of transactional costs is possible only in vertically integrated energy producer offering equal access to information for both sides. As it was shown in [4] such solution does not create any threat for energy market efficiency ÔÇô on the contrary it can allow on better level of deposit recovery through excavation of the greater ultimate pit. The interesting proposal is the treatment of pit optimization as a real option of mine size change. Presented methods, tools and solutions should help both firms in real negotiation in finding their strategic positions and avoiding potential threats. But eventually from negotiating sides it depends if they will choose the cooperation or competition, rational arguments or rational threats, maximization of joint profits or only their own.bilateral monopoly; lignite price; price negotiation; bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; cooperative game; non-zero sum game; pit optimisation; Lerchs-Grossmann algorithm; vertical integration; Pareto efficiency; opportunism; asymmetry of information; ultimate pit; optimal pit; lignite mining; real option

    Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?

    Get PDF
    Is vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom? Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits from reduction of transactional costs described by Williamson. Additional benefits can be attained by application of open pit optimisation which leads to the solution of modified bilateral monopoly of lignite mine and power plant. Cooperation can assure joint profits maximisation and rivalry leads to suboptimal solution in Pareto sense. Due to asymmetry of information about the deposit the mine has information advantage and can apply its predominant solution maximising only their own profits in long run.bilateral monopoly; lignite mine; power plant; market structure; trasactional costs; lignite price; price negotiation; strategic benefits; bargaining; cooperative game; Pareto optimality; asymmetry of information

    Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and power plants. Part II ÔÇô Lignite price formulas.

    Get PDF
    For methods of the profit division in the bilateral monopoly of the mine and the power station sug-gested in the first part of this paper the formulae for lignite price and shares in the joint profit of the mine and the power station are calculated. The proposed profit division contain: the egalitarian, normal and asymmetrical Nash solution, the proportional division, assuring equal and proportional profit margins division (in it calculated only on the basis of prime costs) and Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with individual utility functions.Bilateral monopoly; pit optimisation; bargaining; price negotiation; fair division; Nash bargaining solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; lignite price; lignite mine; lignite power plant; coal mine; coal power plant; coal price

    Schemat arbitra┼╝owy Nasha, a podzia┼é zysk├│w w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni w─Ögla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cze┼Ť─ç pierwsza ÔÇô podstawy teoretyczne

    Get PDF
    The newest findings in analysis of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution not only in quantity of lignite (the size and shape of the ultimate pit) but also in its price has been depicted. It has been proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a two stage, cooperative, non-zero sum two-person game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximizing the joint profit of BM would be chosen and in the second during bargaining the split of profit would be decided together with the transfer price of lignite. The differences of strategic and tactical negotiations have been depicted and the needs of frequent adjustments to changing conditions have been stressed. It has been proposed to treat this adjustment as a real option to change scale of activity. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM and conditions of good solution have been discussed

    Negocjacje pomi─Ödzy kopalni─ů w─Ögla brunatnego a elektrowni─ů jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej

    Get PDF
    Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Based on the simple model of the lignite deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account nested pits generated by the pit optimisation process. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of two-stage game. In the first step (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution ÔÇô excavation of the smaller pit. Due to existence of information asymmetry and the mine predominant strategy attainment of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation techniques, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further research
    corecore