A synthesis of the role of media reports and elections in Nigerian democracy

This paper examines the interplay between the media and the elections in Nigeria, and discusses some of the relevant communication models that could assist the media in effectively reporting future elections in the country. This study has employed a historical approach, and argues that since Nigeria attained its political independence in 1960; conducting free and fair elections has been the major political problem in the country. The paper observed that the June 12 1993 Presidential Elections resulted in a stalemate, while the 2007 Elections were flawed with cases of electoral irregularities. Many of the results of the elections that were approved earlier by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) were later cancelled by the Nigerian Judiciary, a confirmation that the elections were rigged as confirmed by most of the internal and the external observers that monitored the elections. As a part of the solutions to the problem of elections in Nigeria, this paper recommends the establishment of an Inter-Party Central Committee (ICPP), made up of the national executives of the registered political parties, to work in collaboration with the media as the committee supports the electoral commission to conduct free and fair elections in the country

Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections

Why do we have judicial elections? A democracy without elections for the legislature and executive (or, in parliamentary systems, for the executive as the leadership of the elected legislators), would be simply inconceivable. But no one would deny that eleven of our states, or many other nations, are democracies even though they do not elect judges. It might follow from that irrefutable, fundamental difference between elections for judges and for other offices, that judicial elections should not-or more to the point, need not-be conducted the same as other elections. Before we soar into debate, let us lay a foundation with elements of fact: first, the historical facts about why we have judicial elections; second, how well or poorly those facts-that is, the very purpose of having judicial elections-have been taken into account by the courts that have stricken efforts to treat judicial elections differently

Violent Dissent and Rebellion in Africa

This article analyzes how the selection process for the executive affects the risk of rebellion and insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa between 1971 and 1995. Four executive recruitment processes are distinguished, which are characteristic for the African context: (1) a process without elections, (2) single candidate elections, (3) single party, multiple candidate elections, and (4) multiparty executive elections. The results suggest that single candidate elections and multiparty elections substantially reduce the risk of insurgencies compared to systems without any kind of executive elections. They further show that during times of political instability the risk of large-scale violent dissent increases substantially. The article supports findings of the civil war literature that higher levels of income are associated with a lower risk of intrastate violence, while oil-exporting countries are at a higher risk of rebellion. In short, this article further strengthens the need to use more specific measures of elements of political regimes, which also take into account regional particularities, in order to paint a more informative picture of how political structures influence the risk of internal violence

Garbled Elections

Majority rules are frequently used to decide whether or not a public good should be provided, but will typically fail to achieve an efficient provision. We provide a worst-case analysis of the majority rule with an optimally chosen majority threshold, assuming that voters have independent private valuations and are exante symmetric (provision cost shares are included in the valuations). We show that if the population is large it can happen that the optimal majority rule is essentially no better than a random provision of the public good. But the optimal majority rule is worst-case asymptotically efficient in the large-population limit if (i) the voters’ expected valuation is bounded away from 0, and (ii) an absolute bound for valuations is known

The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections

The belief that elections reduce rent seeking by government officials is widely held, likewise the belief that rent seeking decreases as elections are less subject to corruption. In this paper we develop and test a model in which these beliefs are carefully examined. Our model indicates that, while elections may provide a disincentive for rent seeking, this disincentive (1) need not actually materialise, and (2), is not necessarily correlated with the integrity of the electoral protocol. We next consider the ability of village-level elections in rural China to reduce rent seeking, and the extent to which this ability varies as the elections are more or less corruptible. We find that in practice, even elections that appear quite corruptible provide a strong disincentive to rent seeking. Moreover, our results indicate which types of electoral reform lead to more effective popular oversight of leaders, and which do not.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39988/3/wp602.pd

Do Elections Slow Down Economic Globalization Process in India? It's Politics Stupid!

I investigate whether timing of the elections impact economic globalization process or not in India. In other words, do elections slowdown economic globalization process? The theoretical underpinning is that, policies of economic globalization lead to economic and social hardships in short run but benefit the economy in the long run. The motto behind slowing down the economic globalization process before elections is that it leads to polarization of voters and thus negatively affects the incumbent government. I make use of Axel Dreherís economic globalization index and construct ëinstrumental electoral cycleí to capture the scheduled and midterm election cycle. Using time series data for India for the period 1970 ñ 2006, I find that scheduled elections are associated with slow down in economic globalization, whereas midterm elections are not. Replacing Dreherís economic globalization index with our modified globalization index does not alter the results. I also find that slow down in economic globalization process is responsive to the propinquity to a scheduled election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the scheduled elections, economic globalization process keeps slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. These results suggest that elections generate ìelectoral globalization cycleî in developing democratic country like India.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64406/1/wp929.pd

The 2009 European Election in Italy: National or European?

In June 2009, European citizens voted in the European Parliamentary elections. Despite the relevance of the election, turnout across countries was particularly low. In Italy, too, abstention is growing and this paper aims to explain why. Traditionally, low turnout in European Parliamentary elections is explained by the fact that they are considered second-order elections and, thus, less important than national elections. According to this perspective, national factors are the main cause of lower turnout as compared to national elections. Thus, it is generally considered that low turnout is not related to citizens’ support for the European Union or other European attitudes, such as European identity. In this article, this perspective is questioned and other individual factors are considered. In particular, a number of European attitudes are considered as independent variables together with national factors. The findings show that abstention in European Parliamentary elections in Italy is directly linked to citizens’ disaffection with politics, rather than disaffection with government performance. Furthermore, attitudes toward the European Union integration project play a role only when the level of political involvement is high. Thus, European questions matter and turnout in European Parliamentary elections is driven not only by national-level factors, but also by citizens’ satisfaction with the European Union and sense of European identity

The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electorates

We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully proportional representation rules---Chamberlin--Courant's rule and Monroe's rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be NP-hard for unrestricted preferences. We show that for single-crossing preferences this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm for Chamberlin--Courant's rule, but remains NP-hard for Monroe's rule. Our algorithm for Chamberlin--Courant's rule can be modified to work for elections with bounded single-crossing width. To circumvent the hardness result for Monroe's rule, we consider single-crossing elections that satisfy an additional constraint, namely, ones where each candidate is ranked first by at least one voter (such elections are called narcissistic). For single-crossing narcissistic elections, we provide an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian version of Monroe's rule.Comment: 23 page