Trends and uptake of new formulations of controlled-release oxycodone in Canada

Purpose: This study investigated the impact of changing availability of tamper‐deterrent and non‐tamper‐deterrent oxycodone on prescribing patterns of controlled‐release oxycodone across Canada. Methods: We conducted a population‐based, serial cross‐sectional study of controlled‐release oxycodone dispensing from community pharmacies across Canada between October 2007 and April 2016. We calculated rates of dispensing (tablets per 100 population) and reported the relative market share of generic non‐tamper‐deterrent controlled‐release oxycodone. All analyses were reported nationally and stratified by province. Results: After the introduction of a tamper‐deterrent formulation, the national rate of controlled‐release oxycodone dispensing fell by 44.6% (from 26.4 to 14.6 tablets per 100 population from February 2012 to April 2016). Between December 2012 and July 2013, there was moderate uptake of generic non‐tamper‐deterrent controlled‐release oxycodone (968 452 tablets; 16.0% in July 2013), which appeared to have little impact on the overall rate of controlled‐release oxycodone dispensing in Canada. However, the uptake of generic non‐tamper‐deterrent oxycodone varied considerably by province. By April 2016, 55.0% of all controlled‐release oxycodone tablets dispensed in Quebec were for the generic formulation. […

An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across and within sessions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis: except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire

The chilling effect and the most ancient form of vengeance:discrimination and victimising third parties

The recent Equality Act 2010 includes a revised definition of “victimisation”, which (in the Act’s most litigated field of employment) prohibits employers from victimising workers who use the legislation. The underlying mischief should be the deterrent effect upon litigants, or potential litigants (the “chilling” effect). One particularly pernicious deterrent is the victimisation, not of the complainant, but of a third party, such as the complainant’s spouse, loved one, or friend, “the most ancient form of vengeance”. Yet the revised definition does not address the deterrent effect per se, and specifically excludes third party victimisation from its reach. This paper explores, first, why the deterrent mischief and the chilling effect should underpin the victimisation provision, so that it addresses third party victimisation, second, the potential of existing alternative solutions in domestic law; and third, the position EU law, and under the United States’ Civil Rights Act 1964. It concludes that the best existing solution lies in EU general principles, but for the sake of certainty, a simple amendment to the existing formula is required, which would solve the problem without any undue side-effects

An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across and within sessions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis: except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire.deterrence; law and economics; incentives; crowding out; experiment

An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across and within sessions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis: except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire.deterrence; law and economics; incentives; crowding out; experiment

Liability and Admission of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law

Some judges and scholars have questioned the social value of the standard form in which the Securities and Exchange Commission settles its corporate enforcement actions, including the agency’s use of essentially unreviewed consent decrees that include no admission of liability or wrongdoing. This essay for a symposium on SEC enforcement provides an analysis of the deterrent effects of the three main components of settlements in public enforcement of law: liability, admission, and remedy. The conclusions are the following. All three components have beneficial deterrent effects. Cost considerations nonetheless justify some settlements that dispense with liability or admission, or even both. But a practice like the SEC’s of uniformly institutionalizing settlements without admissions, such that the deterrent effects of admissions are never realized, even for bargaining leverage, is not justified. Further, there is reason to believe that some form of judicial review of enforcement settlements would contribute to deterrence. To put the argument another way, the SEC and other agencies engaged in public civil enforcement could learn something from contemplating why the federal criminal justice system strongly disfavors nolo contendere pleas and why a plea bargaining system dominated by nolo pleas would be so undesirable as to be unthinkable

The Deterrent Effect of Death Penalty Eligibility: Evidence from the Adoption of Child Murder Eligibility Factors

We draw on within-state variations in the reach of capital punishment statutes between 1977 and 2004 to identify the deterrent effects associated with capital eligibility. Focusing on the most prevalent eligibility expansion, we estimate that the adoption of a child murder factor is associated with an approximately 20% reduction in the homicide rate of youth victims. Eligibility expansions may enhance deterrence by (1) paving the way for more executions and (2) providing prosecutors with greater leverage to secure enhanced non-capital sentences. While executions themselves are rare, this latter channel is likely to be triggered fairly regularly, providing a reasonable basis for a general deterrent response

Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment- An Experimental Investigation

Compliance with laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The expected penalty depends on both the probability of punishment and the severity of the punishment if caught. A key question in the economics of crime literature is whether increasing the probability of punishment is a more effective deterrent than an equivalent increase in the severity of punishment. This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate this issue, and finds that increasing the severity of punishment is a more effective deterrent than an equivalent increase in the probability of punishment. This result contrasts with the findings of the empirical crime literature.

State executions, deterrence, and the incidence of murder

This study employs a panel of U.S. state-level data over the years 1978-1997 to estimate the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Particular attention is paid to problems of endogeneity bias arising from the non-random assignment of death penalty laws across states and a simultaneous relationship between murders and the deterrence probabilities. The primary innovation of the analysis lies in the estimation of a simultaneous equations system whose identification is based upon the employment of instrumental variables motivated by the theory of public choice. The estimation results suggest that structural estimates of the deterrent effect of capital punishment are likely to be downward biased due to the influence of simultaneity. Correcting for simultaneity, the estimates imply that a state execution deters approximately fourteen murders per year on average. Finally, the results also suggest that the announcement effect of capital punishment, as opposed to the existence of a death penalty provision, is the mechanism actually driving the deterrent effect associated with state executions.capital punishment, deterrence, executions, murder

An overview of aerodynamic research and technology requirements as related to some military needs

Based on unclassified sources, a general review is presented of some military needs in light of the perceived U.S.S.R. doctrine, force balances, inventory growth, inventory items, and current actions. The Soviets appear to be attempting to increase their sphere of influence throught economic and political control as well as possible military control of land, sea, air, and space. To offset such possibilities, certain areas of deterrent needs that the Western World might pursue are suggested. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of research and technology related to aerospace systems as part of the deterrent needs