Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices

Sennett (1999) and Pawl & Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this essay I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl & Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken to claim that the value of free choice depends on an agent retaining the ability to change their mind; in so doing I demonstrate that some choices which result in fixed outcomes - a feature of the choices leading to impeccability - can indeed be valuable even if they cannot be undone

When is .999... less than 1?

We examine alternative interpretations of the symbol described as nought, point, nine recurring. Is "an infinite number of 9s" merely a figure of speech? How are such alternative interpretations related to infinite cardinalities? How are they expressed in Lightstone's "semicolon" notation? Is it possible to choose a canonical alternative interpretation? Should unital evaluation of the symbol .999 . . . be inculcated in a pre-limit teaching environment? The problem of the unital evaluation is hereby examined from the pre-R, pre-lim viewpoint of the student.Comment: 28 page

ALT-C 2011 call for proposals (abstracts)

This is the detailed call and guidelines document for the submission of abstracts of Short Papers, Short Presentations (ePosters), Symposia, Workshops and Demonstrations for inclusion in the programme of the September 6-8 2011 ALT Conference. The conference "Thriving in a colder and more challenging climate" will be co-chaired by John Cook (Professor of Technology Enhanced Learning at the Learning Technology Research Institute, London Metropolitan University), and Sugata Mitra (Professor of Educational Technology at Newcastle University)

Religious exclusivism unlimited: JEROEN DE RIDDER

Like David Silver before them, Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune argue that the facts of religious pluralism present an insurmountable challenge to the rationality of basic exclusive religious belief as construed by Reformed Epistemology. I will show that their argument is unsuccessful. First, their claim that the facts of religious pluralism make it necessary for the religious exclusivist to support her exclusive beliefs with significant reasons is one that the reformed epistemologist has the resources to reject. Secondly, they fail to demonstrate that it is impossible for basic religious beliefs to return to their properly basic state after defeaters against them have been defeated. Finally, I consider whether there is perhaps a similar but better argument in the neighbourhood and conclude in the negative. Reformed Epistemology's defence of exclusivism thus remains undefeated

Review of Maximum Likelihood Estimation with Stata by Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney

The new book by Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney (2003) is reviewed. Copyright 2003 by StataCorp LP.maximum likelihood, Stata programming

Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games

We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games with many players but few strategies. We show that any such game has an approximate pure Nash equilibrium, computable in polynomial time, with approximation O(s^2 L), where s is the number of strategies and L is the Lipschitz constant of the utilities. Finally, we show that there is a PTAS for finding an epsilo

The Experience Machine: Existential reflections on Virtual Worlds

Problems and questions originally raised by Robert Nozick in his famous thought experiment ‘The Experience Machine’ are frequently invoked in the current discourse concerning virtual worlds. Having conceptualized his Gedankenexperiment in the early seventies, Nozick could not fully anticipate the numerous and profound ways in which the diffusion of computer simulations and video games came to affect the Western world. This article does not articulate whether or not the virtual worlds of video games, digital simulations, and virtual technologies currently actualize (or will actualize) Nozick’s thought experiment. Instead, it proposes a philosophical reflection that focuses on human experiences in the upcoming age of their ‘technical reproducibility’. In pursuing that objective, this article integrates and supplements some of the interrogatives proposed in Robert Nozick’s thought experiment. More specifically, through the lenses of existentialism and philosophy of technology, this article tackles the technical and cultural heritage of virtual reality, and unpacks its potential to function as a tool for self-discovery and self-construction. Ultimately, it provides an interpretation of virtual technologies as novel existential domains. Virtual worlds will not be understood as the contexts where human beings can find completion and satisfaction, but rather as instruments that enable us to embrace ourselves and negotiate with various aspects of our (individual as well as collective) existence in previously-unexperienced guises