974 research outputs found

    Hospital production in a national health service: the physician's dilemma

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    There is a paucity of literature concerning the relation between the resource utilization decisions of the salaried hospital based physician and patient outcomes in a national health service. The purpose of our study is to model and test hospital production where the major decision makers are physicians. We view the output of the hospital as a distribution function over final health states of the patient. Our model contains a utility function for physicians whose arguments include the expected final health status of the patient and a pressure function which reflects the resource allocation and hospital financing policy of the Portuguese Health Ministry. Two sets of first order conditions derived from the theoretical model are estimated within a simultaneous equations framework using data consisting of inpatient discharges for the most frequent non-obstetric DRG during the 1992-1999 time period. We find evidence that budget setting methods and the possession of a third party payer outside of the NHS are important predictors for use of the resource in question. Moreover, we find that use of the resource is important in predicting the final health status of the patient.

    Preventive health care and payment systems to providers

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    Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.Preventive health care, payment systems to providers

    Moral hazard and the demand for health services: A matching estimator approach

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    We estimate the impact of extra health insurance coverage beyond a National Health System on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to deal with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by finding instrumental variables. Since a priori instrumental variables are hard to find we take a different approach. We focus on the most common health insurance plan in Portugal, ADSE, which is given to all civil servants and their dependents. We argue that this insurance is exogenous, i.e., not correlated with the beneficiaries’ health status. This identifying assumption allows us to estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on the demand for three different health services using a matching estimator technique. The health services used are number of visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a dentist. Results show large positive effects of ADSE coverage for number of visits and tests among the young (18–30 years old) but only the latter is statistically significantly different from zero. The effects represent 21.8% and 30% of the average number of visits and tests for the young. On the contrary, we find no evidence of moral hazard on the probability of visiting a dentist.Publicad

    Moral hazard and the demand for health services: a matching estimator approach

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    We estimate the impact of health insurance coverage beyond National Health Insurance on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to deal with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by finding instrumental variables. Since a priori instrumental variables are hard to find we take a different approach. We focus on the most common health insurance plan in Portugal, ADSE, which is given to all civil servants and their dependants. We argue this insurance is exogenous i.e. not correlated with beneficiaries’ health status. This identifying assumption allows us to estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on three different health services using a matching estimator technique. The health services used are: number of visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a dentist. Results show large positive effects of ADSE for number of visits and tests among the young (18 to 30 years old) but only the latter is statistically significantly different from zero. The effects represent 21.8 and 30% of the average number of visits and tests for the young. On the contrary, we find no evidence of moral hazard on the probability of visiting a dentist

    MORAL HAZARD AND THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH SERVICES: A MATCHING ESTIMATOR APPROACH

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    In this paper we estimate the impact of health insurance coverage beyond National Health Insurance on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to deal with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by finding instrumental variables. It is hard to think, however, of any variable that a priori would be a good instrument and, therefore, we take a different approach. We concentrate on the most common health insurance plan in the Portuguese Health Survey, (ADSE), which is given to all civil servants and their dependants. We argue that this insurance is exogenous for most people i.e. not correlated with their health status. Under this identifying assumption we estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on three different health services using a matching estimator technique. The measures of demand for health services are number of visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a dentist. Preliminary results show large effects of ADSE for number of visits and tests among the young (18 to 30 years old) but only for tests are these effects statistically significantly different from zero. The magnitude of the effects represent 21.8 and 30 percent of the average number of visits and tests for the young. On the contrary we find no evidence of moral hazard on the probability of visiting a dentist. Finally, we argue that there is evidence of a positive cumulative effect of ADSE over the years.

    Moral hazard and the demand for health services: A matching estimator approach.

    Get PDF
    We estimate the impact of extra health insurance coverage beyond a National Health System on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to deal with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by finding instrumental variables. Since a priori instrumental variables are hard to find we take a different approach. We focus on the most common health insurance plan in Portugal, ADSE, which is given to all civil servants and their dependents. We argue that this insurance is exogenous, i.e., not correlated with the beneficiaries’ health status. This identifying assumption allows us to estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on the demand for three different health services using a matching estimator technique. The health services used are number of visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a dentist. Results show large positive effects of ADSE coverage for number of visits and tests among the young (18–30 years old) but only the latter is statistically significantly different from zero. The effects represent 21.8% and 30% of the average number of visits and tests for the young. On the contrary, we find no evidence of moral hazard on the probability of visiting a dentist.Demand for health services; Matching estimator; Moral hazard; Portuguese health system;

    Hospital production in a national health service: the physician's dilemma

    Get PDF
    There is a paucity of literature concerning the relation between the resource utilization decisions of the salaried hospital based physician and patient outcomes in a national health service. The purpose of our study is to model and test hospital production where the major decision makers are physicians. We view the output of the hospital as a distribution function over final health states of the patient. Our model contains a utility function for physicians whose arguments include the expected final health status of the patient and a pressure function which reflects the resource allocation and hospital financing policy of the Portuguese Health Ministry. Two sets of first order conditions derived from the theoretical model are estimated within a simultaneous equations framework using data consisting of inpatient discharges for the most frequent non-obstetric DRG during the 1992-1999 time period. We find evidence that budget setting methods and the possession of a third party payer outside of the NHS are important predictors for use of the resource in question. Moreover, we find that use of the resource is important in predicting the final health status of the patient.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT

    How to measure the deterrence effects of merger policy: frequency or composition?

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    "We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals." (author's abstract)"Diese Studie vergleicht zwei Indikatoren zur Messung der Abschreckungswirkung von wettbewerbspolitischen Maßnahmen. Untersucht wird, welcher Indikator sich besser eignet, Veränderungen in der Strenge oder Laxheit von wettbewerbspolitischen Regimes abzubilden. Es lässt sich feststellen, dass der häufigkeitsbasierte Indikator, der die Anzahl von offiziellen Fusionsankündigungen misst, dazu besser geeignet ist als der zusammengesetzte Abschreckungsindikator, der die angekündigten Unternehmensfusionen im Hinblick auf ihre relative Wettbewerbsbeschränkung im Vergleich zu möglichen anderen Fusionen bewertet. Dieses Ergebnis hat Folgen für die empirische Analyse der Abschreckungseffekte, die eine effektive Fusionskontrolle haben sollte. Außerdem kann es Implikationen haben für die Frage, wie die offizielle Ankündigung von wettbewerbsreduzierenden Fusionen verhindert werden können." (Autorenreferat
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