34 research outputs found

    Kryzys konstytucyjny w Polsce. Od planu upakowania s─ůdu (court-packing) do negowania orzecze┼ä Trybuna┼éu Konstytucyjnego

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    The history of the Polish Constitutional Court ( Trybuna┼é Konstytucyjny , hereinafter: the CC) shows that it has been one of the most respected constitutional organs. Although the CC has ruled on many controversial cases, and its case-law sometimes has been heavily criticized, until 2015, it had never become the object of a direct political attack. The ongoing constitutional crisis in Poland started a few months after the new Constitutional Court Act of 25 th June 2015 (hereinafter: the CCA of 2015) had come into force. The CCA of 2015 replaced the previous Constitutional Court Act of 1997 (the CCA of 1997). The draft of the new Act (CCA of 2015) was presented by the former President, Bronis┼éaw Komorowski, already in 2013. Yet, the parliamentary proceeding on the draft came to a standstill until May 2015 [2]. On 25th of June Sejm adopted the CAA of 2015. It was signed by the outgoing President Komorowski [3] on one of his last days in office and soon thereafter became binding law. Promulgated on 30th of July 2015 it entered in force 30 days later, on 30 th of August 2015). * Alexander Hamilton made this claim in Federalist #78. Amongst the others, he stated: ÔÇťIt may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgmentÔÇŁ.┬á [1] A. ┼Üledzi┼äska-Simon, ┬á available at: Midnight Judges: PolandÔÇÖs Constitutional Tribunal Caught Between Political Fronts, VerfBlog, ┬á2015/11/23, http://verfassungsblog.de/midnight-judges-polands-constitutional-tribunal-caught-between-political-fronts/. On 29 th of August 2013 the President submitted a draft Act on the CC to Sejm. The rationale for the draft act was developed by a team (composed, among the others, of former CC judges) headed by the President of the CC. On 3 rd of October 2014 Sejm initiated works on the draft Act on the CC. On 1 st of April 2015 the Extraordinary Subcommittee on the draft Act on the Constitutional Court started to work on the draft. On 9 th of April 2015 the report of the Extraordinary Subcommittee was submitted by the President to Sejm. On 10 th of May 2015 the first round of presidential elections was held. Andrzej Duda obtained 34.76% of votes, while Bronis┼éaw Komorowski 33.77%. Two weeks later, in the second round of elections Andrzej Duda obtained 51.55% of votes and won the elections.Lo presente studio affronta il tema della crisi costituzionale che la Polonia sta attraversando. Fin dal suo inizio , il Tribunale Costituzionale gode dei pi├╣ alti livelli di fiducia sociale. Nonostante le crtiche o le controversie che talvolta sono emerse su alcuni giudizi, fino allÔÇÖanno scorso il Tribunale non ├Ę stato mai oggetto di attacchi politici diretti. La crisi, provocata dal conflitto sulla sua composizione, avvenuta anche negli altri ordinamenti sotto forma del court packing plan, evolve verso una situazione in cui tutte le sue attivit├á vengano compromesse. L' attuale governo polacco nega validit├á alle decisioni del Tribunale e ha rifiutato di pubblicarne alcune. Istituzioni internazionali, tra cui il Consiglio dÔÇÖEuropa e lÔÇÖUnione europea, hanno sollevato gravi obiezioni in proposito.Niniejszy artyku┼é dotyczy kryzysu konstytucyjnego wok├│┼é Trybuna┼éu Konstytucyjnego w Polsce. Trybuna┼é Konstytucyjny by┼é od pocz─ůtku swojego istnienia uznawany za organ ciesz─ůcy si─Ö jednym z wy┼╝szych wska┼║nik├│w zaufania spo┼éecznego. Mimo kontrowersyjno┼Ťci niekt├│rych orzecze┼ä i krytyki kierowanej pod ich adresem, nigdy, do ostatniego roku, TK nie by┼é si─Ö obiektem bezpo┼Ťredniego politycznego ataku. Trwaj─ůcy sp├│r polityczny wok├│┼é Trybuna┼éu Konstytucyjnego, cho─ç pierwotnie dotycz─ůcy znanego innym systemom pomys┼éu obsadzenia s─ůdu ÔÇ×swoimi s─ÖdziamiÔÇŁ ( court packing plan ), ewoluuje w kierunku pr├│by pe┼énego sparali┼╝owania prac tego organu. Obecny rz─ůd i wi─Ökszo┼Ť─ç parlamentarna neguj─ů wa┼╝no┼Ť─ç orzecze┼ä TK i odmawiaj─ů cz─Ö┼Ťci z nich publikacji. Budzi to powa┼╝ne zastrze┼╝enia ze strony podmiot├│w mi─Ödzynarodowych, w tym Rady Europy oraz Unii Europejskiej

    THE FIRST PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REFERRED BY ITALIAN CORTE COSTITUZIONALE, SPANISH TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL, AND FRENCH CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL

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    The article concerns the issue of constitutional courtsÔÇÖ preliminary references to the CJ. So far only a few centralized constitutional courts have accepted raising the preliminary reference to the CJ. Three of them are courts which initially had denied such possibility, but later changed their minds: Italian Corte Costitutionale (the Italian Constitutional Court; further: ICC); Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal, further: SCT) and French Conseil Constitutionell (the French Constitutional Council; further: FCC). The first reference addressed to the ECJ by ICC came after more than a decade of explicit denial of having the status of a court in the meaning of the current Article 267(3) TFUE. The change of the ICCÔÇÖs position towards the preliminary ruling procedure was based on the juxtaposition of two ways in which a constitutional review proceeding may be initiated in the Italian legal system: via incidentale and via principale. The SCT denied its status as a court in the meaning of Article 267(3) TFUE till 2011. The change of the SCTÔÇÖs position, in contrast to the ICC case was not followed by any in-depth argumentation favouring such ÔÇťjudicial voltÔÇŁ. The FCC for the first time referred to the CJ in 2013. The profound change in the FCCÔÇÖs attitude towards EU law was triggered by the introduction of Priority Preliminary Question on Constitutionality proceedings (QPC) in 2008

    The Constitution as a Bargaining Chip

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    To┼╝samo┼Ť─ç konstytucyjna jako implikowane ograniczenia uprawnie┼ä do zmian konstytucyjnych. Przypadek Polski

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    Ongoing discussions on the need to amend the effective Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 or to enact a new Fundamental Law have made the question on the limits of permitted modifications of system-related decisions to become increasingly pertinent also in the context of Polish constitutional law. The question posed above naturally raises further questions: the importance of the constitution itself,its role in the legal system, the relationship between constituent power and constituted power, as well as the interdependence between constitutionalism and democracy. These questions are well embedded in theoretical and legal considerations, and the answers tothem depend to a large extent on the adoption of specific initial assumptions.Trwaj─ůce dyskusje na temat potrzeby zmiany obowi─ůzuj─ůcej Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. b─ůd┼║ uchwalenia nowej ustawy zasadniczej sprawi┼éy, ┼╝e kwestia granic dozwolonych modyfikacji decyzji systemowych staje si─Ö coraz bardziej istotna r├│wnie┼╝ w kontek┼Ťcie polskiego prawa konstytucyjnego. Postawione pytanie badawcze w naturalny spos├│b rodzi kolejne pytania: o znaczenie samej konstytucji i jej roli w systemie prawnym, jej zwi─ůzek z w┼éadz─ů, a tak┼╝e wsp├│┼ézale┼╝no┼Ť─ç mi─Ödzy systemem konstytucjnym a demokracj─ů. Pytaniate s─ů dobrze osadzone w rozwa┼╝aniach teoretycznych i prawnych, a odpowiedzi na nie w du┼╝ej mierze zale┼╝─ů od przyj─Öcia konkretnych za┼éo┼╝e┼ä

    Populist but not Popular

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    Legitymacja czynna zwi─ůzk├│w zawodowych i organizacji zawodowych w ┼Ťwietle orzecznictwa Trybuna┼éu Konstytucyjnego

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    According to Article 190 para 1 subpara. 4 of the Constitution the national organs of trade unions as well as the national authorities of employersÔÇÖ organizations and occupational organizations may make application to the Constitutional Tribunal regarding constitutional review. According to para 2 of Article 190 of the Constitution the subjects referred to in para. 1 subpara 4 may make such application if the normative act relates to matters relevant to the scope of their activity. The aim of this paper is to present the hinterto prevailing case law of the Constitutional Tribunal concerning the issue of locus standi of two types of subjects indicated in Article 190 para 1 subpara 4: the national organs of trade unions and national authorities of occupational organizations. The Constitutional Tribunal has received a quite precise defi nition of ÔÇť a national organ of a trade union ÔÇŁ as well as a defi nition of ÔÇť an occupational organization ÔÇŁ. On the other hand, more problems usually causes the issue of the objective scope of the competence to initiate constitutional review by one of aforementioned subjects. The Constitutional Tribunal pointed out in a few judgments merely main requirements which have to be fulfi lled when constitutional review is initiated by a national organ of a trade union or national authority of an occupational organization. It means that some questions regarding the objective scope of locus standi of trade unions and occupational organizations are still open

    Kontrola konstytucyjno┼Ťci prawa w pa┼ästwach UE w ┼Ťwietle ewolucji s─ůdownictwa konstytucyjnego w Europie

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    The article presents fundamental changes of judicial review in European countries. First of all, within the so-called the Kelsenian model of judicial review, in many countries, including Austria itself, numerous modifications were made regarding the scope of competences of constitutional courts, types and legal consequences of their rulings. In addition to classical judicial review, constitutional courts have obtained a number of other functions such as review of the goals and activities of political parties, resolution of constitutional disputes, adjudication on constitutional liability of politicians or verification of the validity of elections. Due to the growing significance of the constitutional complaint, constitutional courts have become a kind of national courts of human rights. Issues related to the temporal effects of judgments (including the effects of the so-called postponing the loss of validity of an unconstitutional provision) were developed. In France ÔÇô the last bastion of continental Europe denying the subsequent judicial review ÔÇô in 2008, a revolutionary change was introduced: the institution of the preliminary questions to the Constitutional Council.Artyku┼é przedstawia podstawowe zmiany, kt├│rym uleg┼éa kontrola konstytucyjno┼Ťci prawa w pa┼ästwach europejskich. Wskazano, ┼╝e w ramach tzw. kelsenowskiego modelu s─ůdownictwa konstytucyjnego w wielu pa┼ästwach, w tym w Austrii, dokonywano licznych modyfikacji dotycz─ůcych zakresu kompetencji s─ůd├│w konstytucyjnych, rodzaj├│w oraz skutk├│w prawnych ich orzecze┼ä. Opr├│cz orzekania w sprawach kontroli konstytucyjno┼Ťci s─ůdy konstytucyjne uzyska┼éy szereg innych funkcji, takich jak kontrola konstytucyjno┼Ťci cel├│w i dzia┼éalno┼Ťci partii politycznych, rozstrzyganie spor├│w konstytucyjnych, orzekanie w sprawach odpowiedzialno┼Ťci konstytucyjnej polityk├│w czy te┼╝ rozstrzyganie o wa┼╝no┼Ťci wybor├│w. Ze wzgl─Ödu na rosn─ůce znaczenie skargi konstytucyjnej s─ůdy konstytucyjne sta┼éy si─Ö swego rodzaju krajowymi trybuna┼éami ochrony praw cz┼éowieka. W praktyce orzeczniczej rozwini─Öte zosta┼éy kwestie zwi─ůzane ze skutkami czasowymi orzecze┼ä, w tym skutkami tzw. odroczenia utraty mocy obowi─ůzuj─ůcej niekonstytucyjnego przepisu. We Francji ÔÇô ostatnim bastionie kontynentalnej Europy neguj─ůcym nast─Öpcz─ů kontrol─Ö konstytucyjno┼Ťci ÔÇô w 2008 r. zdecydowano si─Ö na wprowadzenie rewolucyjnej zmiany: instytucji pyta┼ä prejudycjalnych do Rady Konstytucyjnej

    Pluralizm prawny. Tradycja, transformacje, wyzwania, 510 s.

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    Ksi─ů┼╝ka po┼Ťwi─Öcone tradycji, wsp├│┼éczesno┼Ťci i prognozowanej przysz┼éo┼Ťci zjawiska pluralizmu prawnego. Fenomen ten zosta┼é w ukazany z r├│┼╝nych punkt├│w widzenia - towarzysz─ůcych mu pr─ůd├│w ideowych, uwarunkowa┼ä politycznych, ekonomicznych, a tak┼╝e zmieniaj─ůcego si─Ö technicznego otoczenia ┼╝ycia spo┼éecze┼ästw, szczeg├│lnie nowych system├│w masowej, horyzontalnej i wertykalnej komunikacji
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