Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market

While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.Indivisible Goods Market, Dynamics, Competitive Allocation, Strict Core, Foresight, Stable Set

ROCK-I/-II 遺伝子欠損マウス卵黄嚢における血管形成不全について

京都大学0048新制・課程博士博士(医学)甲第18880号医博第3991号新制||医||1008(附属図書館)31831京都大学大学院医学研究科医学専攻(主査)教授 山下 潤, 教授 篠原 隆司, 教授 斎藤 通紀学位規則第4条第1項該当Doctor of Medical ScienceKyoto UniversityDFA

EXAFS Study on Local Structure of Iron Crystal by the Use of Asymmetrical Monochromator and PSPC

The EXAFS spectroscopy equipment constructed from an asymmetrical cut flat monochromator and PSPC is applied to the structural determination of pure α-iron which has small difference (0.038nm) in the first and second nearest neighbour distance. The efficiency of the curve fitting method for the two shell model of known structure material (α-iron) is discussed, in addition to describing the details of the experimental procedure of our new type of spectrometer and of the EXAFS data analysis