29,098 research outputs found

    Irish Sea Coastal Stakeholder Engagement in NW England consultation, participation, strategic purpose and rhetoric. Do you reap just what you sow?

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    The creation of a holistic more inclusive approach to marine management could be positively influenced by the development of well structured and sincere Stakeholder Engagement and Public Participation (SEPP) processes. However poorly designed frameworks and processes lacking sincerity may engender skepticism, mistrust and create barriers in the attainment of a thriving and diverse coastal economy During 2009 a public participation and stakeholder engagement policy has been used by government agencies, Defra and the Department of Energy and Climate Change to gauge public opinion within the marine and coastal environment of the Irish Sea. This concerns the development of Irish Sea Conservation Zones and the UK’s Nuclear Newbuild programme. Both issues have complex dynamics regarding their environmental, economic, societal and sustainability aspects. This paper studies two contrasting styles of SEPP deployed during this critical ‘first contact’ stage by a participatory observation approach and assesses how this phase may affect the development of the engagement process and how this may affect a project’s outcome

    What is a quantum simulator?

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    Quantum simulators are devices that actively use quantum effects to answer questions about model systems and, through them, real systems. Here we expand on this definition by answering several fundamental questions about the nature and use of quantum simulators. Our answers address two important areas. First, the difference between an operation termed simulation and another termed computation. This distinction is related to the purpose of an operation, as well as our confidence in and expectation of its accuracy. Second, the threshold between quantum and classical simulations. Throughout, we provide a perspective on the achievements and directions of the field of quantum simulation.Comment: 13 pages, 2 figure

    A different cold war? European settlement of 1963 and afterward

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    The expectation of ongoing pressure against the Soviet Union and potential allies elsewhere in world made up the thrust of early US planning for the Cold War, and were emblematic of Containment. They led the US to assume leadership of NATO in Western Europe, and to worldwide US engagements, including in Vietnam.  But the US and NATO during the 1950s could not agree on a defense strategy; Eisenhower’s plan by 1957 and 1958 was for the US to reduce its European presence in favor of national control of nuclear weapons, including by West Germany. That prospect frightened the Soviets, and more than anything else led to Khrushchev’s ultimatum on Berlin in November 1958. Kennedy, with some collaboration from Khrushchev, constructed a settlement by 1963 that would keep US forces in western Europe; keep US nuclear weapons under US control, hence prevent Germans from having them; and maintain the political status quo in central Europe.  A self-enforcing European peace could be achieved only because the Soviet goal of regional hegemony had been thwarted. But Kennedy and Khrushchev both left the scene, following which the accomplishment was poorly understood, a pattern oddly continued by most Cold War observers – including Morgenthau and Kissinger. Had it been better understood, it might have changed US policy toward less intervention in the Third World. Eisenhower left office in January 1961 with the US on the brink of showdown in central Africa, Cuba, and Laos. We got a pre-vision of a different strategy in Kennedy’s policy shifts in all of these, and in withdrawal underway of forces from Vietnam.  Meanwhile, DeGaulle offered a multi-dimensional case for neutrality in southeast Asia. A less ideological, more “realist” view would have led the US to stay “offshore,” to avoid confrontation where superpower interests were only marginally involved, and otherwise to encourage neutralist solutions.  The Cold War might have faded away; but that was not to be. Containment, as practiced, and resumed after 1963, prolonged the Cold War. Kennedy and DeGaulle were effective realists, while Eisenhower, Kissinger, and often Acheson, were not. The 1963 European settlement should have been updated during the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it was not. A consequence, in part, was the Ukraine war of 2022.Keywords. Containment; European settlement 1963; Cold War; Realism; Hegemony in Europe; Nuclear weapons policy; MC-48; NATO history; Berlin crisis; Vietnam War;  Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; Domino Theory; Neutralism; Multi-lateral Force (MLF) arrangements; Dwight Eisenhower; John Kennedy; Dean Acheson; Henry Kissinger; Nikita Khrushchev; Charles DeGaulle; Konrad Adenauer; Harold Macmillan; Walter Lippmann; Hans Morgenthau; John Mearsheimer; Marc Trachtenberg; Kissinger’s Diplomacy; Skybolt missile; Polaris missile; Ukraine War; Congolese neutrality; Laotian neutrality.JEL. M14

    Too Much Idealism? Ferguson, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War

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    Abstract. Ferguson provides evidence from Kissinger’s early academic writings involving Kantian philosophy and nineteenth century diplomacy, but continuing much later, that his subject was not the one-dimensional realist many have taken him to be. Kissinger was in fact a Kantian idealist, thought Prince Metternich to be backward-looking, and had serious reservations about the thrust of Bismarck’s power politics… Ferguson’s account of his record regarding Vietnam during the Kennedy andJohnson administrations demonstrates that Kissinger never opposed overall war strategy, although he made tactical criticisms of it.  Ferguson and Kissinger both neglect evidence that Kennedy was moving in an opposite direction regarding Vietnam, and that serious intra-Vietnam peace talks were underway in 1963. Such neglect leaves a misleading impression about alternatives… Ferguson’s account provides much evidence that Kissinger’s, and US, expectations for what might be obtained at the negotiating table in 1967-68 were unrealistic–this is a cardinal criticism of Kissinger and Nixon’s performance… Kissinger’s premises for continuing in Vietnam were usually geopolitical, rather than based on careful understanding of what was happening on the ground; and his view of power relations, at least during the 1950s and 1960s, gave insufficient attention to the role of nonaligned countries in contributing to international stability. Also, Kissingerthought maintaining US credibility an almost independent rationalefor continuing the war effort. Credibility arguments work best, however, where their advocates are otherwise on the right side of history.  Just as the US security framework survived concessions to avoid nuclear war over Berlin or Cuba, it would survive the post-Vietnam consequence thattroop commitments would henceforth be severely limited. The Kissinger-Nixon approach to Vietnam suffered from too little foreign policy realism, not too much.Keywords. Niall Ferguson, Henry Kissinger, John F. Kennedy, Charles DeGaulle, Hans Morgenthau, Vietnam War.JEL. F50, F52, F59

    Supply-side economics and the 2017 Tax Act

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    Abstract. Abstract. Several of the designers of the 2017 Tax Act were prominent as ‘supply side‛ advocates at the time of Reagan tax cuts during the 1980s. The economic argument for supply side tax rate reductions drew on a policy mix framework developed by Robert Mundell as early as 1962. Within that framework, the easy fiscal/ tight monetary policy solution was intended for circumstances of either pressure on reserves or the exchange rate (as during the Kennedy Administration) or of serious domestic inflation (as under the Carter and Reagan Administrations). Tax cuts in the US since the 1980s have not had the intended stimulus effects because neither the currency weakness nor inflationary preconditions have existed. Absent such conditions, tax rate reductions will generate either domestic over-heating or a redistribution of income to those in higher brackets. Any argument in favor of the 2017 Tax Act should not fall back on Mundell’s policy mix advocacy. In contrast, the case for an easy fiscal/ tight money policy may have unexpected force in situations of fixed exchange rates, or where domestic monetary policy options are otherwise constrained or absent – as in Eurozone periphery countries.Keywords. Supply side economics, Robert Mundell, Policy Mix classifications, 2017 Tax Act, Eurozone macroeconomics.JEL. B30, E30, E50, E60, F20

    From Keynes’ Clearing Union to the Euro-zone and the Renminbi

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    Abstract. The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement provided an international imprimatur for the dollar standard. H. D. White, the lead US negotiator, saw to it that the ability of other countries to obtain commitments from the US (via the International Monetary Fund) for loans or approval for currency devaluations would be limited. J.M. Keynes, representing Britain, in contrast proposed an International Clearing Union that would issue its own currency (“bancor”), intended to reduce systemic dependence on the dollar or on gold. The ICU would be a bank for the world’s central banks, which would allow debtor nations to borrow freely.  In contrast to White’s plan, ICU creditors would be expected to reduce their balances by expanding domestic credit or other means. Insights from Keynes’ plan help to understand later developments. An ICU premise was that international reserves should be pooled, and centralized.  The Bretton Woods gold-dollar standard was jeopardized during the 1960s – the Triffin dilemma -- when European creditor countries demanded gold reserves from the US. A monetary truce, proposed by Mundell, would have included 1) agreement by Europe and the US on an inflation level, and for US monetary policy to target that level; and 2) Europeans adjust their gold-to-dollar ratios to maintain the US gold stock. Monetary cooperation could thereby have created de facto international reserves. Instead, the Bretton Woods exchange rate apparatus collapsed by 1973, leaving major currencies to float. Against expectation, international demand for reserves soared. Relentless demand for US securities has contributed to deindustrialization and financial fragility, ongoing consequences of the dollar standard.  And exchange rate depreciation has done little to correct account imbalances. Clearing Union concepts help to understand the euro experiment – when it nearly failed, and how it recovered. An international currency can succeed only if 1) surplus and creditor countries are both required to adjust; and 2) member countries agree on inflation objectives. Demands on China to revalue have been misguided.  From the perspective of 2022, correction of account imbalances will not happen without the approval of the world’s now largest creditor – China – which is likely to resist any constrain on its actions.  This is and will be a drag on the world economy.Keywords. Bretton Woods;  International Clearing Union;  Bancor;  John Maynard Keynes;  Harry Dexter White;  Robert Triffin;  Robert Mundell;  Triffin Dilemma;  Monetary truce; 1966; Euro-zone; Renminbi revaluation; Partial equilibrium models; Multi-lateral clearing;  Flexible exchange rates.JEL. F02; F31; F33; F36; F38; F41; F45

    Scott B. Sumner, The Midas Paradox: Financial Markets, Government Policy Shocks, and the Great Depression

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    Abstract. In a study with detailed evidence and technical economics, Scott Sumner seeks to explain both the monetary origins of the Great Depression (1929-1932) and its persistence due to government-driven wage shocks (1933-1941). He credits the Mundell-Johnson hypothesis, based on the post WWI undervaluation and shortage of gold, with identifying the deflationary pressure that led to monetary distress. Sumner concludes that interest rates, money supply, and price changes provide inadequate measures of the stance of monetary policy. Sumner’s most important evidence supports his arguments that, first, raising the price of gold in 1933 facilitated price inflation and rapid recovery after years of deflation; and second, that several Roosevelt-era recoveries were stopped in their tracks by New Deal-driven real wage increases. The 1937-38 depression was caused by Treasury sterilization of gold inflows, but aggravated by unionization drives and wage increases. Reviewer considers Sumner’s critique of Keynesian economics, and adds overview to identify two areas where Keynes’ “revolution” set back understanding. He then moves to some intra-New Deal dynamics and to some recent political economy parallels.Keywords. Great Depression, New Deal, Wages, Monetary History, Financial Markets, Keynesian Macroeconomics.JEL. B22, E24, E52, F33, N12

    The Importance of Academic Deans\u27 Interpersonal/Negotiating Skills as Leaders

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    Four academic deans investigated when and how they used interpersonal/negotiating skills to function effectively in their positions. For two full weeks, the deans coded their on-the-job interactions during scheduled meetings, informal meetings, spontaneous encounters/meetings, telephone calls, and select email. Analyses revealed that the interpersonal/negotiating skills used, from most to least prevalent, were: working closely with others, being responsive to key persons, negotiating key players\u27 roles, and keeping key persons in the organisation informed. Across these engagements, the deans interacted with 35 different categories of stakeholders inside and outside their institutions for 32 different purposes. Given the nature and range of interactions, the deans concluded that practicing and prospective deans should likely have access to professional development opportunities explicitly focused on working closely with others. Future research would need to confirm, however, whether interpersonal/negotiating skills are essential for deans\u27 job survival and, if so, whether such skills can authentically be developed

    The Prevalence of the Need for Esthetic Crown Lengthening in Post Orthodontically Treated Subjects

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    The problem of excess gingival display is difficult to diagnose and treat. By studying one aspect of excess gingival display, namely the size relationships of the clinical crowns of teeth, we can begin to quantify reasonable goals of therapy. In this study, two hundred plaster models were used as subjects. These represented two hundred patients before and after orthodontic therapy. The six anterior teeth were measured for length and width and compared to known ideals. Teeth that did not meet ideal standards may require treatment. It was found that the mean tooth length after orthodontic therapy was approximately two millimeters shorter than ideal. The length of maxillary central incisors did not increase over the course of therapy. Eighty-five to ninety percent of maxillary central incisors exceeded allowable tooth width-to-length ratios. Twenty-nine to thirty percent of central incisors exceeded one hundred percent in their width-to-length ratio. Sixty-eight percent of patients displayed asymmetry in gingival architecture

    Illegal Walleye introduction may destabilize a wild Lake Trout—Cutthroat Trout fishery in a Wyoming reservoir

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    2016 Spring.Includes bibliographical references.Introduced Lake Trout Salvelinus namaycush coexisted for decades with wild, native Yellowstone Cutthroat Trout Oncorhynchus clarkii bouvieri and Rainbow Trout O. mykiss in Buffalo Bill Reservoir, Wyoming. Recently, managers became concerned when illegally introduced Walleye Sander vitreus were discovered. The goals of this study were to examine potential habitat constraints on predator-prey interactions, and determine how arrival of a coolwater predator may affect the Oncorhynchus population. We measured limnological variables and used gill nets, electrofishing and trap nets to sample fish populations monthly during April–October in 2012 and 2013 to determine fish habitat use and collect samples for growth and diet analyses. Prior to thermal stratification Lake Trout, Oncorhynchus spp., and Walleye co-occurred at depths 210 mm TL, 68% CI = 13,765–22,531) was lower than Oncorhynchus spp. (43,872 fish, 90% CI = 33,627–54,118). Walleye appeared to still be rare and could not be enumerated with confidence. Bioenergetics modeling showed that lifetime per capita consumption of Oncorhynchus spp. by Lake Trout (18.29 kg) was similar to that by Walleye (14.71 kg), despite the longer lifespan of Lake Trout. A growing Walleye population may adversely affect both Lake Trout and Oncorhynchus populations in this system