181 research outputs found

    Impact of takeover defenses on managerial incentives

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    Abstract: The article studies how takeover defenses influence managerial incentives with respect to long term investments, excess liquidity and the amount of debt relative to equity. The article conducts a cross-sectional regression based on a sample of Danish listed firms, dealing explicitly with the problem of causation between the variables. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of shares with dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. The article finds that protected firms have significantly less debt to equity. However, protected firms are not significantly more oriented towards the long-term and do not have significantly more excess liquidity

    a matter of contractual failures

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    Abstract: This article analyzes the conflict of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders, including when such conflicts of interests may arise. It is argued that shareholder value cannot be justified simply by referring to any prerogative property rights of the shareholders. Instead, shareholder value coincides with the efficient hypothetical perfect contract. However, due to contractual failures in certain bargain situations, management may be unable to "internalize the firms externalities". This means that in these situations there is a tradeoff between a broad duty of loyalty for management in listed firms and other traditional remedies. The theoretical insights are applied on a case from the Danish Supreme Court (Louis Poulsen A/S) where the interests of the stakeholders were decisive. However, it is shown that the verdict may instead harm the relevant stakeholders illustrating how cautious the legal system should use a doctrine based on the "company’s interests". In addition, the notion of a firm’s social responsibility is critically evaluated together with the associated pitfalls of accepting this concept

    Medarbejdervalgte bestyrelsesmedlemmer i

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    danske virksomheder — Konsekvenser for corporate governance og stakeholder teori I diskussionen af god corporate governance diskuteres, om ledelsen udelukkende bør maksimere aktionærernes økonomiske afkast, eller alternativt også varetage hensynet til andre interessenter, også benævnt stakeholders. Artiklen beskriver hovedresultaterne i en ny empirisk analyse, som belyser i hvor høj grad de medarbejdervalgte bestyrelsesmedlemmer vægter forskellige stakeholder hensyn i forhold til bestyrelsen som sådan. Det vises, at de medarbejdervalgte selv mener, at de vægter hensynet til lokalsamfundet og miljøet signifikant højere end bestyrelsen som sådan. Der argumenteres med, at de medarbejdervalgte udgør en sund modvægt mod en for snæver fokusering på ejernes interesser, også betegnet shareholder value

    Er Nørbyrapportens anbefalinger til gavn for aktionÌrerne?

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    Abstract: This article presents an empirical analysis of board composition and financial performance using a unique sample of Danish listed firms. In 2002, a group consisting of four prominent business leaders formulated Denmark’s own code of good corporate governance, entitled the Nørby report, The report consists of various recommendations aiming at strengthen Danish firms competitiveness and value creation including some specific recommendations concerning board composition. However, the analysis shows that none of the recommendations impact Tobin’s Q. Specifically, board size, proportion of insiders, positions held by board members in other firms do not significantly impact Tobin’s Q. The analysis only finds that the average age of the board has a significantly negative impact on performance. Board diversity, measured by the fraction of women and foreigners in boards as well as the educational background of board members does not impact performance either

    BestyrelsessammensÌtning og finansiel performance i børsnoterede virksomheder: belyst i et corporate governance perspektiv

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    Artiklen beskriver bestyrelsessammensætningen i danske børsnoterede virksomheder, som analyseres med udgangspunkt i diskussionen om god corporate governance. Nørby-udvalgets rapport om god corporate governance indeholder bl.a. en række konkrete anbefalinger om, hvordan bestyrelsen bør sammensættes. Denne analyse søger at undersøge, om der kan identificeres nogle specifikke bestyrelsesstrukturer, der øger selskabernes finansielle performance. Undersøgelsen viser imidlertid, at dette ikke er tilfældet. Det gøres således gældende, at Københavns Fondsbørs krav til virksomhederne om ”comply or explain” i den sammenhæng er uheldig, da øget compliance vedrørende Nørby-udvalgets bestyrelsesanbefalinger ikke øger selskabernes værdiskabelse. Der argumenteres for, at en effektiv bestyrelsessammensætning afhænger specifikt af den enkelte virksomhed, samt at bestyrelsens rolle og virke især er udslagsgivende, når et selskab befinder sig i en krisesituation eller på anden måde er under eksternt pres

    en retsøkonomisk analyse

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    Artiklen indeholder en diskussion af Værdipapirhandelslovens forbud mod insider handel. Der redegøres for tesen om effektive markeder. Med udgangspunkt i økonomisk teori redegøres for argumenter for et forbud. Der argumenteres for at, at insiderforbudets økonomiske berettigelsen med fordel kan støttes på tesen om effektive markeder. Det er i modsætning hertil blevet gjort gældende i den nyeste børsretlige teori, at den økonomiske teori om effektive markeder ikke er et adækvat grundlag for insider reglerne, og at denne teori bør erstattes af den såkaldte Lemon-teori, formuleret af Akerlof. Artiklen gør gældende, at det ikke er uden problemer at overføre Akerlof’s teori til de finansielle markeder, eftersom der ikke tages hensyn til markedets selvregulerende mekanismer, som mindsker problemet med asymmetrisk information. Artiklen afsluttes med en diskussion af de reguleringsmæssige konsekvenser som følge af valg af det økonomiske grundlag for insiderforbudet

    An Economic Analysis

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    This article studies the involuntary transfer of property rights by theft - a topic almost unexplored in the law and economics literature. The question is whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. As described in the article different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. The traditional theory suggests that there is a tradeoff between the costs of protecting the good and the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as shown, the rule of law concerning this issue significantly affects parties’ incentives. Specifically, it is shown that a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer. Thus, an owner of an asset will spend more resources on protecting his property and potential buyers will incur higher costs in order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights. JEL Classification: K11, K14 and K42 Keywords: property right law, theft, good faith and game theor

    Corporate financial performance and the use of takeover defenses

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