Distortions in memory for visual displays

Systematic errors in perception and memory present a challenge to theories of perception and memory and to applied psychologists interested in overcoming them as well. A number of systematic errors in memory for maps and graphs are reviewed, and they are accounted for by an analysis of the perceptual processing presumed to occur in comprehension of maps and graphs. Visual stimuli, like verbal stimuli, are organized in comprehension and memory. For visual stimuli, the organization is a consequence of perceptual processing, which is bottom-up or data-driven in its earlier stages, but top-down and affected by conceptual knowledge later on. Segregation of figure from ground is an early process, and figure recognition later; for both, symmetry is a rapidly detected and ecologically valid cue. Once isolated, figures are organized relative to one another and relative to a frame of reference. Both perceptual (e.g., salience) and conceptual factors (e.g., significance) seem likely to affect selection of a reference frame. Consistent with the analysis, subjects perceived and remembered curves in graphs and rivers in maps as more symmetric than they actually were. Symmetry, useful for detecting and recognizing figures, distorts map and graph figures alike. Top-down processes also seem to operate in that calling attention to the symmetry vs. asymmetry of a slightly asymmetric curve yielded memory errors in the direction of the description. Conceptual frame of reference effects were demonstrated in memory for lines embedded in graphs. In earlier work, the orientation of map figures was distorted in memory toward horizontal or vertical. In recent work, graph lines, but not map lines, were remembered as closer to an imaginary 45 deg line than they had been. Reference frames are determined by both perceptual and conceptual factors, leading to selection of the canonical axes as a reference frame in maps, but selection of the imaginary 45 deg as a reference frame in graphs

Probabilistic insurance

decision making;insurance;probability

Are Individuals Fickle-Minded?

Game theory has been used to model large-scale social events — such as constitutional law, democratic stability, standard setting, gender roles, social movements, communication, markets, the selection of officials by means of elections, coalition formation, resource allocation, distribution of goods, and war — as the aggregate result of individual choices in interdependent decision-making. Game theory in this way assumes methodological individualism. The widespread observation that game theory predictions do not in general match observation has led to many attempts to repair game theory by creating behavioral game theory, which adds corrective terms to the game theoretic predictions in the hope of making predictions that better match observations. But for game theory to be useful in making predictions, we must be able to generalize from an individual’s behavior in one situation to that individual’s behavior in very closely similar situations. In other words, behavioral game theory needs individuals to be reasonably consistent in action if the theory is to have predictive power. We argue on the basis of experimental evidence that the assumption of such consistency is unwarranted. More realistic models of individual agents must be developed that acknowledge the variance in behavior for a given individual

Cognitive maps, cognitive collages, and spatial mental models

Although cognitive map is a popular metaphor for people's mental representations of environments, as it is typically conceived, it is often too restrictive. Two other metaphors for mental representations are proposed and supported. Cognitive collages are consistent with research demonstrating systematic errors in memory and judgment of environmental knowledge. Yet, for some simple or well-known environments, people seem to have coherent representations of the coarse spatial relations among elements. These spatial mental models allow inference and perspective-taking but may not allow accurate metric judgments

Multiple Models: In the Mind and in the World

Models, in whatever sense, have a dual status: they are what they are and they represent something else, even Borges’ (1999) legendary point-to-point map. Representations select, add, and distort the information they represent. Models are meant for more than representation; they are meant as thinking tools, to promote inference, discovery, and creative thought. Research has shown that representations created on the page or in the air (gesture) have an accessible semantics and syntax and that such representations promote thought through a wordless conversation between the eye and the hand and the (sometimes virtual) page

Prospect relativity: how choice options influence decision under risk.

In many theories of decision under risk (e.g., expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and prospect theory), the utility of a prospect is independent of other options in the choice set. The experiments presented here show a large effect of the available options, suggesting instead that prospects are valued relative to one another. The judged certainty equivalent for a prospect is strongly influenced by the options available. Similarly, the selection of a preferred prospect is strongly influenced by the prospects available. Alternative theories of decision under risk (e.g., the stochastic difference model, multialternative decision field theory, and range frequency theory), where prospects are valued relative to one another, can provide an account of these context effects

Quantum phenomenology of conjunction fallacy

A quantum-like description of human decision process is developed, and a heuristic argument supporting the theory as sound phenomenology is given. It is shown to be capable of quantitatively explaining the conjunction fallacy in the same footing as the violation of sure-thing principle.Comment: LaTeX 8 pages, 2 figure

Reasons and Means to Model Preferences as Incomplete

Literature involving preferences of artificial agents or human beings often assume their preferences can be represented using a complete transitive binary relation. Much has been written however on different models of preferences. We review some of the reasons that have been put forward to justify more complex modeling, and review some of the techniques that have been proposed to obtain models of such preferences

Unpacking estimates of task duration: The role of typicality and temporality

Research in task duration judgment has shown that unpacking a multifaceted task into components prior to estimating its duration increases estimates. In three studies, we find that unpacking a complex task can increase, decrease, or leave unaffected task duration estimates depending on the typicality of the unpacked components and their temporal position in the task sequence. Unpacking atypical long components increases task duration estimates, while unpacking atypical short components decreases estimates (Study 1). Unpacking atypical early components increases task duration estimates, while unpacking atypical late components decreases estimates (Study 2). Unpacking typical early or late components leaves estimates unaffected (Study 3). We explain these results based on the idea that task duration estimation involves a mental simulation process, and by drawing on theories of unpacking in probability judgment that emphasize the role of the typicality of the unpacked components. These findings hint at a deep conceptual link between probability judgment and task duration estimation but also show differences, such as the influence that temporality exerts on estimated duration. © 2013 Elsevier Inc