A tutorial on the CARE III approach to reliability modeling

The CARE 3 reliability model for aircraft avionics and control systems is described by utilizing a number of examples which frequently use state-of-the-art mathematical modeling techniques as a basis for their exposition. Behavioral decomposition followed by aggregration were used in an attempt to deal with reliability models with a large number of states. A comprehensive set of models of the fault-handling processes in a typical fault-tolerant system was used. These models were semi-Markov in nature, thus removing the usual restrictions of exponential holding times within the coverage model. The aggregate model is a non-homogeneous Markov chain, thus allowing the times to failure to posses Weibull-like distributions. Because of the departures from traditional models, the solution method employed is that of Kolmogorov integral equations, which are evaluated numerically

Attitudes, Incentives and Tax Compliance

Our study examines whether combining experimental economics and economics psychology techniques can provide a better understanding of individuals’ tax compliance decisions in the laboratory. We find that considering individuals’ attitudinal, personality and intention measures in addition to economic based variables provides a richer understanding of individuals’ actual tax compliance decisions in the laboratory in the face of monetary incentives. We also find that hypothetical and actual compliance decisions in the laboratory are significantly different from each other. Specifically, we find that actual (hypothetical) compliance decisions are significantly influenced by their moral reasoning (anti-establishment) views. Finally, we find that individuals’ actual compliance decisions in the laboratory correlate more significantly with their admission of prior evasion than either their hypothetical compliance decisions or their responses to case scenarios. The latter result, coupled with the lack of appropriate field data on tax compliance, indicates that actual compliance decisions in the laboratory in the face of monetary incentives and with the use of tax terms in the instructions may be an ideal method of obtaining data on individuals’ tax compliance.

High Tc Superconductors -- A Variational Theory of the Superconducting State

We use a variational approach to gain insight into the strongly correlated d-wave superconducting state of the high Tc cuprates at T=0. We show that strong correlations lead to qualitatively different trends in pairing and phase coherence: the pairing scale decreases monotonically with hole doping while the SC order parameter shows a non-monotonic dome. We obtain detailed results for the doping-dependence of a large number of experimentally observable quantities, including the chemical potential, coherence length, momentum distribution, nodal quasiparticle weight and dispersion, incoherent features in photoemission spectra, optical spectral weight and superfluid density. Most of our results are in remarkable quantitative agreement with existing data and some of our predictions, first reported in Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 87}, 217002 (2001), have been recently verified.Comment: (Minor revisions, 1 figure added, version to appear in PRB) 23 RevTeX pages, 11 eps figs, long version of cond-mat/0101121, contains detailed comparisons with experiments, analytical insights, technical aspects of the calculation, and comparison with slave boson MF

Incentive Stackelberg Mean-payoff Games

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally. In the setting of incentive and leader equilibria, there is a distinguished player called the leader who can assign strategies to all other players, referred to as her followers. A strategy profile is a leader strategy profile if no player, except for the leader, can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally, and a leader equilibrium is a leader strategy profile with a maximal return for the leader. In the proposed case of incentive equilibria, the leader can additionally influence the behaviour of her followers by transferring parts of her payoff to her followers. The ability to incentivise her followers provides the leader with more freedom in selecting strategy profiles, and we show that this can indeed improve the payoff for the leader in such games. The key fundamental result of the paper is the existence of incentive equilibria in mean-payoff games. We further show that the decision problem related to constructing incentive equilibria is NP-complete. On a positive note, we show that, when the number of players is fixed, the complexity of the problem falls in the same class as two-player mean-payoff games. We also present an implementation of the proposed algorithms, and discuss experimental results that demonstrate the feasibility of the analysis of medium sized games.Comment: 15 pages, references, appendix, 5 figure

Estimation of Parameters of Misclassified Size Biased Borel Distribution

A misclassified size-biased Borel Distribution (MSBBD), where some of the observations corresponding to x = c + 1 are wrongly reported as x = c with probability α, is defined. Various estimation methods like the method of maximum likelihood (ML), method of moments, and the Bayes estimation for the parameters of the MSBB distribution are used. The performance of the estimators are studied using simulated bias and simulated risk. Simulation studies are carried out for different values of the parameters and sample size

Classification of Lipschitz simple function germs

It was shown by Henry and Parusiński in 2003 that the bi-Lipschitz right equivalence of function germs admits moduli. In this article, we introduce the notion of Lipschitz simple function germ and present the complete classification in the complex case. For this, we present several bi-Lipschitz invariants associated to functions germs. In particular, we prove that the lowest degree homogeneous part of a function germ is a bi-Lipschitz invariant and use this to show a weak version of the splitting lemma for bi-Lipschitz equivalence. We improve upon earlier results on bi-Lipschitz triviality of families to show that several families of germs in Arnold's list of unimodal singularities are bi-Lipschitz trivial. A surprising consequence of our result is that a function germ is Lipschitz modal if and only if it deforms to the smooth unimodal family of singularities called (Formula presented.) in Arnold's list

Estimation in Misclassified Size – Biased Log Series Distribution

A misclassified size-biased Log Series Distribution (MSBLSD) ............

Polarographic Study of Complexation of BP+ with Schiff Bases In Acetate Buffer

1051-105

Results of an aqueous source term model for a radiological risk assessment of the Drigg LLW Site, U.K.

A radionuclide source term model has been developed which simulates the biogeochemical evolution of the Drigg low level waste (LLW) disposal site. The DRINK (DRIgg Near field Kinetic) model provides data regarding radionuclide concentrations in groundwater over a period of 100,000 years, which are used as input to assessment calculations for a groundwater pathway. The DRINK model also provides input to human intrusion and gaseous assessment calculations through simulation of the solid radionuclide inventory. These calculations are being used to support the Drigg post closure safety case. The DRINK model considers the coupled interaction of the effects of fluid flow, microbiology, corrosion, chemical reaction, sorption and radioactive decay. It represents the first direct use of a mechanistic reaction-transport model in risk assessment calculations