2,115 research outputs found
Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience
In the section âUnity and Objectivityâ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences if we are to self-ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity
TRUTH â A Conversation between P F Strawson and Gareth Evans (1973)
This is a transcript of a conversation between P F Strawson and Gareth Evans in 1973, filmed for The Open University. Under the title 'Truth', Strawson and Evans discuss the question as to whether the distinction between genuinely fact-stating uses of language and other uses can be grounded on a theory of truth, especially a 'thin' notion of truth in the tradition of F P Ramsey
Aspects in DualâAspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky
Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti-realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual-aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these aspects by showing that the anti-realist interpretation collapses into neutral monism and that the realist interpretation is an interesting alternative. I close with a discussion of the realist interpretation of the aspects and its relation with panpsychism
INTENTIONNALITĂ RĂELLE 2 : POURQUOI LâINTENTIONNALITĂ ENTRAĂNE LA CONSCIENCE?
Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential (conscious) phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost everything (if not everything) has intentionalityâall the way down to subatomic particles. Second, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of itâperhaps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly naturalistic theory of intentionality is (1) a realistic conception of naturalism and (2) a properly developed understanding of the phenomenon of cognitive experience.IntentionalitĂ€t ist ein essenziell mentales, essenziell ereignishaftes und essenziell auf Erfahrung beruhendes (bewusstseinsbetontes) PhĂ€nomen. Jeder Versuch, der die IntentionalitĂ€t charakterisieren will und sie von der bewussten Erfahrung entkoppelt, sieht sich zwei unĂŒberwindbaren Problemen gegenĂŒbergestellt. Erstens muss man einrĂ€umen, dass beinahe alles (wenn nicht geradezu alles) IntentionalitĂ€t besitzt â bis hin zu den subatomaren Partikeln. Zweitens hat dies zur Folge, dass alles, was IntentionalitĂ€t besitzt, viel zuviel davon besitzt â ja vielleicht sogar unendlich viel davon. Der SchlĂŒssel zu einer zufrieden stellenden und wirklich naturalistischen Theorie der IntentionalitĂ€t ist (1) ein realistisches Konzept des Naturalismus und (2) ein wohl entwickeltes VerstĂ€ndnis des PhĂ€nomens der kognitiven Erfahrung.LâintentionnalitĂ© est un phĂ©nomĂšne essentiellement mental, essentiellement Ă©vĂ©nementiel et essentiellement expĂ©rienciel (conscient). Toute tentative de caractĂ©risation de lâintentionnalitĂ© qui la sĂ©pare de lâexpĂ©rience consciente est confrontĂ©e Ă deux problĂšmes insurmontables. Dâabord elle est obligĂ©e de reconnaĂźtre que presque tout (sinon tout) â y compris mĂȘme les particules subatomiques â est dotĂ© dâintentionnalitĂ©. En consĂ©quence de quoi, tout ce qui est dotĂ© dâintentionnalitĂ© en est beaucoup trop â peut-ĂȘtre infiniment. La clĂ© dâune thĂ©orie de lâintentionnalitĂ© satisfaisante et vraiment naturiste est (1) une conception rĂ©aliste du naturalisme et (2) une comprĂ©hension correctement dĂ©veloppĂ©e du phĂ©nomĂšne de lâexpĂ©rience cognitiv
Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism
I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft â being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden â being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein â being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist FĂŒrsichsein â being is mind. [1]â[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of conscious experience is certain and that panpsychism doesnât posit the existence of any kind of stuff other than conscious experience. [ii] A question also arises about why metaphysicians have posited the existence of something for which there is zero evidence: non-experiential concrete reality. The question is the more pressing because of the silence of physics: physics with its numbers and equations is perfectly silent on the question of the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality
The Truth in Compatibilism and the truth of Libertarianism
The paper offers the outlines of a response to the often-made suggestion is that it is impossible to see how indeterminism could possibly provide us with anything that we might want in the way of freedom, anything that could really amount to control, as opposed merely to an openness in the flow of reality that would constitute merely the injection of chance, or randomness, into the unfolding of the processes which underlie our activity. It is suggested that the best first move for the libertarian is to make a number of important concessions to the compatibilist. It should be conceded, in particular, that certain sorts of alternative possibilities are neither truly available to real, worldly agents, nor required in order that those agents should act freely; and it should be admitted also that it is the compatibilist who tends to give the most plausible sorts of analyses of many of the âcanâ and âcould haveâ statements which seem to need to be assertible of those agents we regard as free. But these concessions do not bring compatibilism itself in their wake. The most promising version of libertarianism, it is argued, should be based on the idea that agency itself (and not merely some special instances of it which we might designate with the honorific appellation âfreeâ) is inconsistent with determinism. This version of libertarianism, it is claimed, can avoid the objection that indeterminism is as difficult to square with true agential control as determinism can sometimes seem to be
- âŠ