The structure of foreign policy attitudes in transatlantic perspective: comparing the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany

This is the final version of the article. Available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the US. Using new data, we find a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the US, the UK, France, and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy-related survey items that are analyzed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). We specifically test for measurement equivalence and find a common four-factor structure that fits the data in all four countries. Consequently, we make valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers. In the process, our four-factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. We also demonstrate the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross-national equivalence of social science concepts.Data collection was funded by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom (RES-061-25-0405). All data supporting this research are available from the UK Data Archive (Study Number 851142): https://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-851142/

The consequential Nationalist–Globalist policy divide in contemporary Britain: some initial analyses

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this record.The verdict delivered by voters in the 2015 and 2017 British General Elections and the European Union Referendum surprised pollsters, pundits, the media, and even the victors. Political choices representative of globalist outlooks saw defeat at the polls. Liberal Democratic support was below 10% and voting to remain in the EU underperformed predictions. Empirical analyses demonstrate that there is a nationalist-globalist policy divide, partially rooted in demographics and authoritarian predispositions, which go beyond traditional valence factors in explaining the recent choices of the British electorate. Moreover, this outlook influences how satisfied citizens are with the way democracy works in Britain. Nationalist viewpoints, when juxtaposed against globalist outlooks, are salient in a way they were not during the height of Thatcherism, encompass left-right economic concerns and may portend a new era in British political culture.Data collection was funded by ESRC Grants RES-061-25-0405 and ES/L011867/

Like Father, Like Son: Justin Trudeau and Valence Voting in Canada's 2015 Federal Election

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Cambridge University Press via the DOI in this record.Canada’s 2015 federal election was an exiting, as well as a nostalgia provoking, contest. After nine years in office, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the governing Conservatives were defeated by the resurgent Liberals led by Justin Trudeau. Trudeau is the son of Pierre Trudeau, perhaps Canada’s best known prime minister. Analyses of national survey data demonstrate that party leader images—a major component of the “valence politics” model of electoral choice—were important in both cases. Unlike his father, Justin Trudeau was castigated as a “lightweight” and “just not ready.” However, articulating plausible policies to jump-start Canada’s sluggish economy and espousing “sunny ways,” the younger Trudeau was warmly received by many voters. In contrast, Harper’s image of managerial competence was tarnished by bad economic news, and his attempt to refocus the campaign on emotionally charged cultural issues failed. The result was a Liberal majority government and a prime minister named Trudeau

The structure of foreign policy attitudes among middle power publics: a transpacific replication

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Routledge via the DOI in this recordEmpirical models illustrating how mass publics organise their views on foreign policy issues abound. Models that posit militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism as the two factors structuring mass foreign policy attitudes and that typically rely on American survey data have given way to models positing a larger number of underlying factors supported by cross-national survey data. Still, there are few studies assessing the cross-national validity of multi-factor models. Further, middle power states that must navigate between international leadership and followership remain understudied. This article draws on new survey data from Canada and Australia—two archetypal middle power states—to replicate a recent and influential model of foreign policy attitudes comprised of four factors: cooperative internationalism, militant internationalism, isolationism, and support for global justice. Using an exploratory structural equation modelling (ESEM) framework, it finds that the four-factor structure of foreign policy attitudes observed in the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany obtains among the Canadian and Australian publics, yet there are country-specific nuances that suggest differences in the ways Canadians and Australians perceive foreign policy options.University of Melbourne, Faculty of ArtsEconomic and Social Research Council (ESRC

Alternative Measures of Political Efficacy: The Quest for Cross-Cultural Invariance with Ordinally Scaled Survey Items

This is the final version. Available on open access from Frontiers Media via the DOI in this recordIn this paper, we examine the measurement of citizens' beliefs that politicians and political systems are responsive (external efficacy) and that citizens see themselves sufficiently skilled to participate in politics (internal efficacy). This paper demonstrates techniques that allow researchers to establish the cross-context validity of conceptually important ordinal scales. In so doing, we show an alternative set of efficacy indicators to those commonly appearing on cross-national surveys to be more promising from a validity standpoint. Through detailed discussion and application of multi-group analysis for ordinal measures, we demonstrate that a measurement model linking latent internal and external efficacy factors performs well in configural and parameter invariance testing when applied to representative samples of respondents in the United States and Great Britain. With near full invariance achieved, differences in latent variable means are meaningful and British respondents are shown to have lower levels of both forms of efficacy than their American counterparts. We argue that this technique may be particularly valuable for scholars who wish to establish the suitability of ordinal scales for direct comparison across nations or cultures.Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC

How political are national identities? A comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in the 2010s

This is the final version of the article. Available from SAGE Publications via the DOI in this record.Original data supporting this research are available from the UK Data Archive (Study Number 851142): http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-851142/Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Data collection was funded by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom (RES-061-25-0405)

Estimating the size of "anti-vax" and vaccine hesitant populations in the US, UK, and Canada: comparative latent class modeling of vaccine attitudes

This is the final version. Available on open access from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this recordVaccine hesitancy is a significant impediment to global efforts to vaccinate against the SARS-CoV-2 virus at levels that generate herd immunity. In this article, we show the utility of an inductive approach - latent class analysis (LCA) - that allows us to characterize the size and nature of different vaccine attitude groups; and to compare how these groups differ across countries as well as across demographic subgroups within countries. We perform this analysis using original survey data collected in the US, UK, and Canada. We also show that these classes are strongly associated with SARS-CoV-2 vaccination intent and perceptions of the efficacy and safety of the COVID-19 vaccines, suggesting that attitudes about vaccines to fight the novel coronavirus pandemic are well explained by latent vaccine attitudes that precede the pandemic. More specifically, we find four substantive classes of vaccine attitudes: strong supporters, supporters with concerns, vaccine hesitant, and "anti-vax" as well as a fifth measurement error class. The strong "anti-vax" sentiment class is small in all three countries, while the strong supporter class is the largest across all three countries. We observe different distributions of class assignments in different demographic groups - most notably education and political leaning (partisanship and ideology).Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC

A new measure of the ‘democratic peace’: what country feeling thermometer data can teach us about the drivers of American and Western European foreign policy

This is the final version. Available on open access from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this recordReplication data is available on the first authors' Harvard dataverse page.While the existence of a ‘Democratic Peace’ (DP) is widely accepted, the various DP theories that seek to explain why democracies rarely fight one another are highly contested. A ‘commercial/capitalist peace’ counterargument maintains that the relationship between democratic politics and peace is spurious: the actual driver is greater trade among democracies. Meanwhile, Realists counter that it is alliances among democratic states, not their democratic nature, that causes peace among them. This research note utilizes novel country feeling thermometer data to explore the debate’s micro-foundations: the underlying drivers of international amity and enmity among democratic citizens in the US, UK, France, and Germany. Utilizing Freedom House and other quantitative measures of freedom, trade, military strength, and racial and cultural difference, it pits the micro-foundations of the DP against its rivals to explain attitude formation among a group of Western democratic publics. Given the resurgence of authoritarianism around the world today, a better understanding of the role of regime type in shaping public opinion – and subsequently war and peace – is urgently needed

Some people just want to watch the world burn: The prevalence, psychology and politics of the “Need for Chaos”

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the Royal Society via the DOI in this recordPeople form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process. Analyzing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we identify the prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we explore whether different subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to “want to watch the world burn.”Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC

Guidelines for the use and interpretation of assays for monitoring autophagy (4th edition)1.

In 2008, we published the first set of guidelines for standardizing research in autophagy. Since then, this topic has received increasing attention, and many scientists have entered the field. Our knowledge base and relevant new technologies have also been expanding. Thus, it is important to formulate on a regular basis updated guidelines for monitoring autophagy in different organisms. Despite numerous reviews, there continues to be confusion regarding acceptable methods to evaluate autophagy, especially in multicellular eukaryotes. Here, we present a set of guidelines for investigators to select and interpret methods to examine autophagy and related processes, and for reviewers to provide realistic and reasonable critiques of reports that are focused on these processes. These guidelines are not meant to be a dogmatic set of rules, because the appropriateness of any assay largely depends on the question being asked and the system being used. Moreover, no individual assay is perfect for every situation, calling for the use of multiple techniques to properly monitor autophagy in each experimental setting. Finally, several core components of the autophagy machinery have been implicated in distinct autophagic processes (canonical and noncanonical autophagy), implying that genetic approaches to block autophagy should rely on targeting two or more autophagy-related genes that ideally participate in distinct steps of the pathway. Along similar lines, because multiple proteins involved in autophagy also regulate other cellular pathways including apoptosis, not all of them can be used as a specific marker for bona fide autophagic responses. Here, we critically discuss current methods of assessing autophagy and the information they can, or cannot, provide. Our ultimate goal is to encourage intellectual and technical innovation in the field