Impossibility of Stable and Non-damaging bossy Matching Mechanism

In this paper we prove the impossibility of stability rules that satisfy a concept weaker than nonbossiness. Stability and nonbossiness are essential to matching theory. However, Kojima Fuhito(2010) shows that a matching mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy dose not exist. We define a new concept that is weaker than nonbossiness and consider whether or not stability and the new concept are compatible. Unfortunately, we show that these properties are incompatible.matching, stability, non-damaging bossy, impossibility theorem.

Does Self-regulation of Advertisement Length Improve Consumer Welfare?

In Japan, TV platforms regulate themselves as to the length of the advertisements they air. Using modified Hotelling models, we investigate whether such self-regulation improves consumer and social welfare or not. When all consumers choose a single TV program (the utility functions of consumers satisfy the standard "full-coverage" condition), self-regulation always reduces consumer welfare. It improves social welfare only if the advertisement revenue of each platform is not small and the cost parameter of investments in improving the quality of TV programs is small. When some consumers have outside options (the standard "full-coverage" condition is not satisfied), self-regulation can benefit consumers because it increases the number of consumers who watch TV programs.

Coordinating Antitrust Policies Against International Cartels

Theoretical research on leniency programs has so far focused attention on cartels formed within a country the purpose of the paper is to analyze the situation where a cartel is formed internationally. We consider a model with two firms operating in two countries. The antitrust authority (AA) in each country chooses either to implement a leniency program or to use traditional investigation to detect/deter cartel activity. Given the combination of antitrust policies, the two firms play market games simultaneously in both countries. Assuming that the information on the existence of a cartel in one country spills over to the other, we analyze a strategic interdependency faced by the AAs. Several policy objectives of the AA are considered. We find that if the objective is to maximize revenues from the penalty imposed on cartels, an asymmetric equilibrium exists in which one country chooses to free-ride the other's choosing a leniency program.Cartels

Forecasting coal power plant retirement ages and lock-in with random forest regression

Averting dangerous climate change requires expediting the retirement of coal-fired power plants (CFPPs). Given multiple barriers hampering this, here we forecast the future retirement ages of the world’s CFPPs. We use supervised machine learning to first learn from the past, determining the factors that influenced historical retirements. We then apply our model to a dataset of 6, 541 operating or under-construction units in 66 countries. Based on results, we also forecast associated carbon emissions and the degree to which countries are locked in to coal power. Contrasting with the historical average of roughly 40 years over 2010–2021, our model forecasts earlier retirement for 63% of current CFPP units. This results in 38% less emissions than if assuming historical retirement trends. However, the lock-in index forecasts considerable difficulties to retire CFPPs early in countries with high dependence on coal power, a large capacity or number of units, and young plant ages

Anti-competitive with Respect to Exclusive Dealing Contract under Supply Chain Market

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