The Passions and Disinterest: From Kantian Free Play to Creative Determination by Power, via Schiller and Nietzsche

I argue that Nietzsche’s criticism of the Kantian theory of disinterested pleasure in beauty reflects his own commitment to claims that closely resemble certain Kantian aesthetic principles, specifically as reinterpreted by Schiller. I show that Schiller takes the experience of beauty to be disinterested both (1) insofar as it involves impassioned ‘play’ rather than desire-driven ‘work’, and (2) insofar as it involves rational-sensuous (‘aesthetic’) play rather than mere physical play. In figures like Nietzsche, Schiller’s generic notion of play—which is itself influenced by Kant’s claim that aesthetic pleasure is orthogonal to desire-satisfaction—becomes decoupled from his (further) Kantian view that aesthetic play essentially involves a harmony of sensuous receptivity and rational spontaneity. The result, I suggest, is a self-standing opposition between desires and passions. This motivates a recognizably Romantic vision of aesthetic disinterestedness, as freedom from desire realized in a state of creative determination by passion

Structural distortions and orbital ordering in LaTiO3 and YTiO3

Theoretical investigations of the electronic, magnetic and structural properties of LaTiO3 and YTiO3 have been made. In the framework of GGA and GGA+U scheme we analyzed the effect of the local Coulomb interaction (U) value on the atomic forces acting in the experimental structure. The optimal parameters of the electron-electron on-site interactions as well as the orbital configurations and magnetic properties are determined.Comment: 6 pages 6 figures, better quality pictures are avelable via e-mail, Submitted to Europhysics Letter

Enterprise reform in China : the evolving legal framework

Enterprise reform in China since 1979 has been supported by accelerated reform of China's legal framework. In the transition to a"socialist market economy", state enterprises will operate independently of the government, may no longer be fully owned or controlled by the state, and will deal with the state and other legal entities through market based transactions. The number of collective (township and village) enterprises has grown rapidly, and in recent years so has the number of private enterprises. This level of economic change requires a commensurate level of legal change. The author describes the legal framework needed for enterprise reform in the world's most populous country. First,it is essential to define the enterprise and its rights and obligations. To define and broaden the autonomy of enterprises, enterprise law and regulations must be reformed. For state and collective enterprises, a goal of legal reform is also to effect the separation of ownership and management. To create a legal environment in which all enterprises - including state enterprises -participate as independent actors, reform is also needed in the following areas. Bankruptcy and competition law, to promote fair effective competition among autonomous enterprises and to ensure the continued protection of the public interest even without direct state management of enterprises. Financial laws, including securities laws and regulations, so enterprise financing can take place in a market driven system rather than through a planning mechanism. Laws governing land use, mortgage financing, and pension and social security systems, to separate employee housing and pension and social security systems from enterprise obligation and henceforth to provide housing pensions, and social security through alternative means. Contract law, to protect the legal rights of enterprises and allow economic transactions between parties to replace administrative controls, and to ensure that the court system and dispute resolution processes function credibly and reliably, thereby making all other reforms enforceable. To make these reforms meaningful, property rights must also be better defined. China's civil code currently offers only a limited definition of the rights of ownership and of an enterprise's rights to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of property. The author catalogs these pieces of the legal framework, suggesting where further reform is needed to support enterprise reform; focuses on the reform of state enterprises but also discusses the reform of nonstate enterprises; and touches only lightly on the role of foreign investment but does address the developing framework of patent, trademark, and copyright laws,National Governance,Legal Products,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Legal Institutions of the Market Economy,Judicial System Reform

A survey of Viet Nam's legal framework in transition

Viet Nam is trying to preserve its sociopolitical system while moving gradually toward a different economic system, recognizing that law is a valuable instrument for effecting orderly change. It has begun to enact the laws and decrees needed in such areas as company law, contract law, banking law, and, especially, laws on foreign investment. Further progress toward a market system will require more legislative activity. The author highlights four areas of special priority. Thoroughly implementing the new land law, by issuing detailed regulations to"marketize"the leasehold system, clarify land-use rights in liquidating state enterprises or making them corporations, and establish a firm basis for mortgage financing. Deepening state enterprise reform through a new legal framework for state enterprises, to be established under a revised company law, to permit state enterprises to operate under the same framework as nonstate enterprises. This should be accompanied by a new state management of its shares in enterprises. Revising the framework of company law and foreign investment law to implement and expand pilot corporatizations. Finalizing the civil code and commercial law to provide rules of the game for everyday business transaction and for resolution of the disputes that will inevitably result from them. Other areas less far-reaching in impact but important for market development include regulations to implement bankruptcy law, competition law, and securities law. In addition, the author notes the need to guard against separate legal regimes for state enterprises, nonstate enterprises, and foreign-investment enterprises, as this would interfere with efficient competition among enterprises with different ownership structures. It is also important to coordinate foreign legal traditions and preferences, especially in such areas as dispute resolution.National Governance,Legal Products,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Legal Institutions of the Market Economy

The one-round Voronoi game replayed

We consider the one-round Voronoi game, where player one (``White'', called ``Wilma'') places a set of n points in a rectangular area of aspect ratio r <=1, followed by the second player (``Black'', called ``Barney''), who places the same number of points. Each player wins the fraction of the board closest to one of his points, and the goal is to win more than half of the total area. This problem has been studied by Cheong et al., who showed that for large enough $n$ and r=1, Barney has a strategy that guarantees a fraction of 1/2+a, for some small fixed a. We resolve a number of open problems raised by that paper. In particular, we give a precise characterization of the outcome of the game for optimal play: We show that Barney has a winning strategy for n>2 and r>sqrt{2}/n, and for n=2 and r>sqrt{3}/2. Wilma wins in all remaining cases, i.e., for n>=3 and r<=sqrt{2}/n, for n=2 and r<=sqrt{3}/2, and for n=1. We also discuss complexity aspects of the game on more general boards, by proving that for a polygon with holes, it is NP-hard to maximize the area Barney can win against a given set of points by Wilma.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figures, Latex; revised for journal version, to appear in Computational Geometry: Theory and Applications. Extended abstract version appeared in Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.2748, 2003, pp. 150-16