Should governments in Europe be more aggressive in pushing for gender equality to raise fertility? The first "YES"

Together with three colleagues, I have been asked by the MPIDR to debate the following question: “Should governments in Europe be more aggressive in pushing for gender equality to raise fertility? Setting aside the “lighthearted†side of this “Rostocker Debate,†(12 minutes for each speech, one minute for each comment), I saw this as a good opportunity to think about the stakes behind the question. In order to address this complex issue, it is necessary to think about the many “preliminary questions†that we have to ponder before responding: Why should fertility be raised? Are political measures legitimate? Are they efficient? On what basis are we qualified to give “expert†opinions on such a topic? When the question comes to the fore, we as scholars are sometimes asked to provide an answer. It would, of course, be more comfortable not to answer, but our interlocutors (politicians, journalists, teachers, and also funding agencies) often want a definite response one way or the other. Even though our position may be a matter of politics as well as a matter of science, we must give an answer. The empirical evidence shows that European countries where gender inequality is lower are also the countries where fertility is the highest. This is the evidence-based response that we can give to that question. European countries need to find a new equilibrium after the end of the baby boom period, when gender equality was very low. In all countries, the empowerment of women is underway, thanks to the economic independence given by work-related income. Increasing gender equality is an efficient way to reduce the opportunity costs of having and raising children, and thus to increase fertility. Finally, “pushing for gender equality†may have many positive effects other than raising fertility, and has few negative side effects. Gender equality is thus a convenient political aim per se; an institutional goal which leaves many political questions open. So, yes, we agree that governments in Europe should be more aggressive in pushing for gender equality to raise fertility!ethics, expert opinion, fertility, gender equity, low fertility, population policies

The trend to later childbearing: is there evidence of postponement?

Fertility rates in most developed societies have been declining at younger ages and rising at older ages. This phenomenon is widely referred to as reflecting the postponement of fertility. But is this an accurate description? The paper considers whether recent changes in the age-pattern of childbearing in France can be described as postponement. The statistical features of time series of rates are distinguished from the underlying behavioural process generating these. Criteria for the presence of postponement are proposed. In the absence of detailed, longitudinal information on intentions, the occurrence or otherwise of postponement is assessed by indirect means. Some evidence is found consistent with fertility postponement in recent decades. However, it cannot be interpreted causally, and so cannot be used either to explain recent trends or to anticipate future trends. Much more detailed evidence is required to establish the existence of postonement in the behavioural sense than is generally assumed

Overview Chapter 4: Changing family and partnership behaviour

Following the era of the ‘golden age of marriage’ and the baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s, marriage has declined in importance, and its role as the main institution on which family relations are built has been eroded across Europe. Union formation most often takes place without a marriage. Family and living arrangements are currently heterogeneous across Europe, but all countries seem to be making the same shifts: towards fewer people living together as a couple, especially in marriage; an increased number of unmarried couples; more children born outside marriage; and fewer children living with their two parents. The relationship between these changing living arrangements, especially the decline of marriage, on the one hand, and the overall level of fertility, on the other, is not straightforward. In most countries, marriage rates and fertility declined simultaneously. However, the aggregate relationship between marriage and fertility indices has moved from negative (fewer marriages imply fewer births) to positive (fewer marriages imply more births). Thus, the decline of marriage, which is a part of the second demographic transition (see Overview Chapter 6), cannot be considered an important cause of the current low fertility level in many European countries. On the contrary, in European countries where the decline of marriage has been less pronounced, fertility levels are currently lower than in countries where new living arrangements have become most common.childbearing, Europe, family, fertility

Does Postponement Explain the Trend to Later Childbearing in France?

Fertility rates in most developed societies have been declining at younger ages and rising at older ages. This phenomenon is widely referred to as reflecting the postponement of fertility. But is this an accurate description? The present paper considers whether recent changes in the age-pattern of childbearing in France can be described as postponement. The statistical features of time series of rates are distinguished from the underlying behavioural process generating them. Criteria for the presence of postponement are proposed. In the absence of detailed, longitudinal information on intentions, the occurrence or otherwise of postponement is assessed by indirect means. Some evidence is found consistent with fertility postponement in recent decades. However, it cannot be interpreted causally, and so cannot be used either to explain recent trends or to anticipate future trends. Much more detailed evidence is required to establish the existence of postponement in the behavioural sense than is generally assumed.

Family Formation in France: Individual Preferences and Subsequent Outcomes

In France, as in all European countries, the birth of a first child has been increasingly delayed over time, but the reasons why individuals decide to postpone the time to become a parent still remain to be deeply investigated at the micro level. In this prospective study we analyse fertility preferences and subsequent reproductive behaviour of childless people, and implement a model that uses desires, or intentions, with their related timing, as key covariates. Results show that desired and intended fertility are a strong predictor of subsequent family formation, even after controlling for the effects of other relevant variables, and people become more realistic about their short-term childbearing plans when asked to assess their personal chance to have a future birth. Moreover, highly educated people anticipate their own transition to parenthood more precisely, as compared to low educated people. Age is the most crucial factor determining the probability to remain involuntarily childless in the interval between the surveys, while persistent childlessness is mostly associated with the lack of a partner if it is a consequence of a deliberate choice to postpone childbearing.

France: High and stable fertility

The current total fertility rate in France is around 1.9 children per woman. This is a relatively high level by current European standards and makes France an outlier, despite the fact that its other demographic trends, especially conjugal behaviour, and social and economic trends are not very different from other Western European countries. France can serve as a counterfactual test case for some of the hypotheses advanced to explain the current low level of fertility in most European countries (delay in fertility, decline in marriage, increased birth control, greater economic uncertainty). France’s fertility level can be partly explained by its active family policy introduced after the Second World War, and adapted in the 1980s to accommodate women’s entry into the labour force. This policy is the result of a battle, fuelled by pro-natalism, between the conservative supporters of family values and the promoters of state-supported individual equality. French family policy thus encompasses a wide range of measures based on varying ideological backgrounds, and it is difficult to classify in comparison to the more precisely focused family policies of other European welfare states. The active family policy seems to have created especially positive attitudes towards two- or three child families in France.childbearing, fertility, France

French family policy: long tradition and diversified measures

In France, the intervention of the state in the private sphere has long been accepted as legitimate. The current French family policy is the result of a compromise between the objectives of raising fertility, providing income support to families and promoting the work-family balance. Thus it includes a wide range of measures based on a variety of ideological standpoints. It combines measures encouraging women's employment with others in favour of large families. Recently, employers have been encouraged to implement family-friendly policies of their own. Since the state family policy is already quite comprehensive, their participation is rather low. This long-term `mix of tools' is likely to be a factor behind the current high fertility in France, but the number and the complexity of family policy measures make it very difficult to quantify their overall effect on fertility.

Measuring the educational gradient of period fertility in 28 European countries: A new approach based on parity-specific fertility estimates

Background: Measures of fertility by level of female education are currently only available for cohorts that have already completed childbearing age. The focus on cohorts whose fertility decisions were made in the past is problematic when the objective is to better understand which specific groups within European countries are currently the most affected by low and/or declining fertility. Objective: In this article we provide more timely measures of the educational gradient of fertility for Europe by quantifying it for those cohorts that are currently of childbearing age (ages 15 to 49) for most European countries. Methods: To measure period fertility by education for 24 EU and 4 non-EU countries in Europe, we use data from the European Union’s Survey of Income and Living Conditions, EU-SILC (Eurostat 2020). A semi-retrospective approach is used to observe the parity-specific fertility behavior of cohorts that are of childbearing age, while at the same time recording the educational level correctly. Bayesian statistics allow us to obtain credible intervals for the age-, education-, and parity-specific birth probabilities for each country. These birth probabilities are then combined into a multi-state life table in order to obtain parity-specific and total birth intensities by education. A post-stratification of birth probabilities allows consistency with national fertility estimates, enabling international comparisons of specific groups (e.g., highly educated women) or of particular dimensions of fertility behavior (e.g., childlessness). Results: Our analytical set-up reveals whether there are significant differences in fertility behavior between education groups in each European country and how these differentials vary between European countries. More precisely, we answer the question of whether, when all birth orders are combined, heterogeneity in period fertility behavior is greater among the higher- or the lower-educated across Europe. In addition, we show for which parity the heterogeneity between education groups is the largest. Conclusions: Even if low-educated women have the highest period fertility levels in almost all covered European countries, the educational gradient is not always negative. In one-third of European countries, period fertility levels in 2010 exhibit a U-shaped pattern, with the middle-educated having the lowest fertility. The diversity in period fertility levels among highly educated women in Europe is due to the transitions to first and second childbirth of highly educated women being higher in some countries than in others, while higher-order childbirths exhibit a more negative educational gradient across Europe. Contribution: By delivering a new method for measuring the educational gradient of fertility for women who are of childbearing age rather than for women who have already completed their reproductive years, our research enables a timely analysis of within-country differentials of period fertility behavior

The number of deaths in France will increase over the coming years

International audienceThe population of France has grown by more than half over the last 70 years and has increased in age. While the number of deaths should logically have risen, two factors explain why it has remained practically constant throughout the period: the increase in life expectancy, and the entry into extreme old age of the depleted cohorts born during the First World War. Their disappearance and the ageing of the large baby boom cohorts will push up the number of deaths in the coming yearsLa population de la France a augmenté de plus de moitié depuis 70 ans et a vieilli, ce qui aurait dû entraîner une hausse du nombre annuel de décès. Deux facteurs expliquent qu’ils se soient maintenus à peu près constants au cours de cette période : l’augmentation de la durée de vie et l’arrivée aux grands âges des classes creuses nées pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. Leur extinction et l’arrivée à ces âges des générations nombreuses du baby-boom vont entraîner une hausse des décès dans les prochaines années

Summary and general conclusions: Childbearing Trends and Policies in Europe

European fertility early in the 21st century was at its lowest level since the Second World War. This study explores contemporary childbearing trends and policies in Europe, and gives detailed attention to the past two or three decades. We felt motivated to undertake this project because in many European countries, as well as for the European Union as a whole, the overall fertility level and its consequences are of grave concern and draw attention on the political stage. Our account focuses somewhat more on the previously state socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where available knowledge about the impact on childbearing of the momentous political and economic transition that started in 1989 remains relatively scarce. As family formation and childbearing behaviour are inherent components of societal life, they were influenced and modified by the various political, economic, and social changes that took place in Europe during the past 60 years. There were also profound changes in norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes regarding family and childbearing, and these exerted additional effects on fertility and family trends. To identify such effects, this study pays much attention to the influence of social and family policies on fertility, to the influence of political and economic changes on fertility and family trends, and to the diverse ways changes in values, norms, and attitudes relate to the transformation in family-related behaviour in Europe. In the present chapter, we outline main issues discussed in the subsequent overview chapters, and summarise the main findings of the entire study.childbearing, Europe