Causal circuit explanations of behavior: Are necessity and sufficiency necessary and sufficient?

In the current advent of technological innovation allowing for precise neural manipulations and copious data collection, it is hardly questioned that the explanation of behavioral processes is to be chiefly found in neural circuits. Such belief, rooted in the exhausted dualism of cause and effect, is enacted by a methodology that promotes “necessity and sufficiency” claims as the goal-standard in neuroscience, thus instructing young students on what shall reckon as explanation. Here we wish to deconstruct and explicate the difference between what is done, what is said, and what is meant by such causal circuit explanations of behavior. Well-known to most philosophers, yet ignored or at least hardly ever made explicit by neuroscientists, the original grand claim of “understanding the brain” is imperceptibly substituted by the methodologically sophisticated task of empirically establishing counterfactual dependencies. But for the 21st century neuroscientist, after so much pride, this is really an excess of humility. I argue that to upgrade intervention to explanation is prone to logical fallacies, interpretational leaps and carries a weak explanatory force, thus settling and maintaining low standards for intelligibility in neuroscience. To claim that behavior is explained by a “necessary and sufficient” neural circuit is, at best, misleading. In that, my critique (rather than criticism) is indeed mainly negative. Positively, I briefly suggest some available alternatives for conceptual progress, such as adopting circular causality (rather than lineal causality in the flavor of top-down reductionism), searching for principles of behavior(rather than taking an arbitrary definition of behavior and rushing to dissect its “underlying” neural mechanisms), and embracing process philosophy (rather than substance-mechanistic ontologies). Overall, if the goal of neuroscience is to understand the relation between brain and behavior then, in addition to excruciating neural studies (one pillar), we will need a strong theory of behavior (the other pillar) and a solid foundation to establish their relation (the bridge)

Evolution and what the intellect makes of it

The human being is a paradox. We, a result of evolution, have developed the theory of evolution. Namely, the evolutionary process, in an unprecedented attempt, has been thought by one of its products — the bootstrapping is in place: the explanandum nominates itself as the explanans. Yet, the concept of evolution is one thing, while evolution itself is another. Upfront, this is an attempt to rescue Bergson’s intuitions on heterogeneous continuity, his notion of multiplicity, so as to recover that which, being at the core of evolution, has been lost by our habitual ways of thinking about it

When the part mirrors the whole: interactions beyond simple location

Reductionists believe that we can make sense of the whole in terms of its parts. Emergentists react and reply that the reductionist program is unattainable partly due to the existence of emergent properties. Under the celebrated banner “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”, such holistic stance is particularly relevant to the study of life and mind, where interactions amongst system components and environment are key. However, both antithetical tendencies (reduction and emergence) often betray a commitment to what Whitehead called simple location, the idea that things are simply where they are. Here we show the problematic consequences of adopting such a view when trying to understand physical, biological and psychological identities. Dynamic interactions indeed denote “togetherness”, yet they are external: no matter how much one is eager to emphasize their role, each element that inter-acts still exists and can be thought regardless of any essential reference to other bits of matter. We uncover and reject such stance. We then propose an alternative based on Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. The doctrine of internal relations allows conceiving each relationship entering into the essence of an entity. This entails the idea that every part mirrors the whole, which needs to be qualified. We end by discussing the problem in the context of abstraction, and draw basic implications for a theory of perception. In sum, taking an event-notion of individuality, we propose to think “inter-identities” beyond the assumption of simple location. We are not enduring interacting substances, but internally related processes

The False Problem of Consciousness

Philosophers have usually dealt with the problem of consciousness but, in the last decades, neurobiologists have undertaken the daunting task to address it scientifically. In particular, to answer how the brain produces consciousness. Here we question whether it actually does so, seeking to articulate the precise relation between neural activity and subjective experience. There is no doubt that they are intimately related. However, we argue that the thesis of parallelism (that consciousness tells no more than what is going on in the brain, but only in a different language), rather than enunciating an empirical fact, betrays a philosophical commitment. In addition, such equivalence between mental and cerebral states can be shown to lead to self-contradictions (the brain produces the world with itself in it; the brain, as an object in conscious experience, gives rise to conscious experience). Our approach endorses an integration of philosophical and scientific efforts where the scientist seeks to obtain empirically expedient answers to questions that the philosopher has previously formulated in a conceptually precise manner. Namely, that the questions we ask warrant the answers we provide. We posit that the success of an interdisciplinary quest for consciousness hinges on two more challenges: to accept negative proofs as ways forward and, especially, to avoid presenting metaphysical positions as scientific results. Differentiating between solidarity (as brain lesions demonstrate) and equivalence (as no data does) offers an alternative point of departure for understanding consciousness that does not, from the outset, outlay a false problem. The “easy problem” is hard-enough for the “hard problem” to be ill-posed

The False Problem of Consciousness

The orthodox neuroscientific approach to the study of consciousness is paradoxical: scientists examine consciousness (with their own consciousness) and, infatuated with neurons, claim that brains must be the source of everything, and then declare consciousness epiphenomenal. Empirical expediency can provide spectacular scientific answers. Yet, one should make sure it is not to philosophically ill-posed questions. Investigating "how experience ensues from the brain", rather than exploring a factual claim, betrays a philosophical commitment. Here we examine the thesis of parallelism between cerebral and mental states: "consciousness tells no more than what is going on in the brain; it only tells it in a different language". We retrieve an argument by Henri Bergson to expose the fundamental self-contradiction of parallelism: it forces the idealist to sustain that "the part is the whole", and the realist that "the part subsists when the remainder of the whole vanishes". We then recast Bergson's image-movement theory from Matter and Memory as a way forward to overcome the conceptual dead-end of parallelism. Consciousness is real. So is its special relation to the brain. Differentiating between solidarity (as lesions demonstrate) and equivalence (as no data does) offers an alternative point of departure for an understanding of consciousness that does not, from the outset, outlay a false problem

When the part mirrors the whole: interactions beyond simple location

Reductionists believe that we can make sense of the whole in terms of its parts. Emergentists react and reply that the reductionist program is unattainable partly due to the existence of emergent properties. Under the celebrated banner “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”, such holistic stance is particularly relevant to the study of life and mind, where interactions amongst system components and environment are key. However, both antithetical tendencies of reduction and emergence betray a commitment to what Whitehead called simple location: the idea that things are simply where they are. Here we show the problematic consequences of adopting such a view when trying to understand the notion of identity. Dynamic interactions indeed denote “togetherness”, and yet they are external: no matter how much one is eager to emphasize their role, each element that “inter-acts” still exists and can be thought regardless of any essential reference to other elements. We uncover and reject such stance. Within an organismic philosophy, we propose an alternative based on internal relations, which allow to conceive each relationship entering into the essence of an entity. We discuss the fallacy of simple location in the context of abstraction, and end by drawing its implications for a theory of perception. In sum, we argue that the challenge is to conceive “inter-identities” as "intra-identities". We are not enduring interacting substances, but internally related processes

The False Problem of Consciousness

Philosophers have usually dealt with the problem of consciousness but, in the last decades, neurobiologists have undertaken the daunting task to address it scientifically. In particular, to answer how the brain produces consciousness. Here we question whether it actually does so, seeking to articulate the precise relation between neural activity and subjective experience. There is no doubt that they are intimately related. However, we argue that the thesis of parallelism (that consciousness tells no more than what is going on in the brain, but only in a different language), rather than enunciating an empirical fact, betrays a philosophical commitment. In addition, such equivalence between mental and cerebral states can be shown to lead to self-contradictions (the brain produces the world with itself in it; the brain, as an object in conscious experience, gives rise to conscious experience). Our approach endorses an integration of philosophical and scientific efforts where the scientist seeks to obtain empirically expedient answers to questions that the philosopher has previously formulated in a conceptually precise manner. Namely, that the questions we ask warrant the answers we provide. We posit that the success of an interdisciplinary quest for consciousness hinges on two more challenges: to accept negative proofs as ways forward and, especially, to avoid presenting metaphysical positions as scientific results. Differentiating between solidarity (as brain lesions demonstrate) and equivalence (as no data does) offers an alternative point of departure for understanding consciousness that does not, from the outset, outlay a false problem. The “easy problem” is hard-enough for the “hard problem” to be ill-posed

When the part mirrors the whole: interactions beyond simple location

Reductionists believe that we can make sense of the whole in terms of its parts. Emergentists react and reply that the reductionist program is unattainable partly due to the existence of emergent properties. Under the celebrated banner “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”, such holistic stance is particularly relevant to the study of life and mind, where interactions amongst system components and environment are key. However, both antithetical tendencies of reduction and emergence betray a commitment to what Whitehead called simple location: the idea that things are simply where they are. Here we show the problematic consequences of adopting such a view when trying to understand the notion of identity. Dynamic interactions indeed denote “togetherness”, and yet they are external: no matter how much one is eager to emphasize their role, each element that “inter-acts” still exists and can be thought regardless of any essential reference to other elements. We uncover and reject such stance. Within an organismic philosophy, we propose an alternative based on internal relations, which allow to conceive each relationship entering into the essence of an entity. We discuss the fallacy of simple location in the context of abstraction, and end by drawing its implications for a theory of perception. In sum, we argue that the challenge is to conceive “inter-identities” as "intra-identities". We are not enduring interacting substances, but internally related processes

The luminous shadow of materialism

The so often criticized shadow of materialism, when reflected upon with an integral perspective, reveals itself as a hidden potential seeking emergence. However, such a condition for human progress can be grasped provided we are willing to lessen the tension between the two-fold excess of pride and complaint so characteristic of the illusory attachments of enlightenment and romanticism. An appreciation of the power dormant in the dark pool of light of materialism becomes particularly relevant in the context of the current international year of light